Peacebuilding

South Sudan’s customary authorities play an important role in local government, justice, and as intermediaries or brokers between local communities and the government. While significant attention was paid to the role of customary authorities in South Sudan’s state building project prior to the country’s secession in 2011, the start of South Sudan’s civil war in December 2013 reoriented the focus towards humanitarian activities. Making Order Out of Disorder, which synthesizes and expands on the reports from RVI’s South Sudan Customary Authorities project, refocuses attention back to their position and importance in the country today.
The report considers the hybrid role of customary authorities in governance, the part they play in defining customs, and the evolving nature of chiefship within a rapidly changing and urbanizing society. It concludes that chiefs, and other customary authorities, have retained a meaningful role within South Sudan and do not constitute a static system of governance or affiliation. Given this, there is real value in including them within peacebuilding and other discussions about the future of the country.

Taking the current presence of South Sudanese refugees in northern Uganda as a case-study, this paper explores how different forms of mobility enable them to better cope with the harsh conditions caused by their displacement.
Based on extensive field research, the results of this article show how for South Sudanese refugees, crossing borders can be empowering, although these complex strategies do not fit within the mutually exclusive ‘durable solutions’ proposed by the international refugee regime. Looking through a transnational lens, it is illustrated how different forms of movement enable the refugees to hold on to certain aspects of ‘normal life’, such as
being employed, enacting customs and visiting loved ones, blurring the distinction between voluntary and forced migration.
This results in a deepening of transnational networks as the generally large South Sudanese families find their members dispersed across Ugandan and South Sudanese town centres, villages, refugee settlements and third countries in Africa and elsewhere

Mounting peace agreements and numerous ceasefire violations have resulted in sustained international pressure on South Sudan’s leaders to end a civil war that has displaced some 4 million people and created a severe humanitarian crisis. In an effort to address the root causes of the crisis, South Sudan’s president, Salva Kiir Mayardit, announced his government’s intention to initiate a national dialogue process in December 2016. While dialogue should be welcomed as a necessary part of peacemaking and reconciliation, South Sudan’s national dialogue process has had its fair share of skepticism and even opposition.
The sixth annual Juba Lecture Series, held in November 2017, focused on themes of dialogue at both the local and national levels. The lectures—a collaboration with the Institute for Justice and Peace Studies at Catholic University of South Sudan, with support from the Australian Embassy in Addis Ababa—are designed to support local knowledge and provide a safe, open space for debate on key issues. This text forms a summary of some of the key debates that were held during the Juba Lecture Series 2017.

This publication provides perspectives from leading analysts and scholars on the dilemmas groups raise for security provision, the South Sudanese state and peacebuilding nationally. It reviews three of the most significant actors – the arrow boys, gelweng and the White Armies – from the ground up, highlighting the need for local peace and security engagement to be based on a better understanding of their diverse roles and histories.

This report focuses on the IGAD-led mediation process from December 2013 to August 2015 to address the conflict in South Sudan. As per a project initiated, led and owned by IGAD, it identifies lessons from the South Sudan peace talks with the aim to inform future IGAD mediation efforts.

These lessons are based on interviews conducted by a team of researchers with mediators, advisers, parties and supporters as well as an analysis of internal IGAD documents concerning the South Sudan peace talks.The report highlights the commitment of IGAD to peacemaking in South Sudan, stepping in within days of the outbreak of violence on 15 December 2013 in Juba, convening an extraordinary Summit and mandating a mediation process led by highly experienced envoys.

IGAD’s resolute action helped to prevent further escalation of violence, kept the parties focused on negotiating a political settlement and produced a comprehensive peace agreement signed in August 2015. However, the August 2015 agreement failed to bring peace to South Sudan. This is because the parties lacked genuine willingness to make peace. This condition indeed characterized the South Sudan peace talks throughout. The report cautions IGAD mediators not to rush the process of negotiations. In the interests of sustainable peace, there may be no alternative to strategic patience until the parties reach a sufficient degree of consensus and reconciliation.When the talks reached a standstill in early 2015, IGAD mediators and partners applied leverage, pushing the parties to sign an agreement. This included increased diplomatic pressure, the imposition of targeted sanctions, the threat of an arms embargo and a directive mediation strategy presenting parties with an agreement on a take it or leave it basis. While this strategy produced an agreement, it undermined the parties’ ownership of the agreement, without which sustainable peace is not possible.

