Governance

Land governance in South Sudan is not only central to nation building, but also a major contributor to conflicts, poverty and under development in the post conflict context. To reinforce the crucial role of land rights and the importance of gender equality in access of the rights, the Sustainable Development Goals indicators 1.4.2; 5.a.1 and 5.a.2 monitors the progress of security of land and property rights for both men and women and countries’ legal framework ability to guarantee women’s equal rights to land. The crisis in South Sudan has led to an increase in land-related disputes. Women’s housing, land and property rights are the most affected which significantly increases their vulnerability. Supporting displaced women to change their lives through land governance is significant in securing economic independence toward achieving the Sustainable Development Goals.

Referring to the case of Wau county the paper highlights efforts undertaken to enhance women’s access to land to consolidate peace in South Sudan through improving awareness on women’s rights to land, enhancing institutional capacities from the local to national levels and supporting the land policy formulation process with focus on strengthening the gender perspectives. The paper explores implementation of innovative approaches in fit-for-purpose land administration to enhance women’s access to land and entrenching of gender equality in the development of land policy and land administration practices. With the implementation of the peace agreement, it is recognized that upholding and securing women’s rights to land is crucial in facilitating resettlement, reducing recurrence of conflict and contributing to sustainable peace and stability for better livelihoods envisioned in the Sustainable Development Goals.

International, national and local political discourses often portray the Murle community as principal aggressors and the source of much of the instability affecting former Jonglei State in South Sudan. Although such negative stereotypes are partially driven by actual events, they are also manipulated by certain groups to serve political purposes and informed by the assumption that there is a lack of credible authority structure among the Murle. Changing Power Among Murle Chiefs investigates how Murle customary authorities—in particular, red chiefs—navigate and negotiate political, military and spiritual authority, while simultaneously challenging the view that Murle society has no organic leaderships structures. The challenge is not the absence of leadership structures but rather their abundance and the difficulties they pose for the ability of outsiders to navigate them.

In April 2016, seventeen chiefs from different parts of South Sudan gathered in Kuron Holy Trinity Peace Village, in Eastern Equatoria, to discuss the role of customary authority in governance—past and present—and their own contribution to peacemaking and a future political transition. The Chiefs’ meeting at Kuron was the first time that traditional leaders from areas on opposing sides of the conflict had met in South Sudan since 2013. The discussions, led by the chiefs, lasted three days and covered a wide range of topics including the changing role of traditional leadership, the effects of war, the politicization of chiefship, customary law, security and peacebuilding. This report draws on a transcript of the discussions at Kuron to record the words of the chiefs on a number of these subjects.

Federalism has once again become a central issue in political debate in South Sudan. The idea has a long pedigree in the country’s political history, signifying different things at different times. In Federalism in the history of South Sudanese political thought, Douglas Johnson explains how the idea evolved in the colonial era as part of the southern search for political identity. His paper discusses attitudes towards federalism and the ways it was presented from before Sudan’s independence in 1956, up to South Sudan’s independence today.

The R-ARCSS was designed as an all-encompassing package of measures that would help end the civil war in South Sudan. Yet, in reality it does not efficiently address some of the root causes of the conflict. More than addressing those in a manner that connects both bottom-up and top-down drivers of tension, it focuses on elements of a power-sharing agreement and paves the way for resource sharing arrangements.

This brief examines how and why grievances emerge and how these can be instrumentalized by national and local-level actors to secure access to territory and resources, with significant effect on the political stability and security at the local level. It takes the debate around the number of states as an example of how administrative decisions on sub-state boundaries and the administrative power that derive from those decisions can re-enforced competition over governance and territory. This is best illustrated by increased politization of disputes between the Padang Dink and the Shilluk living on the east bank of the White Nile. The brief ends with a number of takeaways for international actors working to support the peace process in South Sudan.

This paper examines key policy and programmatic considerations for international health and employment
interventions responding to COVID-19 in conflict-affected countries. It outlines a range of important
peacebuilding considerations and highlights significant contributions the World Health Organization (WHO)
and the International Labour Organization (ILO) are making to mitigate the impacts of the pandemic.
By doing so, this paper aims to shed light on the risks and resilience factors that are particularly relevant in
countries recently or currently affected by armed conflict, or where the risk of an outbreak, escalation of, or
relapse into violence is high (for the sake of readability, these situations are hereafter referred to as “conflictaffected”). It suggests how these considerations can best be incorporated into COVID-19 policy responses
and programming, and provides general and practical guidance for how programmes and interventions may
need to be adapted to become optimally effective, do no harm and strengthen prospects for peace. Thus, one
of the main added values of this paper is the link of peace to health.
The paper stems from a partnership among WHO, ILO, Interpeace and the UN Peacebuilding Support
Office (PBSO) of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs.1
This publication targets national
governments/donors, international agencies and civil society engaged in the COVID-19 response specifically
in the areas of health, decent work and employment, and peacebuilding in conflict-affected settings.

