Peacebuilding

This report focuses on the IGAD-led mediation process from December 2013 to August 2015 to address the conflict in South Sudan. As per a project initiated, led and owned by IGAD, it identifies lessons from the South Sudan peace talks with the aim to inform future IGAD mediation efforts.

These lessons are based on interviews conducted by a team of researchers with mediators, advisers, parties and supporters as well as an analysis of internal IGAD documents concerning the South Sudan peace talks.The report highlights the commitment of IGAD to peacemaking in South Sudan, stepping in within days of the outbreak of violence on 15 December 2013 in Juba, convening an extraordinary Summit and mandating a mediation process led by highly experienced envoys.

IGAD’s resolute action helped to prevent further escalation of violence, kept the parties focused on negotiating a political settlement and produced a comprehensive peace agreement signed in August 2015. However, the August 2015 agreement failed to bring peace to South Sudan. This is because the parties lacked genuine willingness to make peace. This condition indeed characterized the South Sudan peace talks throughout. The report cautions IGAD mediators not to rush the process of negotiations. In the interests of sustainable peace, there may be no alternative to strategic patience until the parties reach a sufficient degree of consensus and reconciliation.When the talks reached a standstill in early 2015, IGAD mediators and partners applied leverage, pushing the parties to sign an agreement. This included increased diplomatic pressure, the imposition of targeted sanctions, the threat of an arms embargo and a directive mediation strategy presenting parties with an agreement on a take it or leave it basis. While this strategy produced an agreement, it undermined the parties’ ownership of the agreement, without which sustainable peace is not possible.

International, national and local political discourses often portray the Murle community as principal aggressors and the source of much of the instability affecting former Jonglei State in South Sudan. Although such negative stereotypes are partially driven by actual events, they are also manipulated by certain groups to serve political purposes and informed by the assumption that there is a lack of credible authority structure among the Murle. Changing Power Among Murle Chiefs investigates how Murle customary authorities—in particular, red chiefs—navigate and negotiate political, military and spiritual authority, while simultaneously challenging the view that Murle society has no organic leaderships structures. The challenge is not the absence of leadership structures but rather their abundance and the difficulties they pose for the ability of outsiders to navigate them.

In April 2016, seventeen chiefs from different parts of South Sudan gathered in Kuron Holy Trinity Peace Village, in Eastern Equatoria, to discuss the role of customary authority in governance—past and present—and their own contribution to peacemaking and a future political transition. The Chiefs’ meeting at Kuron was the first time that traditional leaders from areas on opposing sides of the conflict had met in South Sudan since 2013. The discussions, led by the chiefs, lasted three days and covered a wide range of topics including the changing role of traditional leadership, the effects of war, the politicization of chiefship, customary law, security and peacebuilding. This report draws on a transcript of the discussions at Kuron to record the words of the chiefs on a number of these subjects.

Grounded in the prevalent under-representation of women in peace-building processes, this brief explores why women’s role in peace-building is critical more generally and particularly in South Sudan. Second, the brief examines the opportunities the recent Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCISS) offers women in the upcoming peace-building efforts. Third, it assesses the challenges that hinder the effective participation of women in peace-building. Lastly, it proposes recommendations that may help address this persistent underutilization of women’s vast skills to support durable peace in South Sudan.



The paper argues that women’s role in peace-building is essential. This is because 1) South Sudanese women have played instrumental roles in resolving past conflicts, which gives them experiences and skills that are crucial in the current peace-building process, 2) women’s activities in peace-building support healing and reconciliation efforts, for women are known for bridging conflicted related divides, 3) war impacts on women quite differently, and as such, their needs and peace-building priorities are different from those of men; and 4) it is a constitutional right and an international obligation that women participate in peace-building activities.
The current peace-building phase in South Sudan offers an opportunity for promoting gender equity, advancing the position of women in the society, mainstreaming women’s perspectives in all the pillars of peace-building and increasing their participation in leadership. This could be done through revision of and recommitment to laws and policies to address historical inequalities and root causes of conflict. However, the patriarchal nature of the South Sudanese society and the associated customary laws, the background on which peace-building works are to be executed, has in the past hindered (may still hinder) women’s participation in public life. These factors are exacerbated by the underlying lack of political will, limited funding, ethnic politics, weak institutions, and the high illiteracy rate among women. Further, these factors could be aggravated by the current move to militarize the government, evident by recent appointments of states’ caretaker governors. While some of these issues are associated with the long-term problems of underdevelopment that South Sudan faces, any meaningful change requires immediate progress on all fronts. It remains to be seen what impact the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGNU) will make towards improving gender equity in building sustainable yet inclusive peace.
There is need for gender stratified intensification and tailoring of capacity building efforts, provision of more funding to improve to support women’s role in public life, implementation of the 25% affirmative action across the board, and mainstreaming gender perspectives in all sectors of South Sudan. These initiatives may promote women’s greater participation in peace-building processes, hence sustainable peace.