International, national and local political discourses often portray the Murle community as principal aggressors and the source of much of the instability affecting former Jonglei State in South Sudan. Although such negative stereotypes are partially driven by actual events, they are also manipulated by certain groups to serve political purposes and informed by the assumption that there is a lack of credible authority structure among the Murle. Changing Power Among Murle Chiefs investigates how Murle customary authorities—in particular, red chiefs—navigate and negotiate political, military and spiritual authority, while simultaneously challenging the view that Murle society has no organic leaderships structures. The challenge is not the absence of leadership structures but rather their abundance and the difficulties they pose for the ability of outsiders to navigate them.

In April 2016, seventeen chiefs from different parts of South Sudan gathered in Kuron Holy Trinity Peace Village, in Eastern Equatoria, to discuss the role of customary authority in governance—past and present—and their own contribution to peacemaking and a future political transition. The Chiefs’ meeting at Kuron was the first time that traditional leaders from areas on opposing sides of the conflict had met in South Sudan since 2013. The discussions, led by the chiefs, lasted three days and covered a wide range of topics including the changing role of traditional leadership, the effects of war, the politicization of chiefship, customary law, security and peacebuilding. This report draws on a transcript of the discussions at Kuron to record the words of the chiefs on a number of these subjects.

Grounded in the prevalent under-representation of women in peace-building processes, this brief explores why women’s role in peace-building is critical more generally and particularly in South Sudan. Second, the brief examines the opportunities the recent Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCISS) offers women in the upcoming peace-building efforts. Third, it assesses the challenges that hinder the effective participation of women in peace-building. Lastly, it proposes recommendations that may help address this persistent underutilization of women’s vast skills to support durable peace in South Sudan.



The paper argues that women’s role in peace-building is essential. This is because 1) South Sudanese women have played instrumental roles in resolving past conflicts, which gives them experiences and skills that are crucial in the current peace-building process, 2) women’s activities in peace-building support healing and reconciliation efforts, for women are known for bridging conflicted related divides, 3) war impacts on women quite differently, and as such, their needs and peace-building priorities are different from those of men; and 4) it is a constitutional right and an international obligation that women participate in peace-building activities.
The current peace-building phase in South Sudan offers an opportunity for promoting gender equity, advancing the position of women in the society, mainstreaming women’s perspectives in all the pillars of peace-building and increasing their participation in leadership. This could be done through revision of and recommitment to laws and policies to address historical inequalities and root causes of conflict. However, the patriarchal nature of the South Sudanese society and the associated customary laws, the background on which peace-building works are to be executed, has in the past hindered (may still hinder) women’s participation in public life. These factors are exacerbated by the underlying lack of political will, limited funding, ethnic politics, weak institutions, and the high illiteracy rate among women. Further, these factors could be aggravated by the current move to militarize the government, evident by recent appointments of states’ caretaker governors. While some of these issues are associated with the long-term problems of underdevelopment that South Sudan faces, any meaningful change requires immediate progress on all fronts. It remains to be seen what impact the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGNU) will make towards improving gender equity in building sustainable yet inclusive peace.
There is need for gender stratified intensification and tailoring of capacity building efforts, provision of more funding to improve to support women’s role in public life, implementation of the 25% affirmative action across the board, and mainstreaming gender perspectives in all sectors of South Sudan. These initiatives may promote women’s greater participation in peace-building processes, hence sustainable peace.