On August 25, Transitional Justice Working Group of South Sudan, Human Rights Watch, and Institute for Security Studies held a webinar for the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) members and other officials to discuss the urgency for the establishment of the AU Hybrid Court for South Sudan, as a key factor to ensuring long term stability and accountability for serious crimes in South Sudan.

The initiative came on the heels of a joint letter, signed by 24 South Sudanese, regional and international civil society organizations calling upon the AU PSC to take concrete action to enable the immediate creation of the Hybrid Court on South Sudan (HCSS). In preparation for the webinar, Human Rights Watch published a question and answer document on the three accountability mechanisms provided for in South Sudan’s 2015 and 2018 peace agreements and the rationale for the AU’s unilateral establishment of the hybrid court, available here. On the day of the webinar, the panelists – who represented perspectives from AU officials as well as South Sudanese and international lawyers and activists –presented on accountability mechanisms agreed to by the parties to the conflict and opportunities and challenges to achieving accountability to break the cycles of violence and impunity in South Sudan.

In October 2015, the president of the Republic of South Sudan, Salva Kiir Mayardit, decreed a change in the country’s administrative structure and increased the number of states from 10 to 28.

The entire process had been accompanied by much political speculation and confrontation. What were the reasons for this decision? Was it a good decision for South Sudan? What interests did it serve? Why did it happen at this time? Was dividing South Sudan into 28 states legal and constitutional? What would the consequences be? How would the subdivision into 28 states relate to what had been agreed in the Agreement for the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS) that was signed in August 2015?

The creation of 28 states and the aftermath are only the latest events in a long history of debate and practice on how to divide South Sudan administratively. Recent steps have further invigorated a discussion that has been at times acrimonious, at others exploratory. It is intensely political, as the latest events have shown.

The purpose of this report is not to comment extensively on the latest events, or to recommend what might be the best structure for South Sudan. Rather, its starting point is the persistence of the debate in South Sudanese history. It acknowledges that, regardless of the next developments, there is a need for a structured and informed review of the myriad challenges and opportunities that arise from different administrative structures.

Despite moderate levels of external debt, the combined impact of a civil conflict, a large fall in oil prices, and high levels of fiscal spending has left South Sudan in debt distress. This crisis has caused payment delays on international obligations, on civil servant salaries, and other government obligations. Moreover, international lines of credit have been restructured on longer maturities, international reserves have declined to near exhaustion, and the country is currently constrained from accessing long term external financing. However, assuming implementation of the recently adopted economic adjustment policies and a successful peace process, the debt outlook would improve considerably which could allow for a gradual resumption of external financing. However, vulnerabilities remain high and a
prolonged period of lower oil prices or failure to address the country’s economic and security problems could cause continued debt sustainability problem.

This paper takes a localized conflict over a non-demarcated stretch of the Uganda–South Sudan boundary in 2014 as a starting point for examining the history of territorial state formation on either side of this border since its colonial creation in 1914. It argues that the conflict was an outcome of the long-term constitution of local government territories as patches of the state, making the international border simultaneously a boundary of the local state. Some scholars have seen the limited control of central governments over their borderlands and the intensification of local territorialities as signs of African state fragmentation and failure. But the article argues that this local territoriality should instead be seen as an outcome of ongoing state-formation processes in which state territory has been co-produced through local engagement and appropriation. The paper is thus of wider relevance beyond African or postcolonial history, firstly in contributing a spatial approach to studies of state formation which have sought to replace centre–periphery models with an emphasis on the centrality of the local state. Secondly it advances the broader field of borderlands studies by arguing that international boundaries have been shaped by processes of internal territorialisation as well as by the specific dynamics of cross-border relations and governance. Thirdly it advocates a historical and processual approach to understanding territory, arguing that the patchwork of these states has been fabricated and reworked over the past century, entangling multiple, changing forms and scales of territory in the ongoing constitution of state boundaries.