In April 2016, after considerable foot-dragging, opposition, and obstacles, the two main parties to the conflict in South Sudan that erupted in December 2013 formed a transitional government as mandated in the August 2015 peace agreement. Deadly and escalating violence in multiple parts of the country has since raised serious doubts about the future of the country’s peace and political process. Sustainable peace in South Sudan will continue to be elusive unless leaders make profound and fundamental changes to establish accountability and end impunity.

Accountability was never built into the governance structure of the violent kleptocratic system that the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) established in the aftermath of the 2005 peace deal that ended the 22-year north-south war. By nature, violent kleptocracies hijack governance institutions for the personal financial benefit of those within the ruling network and for the security of the regime. These kleptocracies use extreme violence, including mass atrocities, to maintain their hold on power. In this regard, South Sudan’s governance institutions were hijacked and the ability of these institutions to implement oversight functions was compromised. Wanton corruption by the political elite accelerated to unprecedented levels and further stymied the government’s ability to deliver services to the populace. In 2012, President Salva Kiir estimated that $4 billion was siphoned from the country’s coffers.1 Over the years, many groups and individuals have studied institutional weaknesses in South Sudan. For the elites and their apologists, these weaknesses stem from a capacity shortfall; an affliction that they argue is inherent in processes of establishing new states. The term “capacity building” has become a catchphrase in the donor community, especially in the years immediately following South Sudan’s secession from Sudan. Donors spent a considerable amount of money and energy on capacity- building efforts in almost all sectors, including governance institutions.

Yet the perceived lack of capacity in governance institutions in South Sudan is actually the symptom of a much larger problem. Because governance institutions work at the behest of elite politicians, it is in the interest of these politicians to disable these institutions and limit their ability to play their role in oversight, regulation, and providing checks and balances on other parts of the government.

This coercion is manifest in a number of ways. First, elite politicians starve governance institutions of the funds required to enable them to perform their duties. Second, mandates to uphold accountability are undercut through the legal system. Third, elite politicians ensure that allies receive leadership positions in some of these institutions in order to wield control over their activities, and ultimately to undermine and counter the fight against graft.

 This report refers to the “government” and “transitional government” in South Sudan, using the terms interchangeably and acknowledging the many uncertainties about the status of the government and situation at the time of writing.

2 The Enough Project • enoughproject.org

A Hope From Within?

Countering the intentional destruction of governance and transparency in South Sudan

The perceived lack of capacity in governance institutions in South Sudan is actually the symptom of a much larger problem.

This report, based on information collected before the transitional government formed in April 2016 and before violence escalated in Juba in July 2016, reviews the weaknesses of three of South Sudan’s governance institutions that are most critical to establishing accountability: the Anti-Corruption Commission, the National Audit Chamber, and the Public Accounts Committee in the National Legislative Assembly. All three institutions face considerable operational challenges that have undercut their effectiveness in implementing their constitutional mandates. Drawing on field research, this paper shows that the weaknesses of governance institutions in South Sudan stem from deliberate efforts by elite politicians to stymie these institutions’ capacity to perform their core functions to promote government accountability.

In the right political atmosphere and with the right political incentives for reform, these institutions could, however, exercise their roles effectively. The weaknesses can be addressed; they are not inevitable. The weaknesses are instilled in large part by elite kleptocrats. With genuine political will for institutional effectiveness from top leadership, supported by pressure and incentives from international partners with South Sudanese leaders, these critical governance institutions could fulfill their mandates.

It is imperative for South Sudan’s leaders to understand the significance of strong and viable institutions in fostering accountability, and most importantly, credibility for the government. Equally, it is crucial that South Sudan’s top political leaders understand that grand, competitive corruption increases the likelihood of conflict and state collapse.

It is therefore imperative that the transitional government take all the necessary steps to reform institutions of governance as stipulated in the August 2015 peace agreement, or else it could find itself presiding over the disintegration of the state.

This briefing argues that, if a leveraged focus on SDG 16 was necessary before COVID-19, it is imperative now – not just insalvaging the 2030 Agenda in the places where it matters most, but also in damping down the potential for far greater and more durable violent conflict.

Across the African continent, 268 million people practice pastoralism, both as a way of life and a livelihood strategy, contributing between 10 to 44 percent of the GDP of African countries. In recent years, this adaptive animal production system has faced growing external threats due to issues such as climate change, political instability, agricultural expansion, and rural ban-ditry that have transformed the rangelands in which they operate. From Mali to South Sudan, governments, regional bodies, peacebuilders, development agencies, environmentalists, economists, and security forces are actively attempting to address the sources of violence and instability that affect both pastoral communities and the rural societies with whom they share resources and landscapes.

