Peacebuilding

In April 2016, seventeen chiefs from different parts of South Sudan gathered in Kuron Holy Trinity Peace Village, in Eastern Equatoria, to discuss the role of customary authority in governance—past and present—and their own contribution to peacemaking and a future political transition. The Chiefs’ meeting at Kuron was the first time that traditional leaders from areas on opposing sides of the conflict had met in South Sudan since 2013. The discussions, led by the chiefs, lasted three days and covered a wide range of topics including the changing role of traditional leadership, the effects of war, the politicization of chiefship, customary law, security and peacebuilding. This report draws on a transcript of the discussions at Kuron to record the words of the chiefs on a number of these subjects.

Grounded in the prevalent under-representation of women in peace-building processes, this brief explores why women’s role in peace-building is critical more generally and particularly in South Sudan. Second, the brief examines the opportunities the recent Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCISS) offers women in the upcoming peace-building efforts. Third, it assesses the challenges that hinder the effective participation of women in peace-building. Lastly, it proposes recommendations that may help address this persistent underutilization of women’s vast skills to support durable peace in South Sudan.



The paper argues that women’s role in peace-building is essential. This is because 1) South Sudanese women have played instrumental roles in resolving past conflicts, which gives them experiences and skills that are crucial in the current peace-building process, 2) women’s activities in peace-building support healing and reconciliation efforts, for women are known for bridging conflicted related divides, 3) war impacts on women quite differently, and as such, their needs and peace-building priorities are different from those of men; and 4) it is a constitutional right and an international obligation that women participate in peace-building activities.
The current peace-building phase in South Sudan offers an opportunity for promoting gender equity, advancing the position of women in the society, mainstreaming women’s perspectives in all the pillars of peace-building and increasing their participation in leadership. This could be done through revision of and recommitment to laws and policies to address historical inequalities and root causes of conflict. However, the patriarchal nature of the South Sudanese society and the associated customary laws, the background on which peace-building works are to be executed, has in the past hindered (may still hinder) women’s participation in public life. These factors are exacerbated by the underlying lack of political will, limited funding, ethnic politics, weak institutions, and the high illiteracy rate among women. Further, these factors could be aggravated by the current move to militarize the government, evident by recent appointments of states’ caretaker governors. While some of these issues are associated with the long-term problems of underdevelopment that South Sudan faces, any meaningful change requires immediate progress on all fronts. It remains to be seen what impact the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGNU) will make towards improving gender equity in building sustainable yet inclusive peace.
There is need for gender stratified intensification and tailoring of capacity building efforts, provision of more funding to improve to support women’s role in public life, implementation of the 25% affirmative action across the board, and mainstreaming gender perspectives in all sectors of South Sudan. These initiatives may promote women’s greater participation in peace-building processes, hence sustainable peace.

In April 2016, after considerable foot-dragging, opposition, and obstacles, the two main parties to the conflict in South Sudan that erupted in December 2013 formed a transitional government as mandated in the August 2015 peace agreement. Deadly and escalating violence in multiple parts of the country has since raised serious doubts about the future of the country’s peace and political process. Sustainable peace in South Sudan will continue to be elusive unless leaders make profound and fundamental changes to establish accountability and end impunity.

Accountability was never built into the governance structure of the violent kleptocratic system that the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) established in the aftermath of the 2005 peace deal that ended the 22-year north-south war. By nature, violent kleptocracies hijack governance institutions for the personal financial benefit of those within the ruling network and for the security of the regime. These kleptocracies use extreme violence, including mass atrocities, to maintain their hold on power. In this regard, South Sudan’s governance institutions were hijacked and the ability of these institutions to implement oversight functions was compromised. Wanton corruption by the political elite accelerated to unprecedented levels and further stymied the government’s ability to deliver services to the populace. In 2012, President Salva Kiir estimated that $4 billion was siphoned from the country’s coffers.1 Over the years, many groups and individuals have studied institutional weaknesses in South Sudan. For the elites and their apologists, these weaknesses stem from a capacity shortfall; an affliction that they argue is inherent in processes of establishing new states. The term “capacity building” has become a catchphrase in the donor community, especially in the years immediately following South Sudan’s secession from Sudan. Donors spent a considerable amount of money and energy on capacity- building efforts in almost all sectors, including governance institutions.