In April 2016, after considerable foot-dragging, opposition, and obstacles, the two main parties to the conflict in South Sudan that erupted in December 2013 formed a transitional government as mandated in the August 2015 peace agreement. Deadly and escalating violence in multiple parts of the country has since raised serious doubts about the future of the country’s peace and political process. Sustainable peace in South Sudan will continue to be elusive unless leaders make profound and fundamental changes to establish accountability and end impunity.

Accountability was never built into the governance structure of the violent kleptocratic system that the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) established in the aftermath of the 2005 peace deal that ended the 22-year north-south war. By nature, violent kleptocracies hijack governance institutions for the personal financial benefit of those within the ruling network and for the security of the regime. These kleptocracies use extreme violence, including mass atrocities, to maintain their hold on power. In this regard, South Sudan’s governance institutions were hijacked and the ability of these institutions to implement oversight functions was compromised. Wanton corruption by the political elite accelerated to unprecedented levels and further stymied the government’s ability to deliver services to the populace. In 2012, President Salva Kiir estimated that $4 billion was siphoned from the country’s coffers.1 Over the years, many groups and individuals have studied institutional weaknesses in South Sudan. For the elites and their apologists, these weaknesses stem from a capacity shortfall; an affliction that they argue is inherent in processes of establishing new states. The term “capacity building” has become a catchphrase in the donor community, especially in the years immediately following South Sudan’s secession from Sudan. Donors spent a considerable amount of money and energy on capacity- building efforts in almost all sectors, including governance institutions.

Yet the perceived lack of capacity in governance institutions in South Sudan is actually the symptom of a much larger problem. Because governance institutions work at the behest of elite politicians, it is in the interest of these politicians to disable these institutions and limit their ability to play their role in oversight, regulation, and providing checks and balances on other parts of the government.

This coercion is manifest in a number of ways. First, elite politicians starve governance institutions of the funds required to enable them to perform their duties. Second, mandates to uphold accountability are undercut through the legal system. Third, elite politicians ensure that allies receive leadership positions in some of these institutions in order to wield control over their activities, and ultimately to undermine and counter the fight against graft.

 This report refers to the “government” and “transitional government” in South Sudan, using the terms interchangeably and acknowledging the many uncertainties about the status of the government and situation at the time of writing.

2 The Enough Project • enoughproject.org

A Hope From Within?

Countering the intentional destruction of governance and transparency in South Sudan

The perceived lack of capacity in governance institutions in South Sudan is actually the symptom of a much larger problem.

This report, based on information collected before the transitional government formed in April 2016 and before violence escalated in Juba in July 2016, reviews the weaknesses of three of South Sudan’s governance institutions that are most critical to establishing accountability: the Anti-Corruption Commission, the National Audit Chamber, and the Public Accounts Committee in the National Legislative Assembly. All three institutions face considerable operational challenges that have undercut their effectiveness in implementing their constitutional mandates. Drawing on field research, this paper shows that the weaknesses of governance institutions in South Sudan stem from deliberate efforts by elite politicians to stymie these institutions’ capacity to perform their core functions to promote government accountability.

In the right political atmosphere and with the right political incentives for reform, these institutions could, however, exercise their roles effectively. The weaknesses can be addressed; they are not inevitable. The weaknesses are instilled in large part by elite kleptocrats. With genuine political will for institutional effectiveness from top leadership, supported by pressure and incentives from international partners with South Sudanese leaders, these critical governance institutions could fulfill their mandates.

It is imperative for South Sudan’s leaders to understand the significance of strong and viable institutions in fostering accountability, and most importantly, credibility for the government. Equally, it is crucial that South Sudan’s top political leaders understand that grand, competitive corruption increases the likelihood of conflict and state collapse.

It is therefore imperative that the transitional government take all the necessary steps to reform institutions of governance as stipulated in the August 2015 peace agreement, or else it could find itself presiding over the disintegration of the state.

This briefing argues that, if a leveraged focus on SDG 16 was necessary before COVID-19, it is imperative now – not just insalvaging the 2030 Agenda in the places where it matters most, but also in damping down the potential for far greater and more durable violent conflict.