These interventions are often shaped by differing assumptions about the source and nature of these conflicts, despite the avail-ability of extensive research and analysis. Though the local dynamics of conflict vary across different contexts, a number of trends and debates appear throughout the literature on pastoralism and conflict. This review draws on several hundred sources to synthesize the major points of consensus and divergence in the existing literature and identify relevant research gaps. This anal-ysis presents data from across Sudano-Sahelian West and Central Africa, to link comparable findings that are often presented in isolation.

Although conflicts over land and water resources in the Sudano-Sahel have long been a political concern and were a major point of contention in the colonial and post-independence eras, they have gained prominence in recent years due to the ongoing spread of violence, instability, and displacement across the region. Latent tensions over resource access and control, which his-torically only occasionally led to violence, have now erupted in some cases into cycles of mass killings and reprisals. In Nigeria, escalating rural banditry and reprisal violence between farmers and pastoralists has left thousands dead and many more dis-placed. In central Mali, the escalation of these conflicts culminated in the massacre of 160 members of the Fulani ethno-linguis-tic and traditionally pastoralist group in Ogossagou in March of 2019, as well as ensuing reprisal violence. And, across Sudan, South Sudan, and the Central African Republic (CAR), conflicts relating to livestock migration and cattle theft have played a critical and destabilizing role in internal insurgencies and cross-border conflict. For these reasons and more, conflict dynamics relating to pastoralism and pastoral communities have become a shared policy priority throughout the region.

As the practice of the protection of civilians (POC) has evolved in peacekeeping missions, the UN has increasingly focused on “people-centered” approaches. As a result, community engagement has emerged as a core component of POC efforts. By engaging with communities, missions can build trust, gather information, and build a protective environment, ultimately improving their ability to protect civilians.

This paper examines the positive implications and impact of this increased focus on community engagement, as well as the challenges and risks it can pose for communities and missions. It analyzes the community engagement activities of the military, police, and civilian components of the UN missions in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, and South Sudan. The paper concludes with recommendations for these four missions, the UN Secretariat, and UN member states on the Security Council:

UN member states should continue to refine the language on community engagement in peacekeeping mandates.
The UN Secretariat should develop more in-depth modules on community engagement in relevant training materials.
Relevant UN stakeholders should explore how missions’ military personnel can improve their community engagement.
The UN Secretariat and missions should optimize their use of community liaison assistants.
The UN Department of Peace Operations should continue to explore where the unarmed civilian protection methodology could complement community engagement by UN missions.

The relationship between what would become South Sudan and China started with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 between the old Sudan and Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). Oil, a major trigger of the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005), continued to fuel the violent conflict, which led to the partition of the largest country on the African continent. Driven by the opening-up policy as an important vehicle of the Chinese reform trajectory, China found itself drawn into the Sudanese conflict. Underpinned by its scramble to invest in the oil industry overseas and to acquire energy to fuel its booming economy, China took part in the conflict by supporting the government of Sudan militarily, economically and politically against the SPLM/A. As soon as the CPA was signed, China started to court the SPLM and newly formed Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) led by the SPLM in Juba. Surprisingly, the leadership of the SPLM overlooked the belligerent past and opted for cooperation with China. Why?

This paper will discuss a handful of issue: the pragmatic approach to cooperation in the light of the opening-up policy of China and its role in the war of liberation of South Sudan; how the realities of The Comprehensive Peace Agreement drove China’s quest to court the SPLM and GoSS during the interim period; how oil became a double-edged sword in the context of African agency; and role of China in the partition of old Sudan and the challenge to the doctrine of non-interference. This paper has mainly utilized data collected during fieldwork research in the form of interviews with so-called elites and the review of official documents.

This paper examines key policy and programmatic considerations for international health and employment
interventions responding to COVID-19 in conflict-affected countries. It outlines a range of important
peacebuilding considerations and highlights significant contributions the World Health Organization (WHO)
and the International Labour Organization (ILO) are making to mitigate the impacts of the pandemic.
By doing so, this paper aims to shed light on the risks and resilience factors that are particularly relevant in
countries recently or currently affected by armed conflict, or where the risk of an outbreak, escalation of, or
relapse into violence is high (for the sake of readability, these situations are hereafter referred to as “conflictaffected”). It suggests how these considerations can best be incorporated into COVID-19 policy responses
and programming, and provides general and practical guidance for how programmes and interventions may
need to be adapted to become optimally effective, do no harm and strengthen prospects for peace. Thus, one
of the main added values of this paper is the link of peace to health.
The paper stems from a partnership among WHO, ILO, Interpeace and the UN Peacebuilding Support
Office (PBSO) of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs.1
This publication targets national
governments/donors, international agencies and civil society engaged in the COVID-19 response specifically
in the areas of health, decent work and employment, and peacebuilding in conflict-affected settings.