Yet the perceived lack of capacity in governance institutions in South Sudan is actually the symptom of a much larger problem. Because governance institutions work at the behest of elite politicians, it is in the interest of these politicians to disable these institutions and limit their ability to play their role in oversight, regulation, and providing checks and balances on other parts of the government.

This coercion is manifest in a number of ways. First, elite politicians starve governance institutions of the funds required to enable them to perform their duties. Second, mandates to uphold accountability are undercut through the legal system. Third, elite politicians ensure that allies receive leadership positions in some of these institutions in order to wield control over their activities, and ultimately to undermine and counter the fight against graft.

 This report refers to the “government” and “transitional government” in South Sudan, using the terms interchangeably and acknowledging the many uncertainties about the status of the government and situation at the time of writing.

2 The Enough Project • enoughproject.org

A Hope From Within?

Countering the intentional destruction of governance and transparency in South Sudan

The perceived lack of capacity in governance institutions in South Sudan is actually the symptom of a much larger problem.

This report, based on information collected before the transitional government formed in April 2016 and before violence escalated in Juba in July 2016, reviews the weaknesses of three of South Sudan’s governance institutions that are most critical to establishing accountability: the Anti-Corruption Commission, the National Audit Chamber, and the Public Accounts Committee in the National Legislative Assembly. All three institutions face considerable operational challenges that have undercut their effectiveness in implementing their constitutional mandates. Drawing on field research, this paper shows that the weaknesses of governance institutions in South Sudan stem from deliberate efforts by elite politicians to stymie these institutions’ capacity to perform their core functions to promote government accountability.

In the right political atmosphere and with the right political incentives for reform, these institutions could, however, exercise their roles effectively. The weaknesses can be addressed; they are not inevitable. The weaknesses are instilled in large part by elite kleptocrats. With genuine political will for institutional effectiveness from top leadership, supported by pressure and incentives from international partners with South Sudanese leaders, these critical governance institutions could fulfill their mandates.

It is imperative for South Sudan’s leaders to understand the significance of strong and viable institutions in fostering accountability, and most importantly, credibility for the government. Equally, it is crucial that South Sudan’s top political leaders understand that grand, competitive corruption increases the likelihood of conflict and state collapse.

It is therefore imperative that the transitional government take all the necessary steps to reform institutions of governance as stipulated in the August 2015 peace agreement, or else it could find itself presiding over the disintegration of the state.

Across the African continent, 268 million people practice pastoralism, both as a way of life and a livelihood strategy, contributing between 10 to 44 percent of the GDP of African countries. In recent years, this adaptive animal production system has faced growing external threats due to issues such as climate change, political instability, agricultural expansion, and rural ban-ditry that have transformed the rangelands in which they operate. From Mali to South Sudan, governments, regional bodies, peacebuilders, development agencies, environmentalists, economists, and security forces are actively attempting to address the sources of violence and instability that affect both pastoral communities and the rural societies with whom they share resources and landscapes.

These interventions are often shaped by differing assumptions about the source and nature of these conflicts, despite the avail-ability of extensive research and analysis. Though the local dynamics of conflict vary across different contexts, a number of trends and debates appear throughout the literature on pastoralism and conflict. This review draws on several hundred sources to synthesize the major points of consensus and divergence in the existing literature and identify relevant research gaps. This anal-ysis presents data from across Sudano-Sahelian West and Central Africa, to link comparable findings that are often presented in isolation.

Although conflicts over land and water resources in the Sudano-Sahel have long been a political concern and were a major point of contention in the colonial and post-independence eras, they have gained prominence in recent years due to the ongoing spread of violence, instability, and displacement across the region. Latent tensions over resource access and control, which his-torically only occasionally led to violence, have now erupted in some cases into cycles of mass killings and reprisals. In Nigeria, escalating rural banditry and reprisal violence between farmers and pastoralists has left thousands dead and many more dis-placed. In central Mali, the escalation of these conflicts culminated in the massacre of 160 members of the Fulani ethno-linguis-tic and traditionally pastoralist group in Ogossagou in March of 2019, as well as ensuing reprisal violence. And, across Sudan, South Sudan, and the Central African Republic (CAR), conflicts relating to livestock migration and cattle theft have played a critical and destabilizing role in internal insurgencies and cross-border conflict. For these reasons and more, conflict dynamics relating to pastoralism and pastoral communities have become a shared policy priority throughout the region.

The relationship between what would become South Sudan and China started with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 between the old Sudan and Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). Oil, a major trigger of the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005), continued to fuel the violent conflict, which led to the partition of the largest country on the African continent. Driven by the opening-up policy as an important vehicle of the Chinese reform trajectory, China found itself drawn into the Sudanese conflict. Underpinned by its scramble to invest in the oil industry overseas and to acquire energy to fuel its booming economy, China took part in the conflict by supporting the government of Sudan militarily, economically and politically against the SPLM/A. As soon as the CPA was signed, China started to court the SPLM and newly formed Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) led by the SPLM in Juba. Surprisingly, the leadership of the SPLM overlooked the belligerent past and opted for cooperation with China. Why?

This paper will discuss a handful of issue: the pragmatic approach to cooperation in the light of the opening-up policy of China and its role in the war of liberation of South Sudan; how the realities of The Comprehensive Peace Agreement drove China’s quest to court the SPLM and GoSS during the interim period; how oil became a double-edged sword in the context of African agency; and role of China in the partition of old Sudan and the challenge to the doctrine of non-interference. This paper has mainly utilized data collected during fieldwork research in the form of interviews with so-called elites and the review of official documents.

Investment in overseas developmental projects is a multifaceted effort which involves a variety of actors. These include donor governments and their departments for international aid, international organisations, recipient governments and the societies in the recipient countries. With relation to the latter, the existence of an active civil society has been identified as crucial for the advancement of socio-political reforms (Putnam 1995; Kaldor 2003; Neumayer 2005). Certainly, aid providers have become more aware of the need to take civil society into account when supporting initiatives aiming to promote democratisation, human rights, and human security in general. The United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID), and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), two of the largest government-supported aid agencies, have invested resources in exploring the importance of civil society in recipient countries and the avenues for encouraging its further development (DFID 2012; Giffen and Judge 2010; USAID 2014).

More recent works on civil society have recognised, though, the fact that such actors are not confined to particular territorial boundaries. Civil society campaigns are often global, involving elements that operate at the international and transnational levels. One element, nevertheless, has been overall neglected by both policymakers and scholars examining transnational civil society, and that is diaspora communities. The refugees of previous decades, which have evolved into well-established communities in the West, have traditionally played pivotal roles in the reconstruction of their homelands. But as time has gone by, they have become involved in other aspects of state- and society-building in the homeland. As the paper concludes, while there is undoubtedly eagerness among highly motivated and talented diasporans to contribute to social and political changes in the homeland, on the ground, there are difficulties and challenges. These challenges may limit the contribution and hinder diasporan integration in, and contribution to, activism in the homeland. Aid providers and donors should develop clear strategies to incorporate diaspora communities in development programmes. Such integration would help not only to utilise the advantages that diaspora returnees possess when participating in civil society campaigns in the homeland, but could also help these returnees to overcome potential challenges that they face.

Survivors of conflict-related sexual violence continue to struggle to access adequate medical and mental health care, according to a new report issued by the United Nations Mission in South Sudan and the UN Human Rights Office.

“The COVID-19 pandemic has made it clear, if there was ever any doubt, just how important it is for everyone to have immediate and adequate access to health care,” said UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet. “For the survivors of conflict-related sexual violence, it goes beyond treating their physical injuries and psychological trauma. It is quite simply a crucial step in giving them a chance to rebuild their lives and the lives of their families.”

The report, titled “Access to Health for Survivors of Conflict-Related Sexual Violence in South Sudan,” takes an in-depth look at the adequacy of health care available in Unity and the Central and Western Equatorian regions, which account for 85 percent of conflict-related sexual violence cases documented between January 2018 and January 2020.

It found that funding for public health care in South Sudan has not been prioritized, with just 1.2 percent (USD 14 million) of the national budget allocated for this purpose. This has resulted in international organizations using donor funding to try to fill the gap. Despite the enormous financial investment, the medical response for survivors of sexual violence remains weak.

Prophets—those recognised as having been ‘seized’ by a divinity—have played an important role in the history of South Sudan, particularly that of the Nuer people. They were seen as being powerful political actors and, alongside chiefs, important intermediaries for the colonial authorities. However, the influence of the Nuer prophets goes much further than mobilizing or de-mobilizing the Nuer population to or from violence. In the UN Protection of Civilians Site (POCS) in Bentiu, where over one hundred thousand war-displaced now live, the histories of the prophets have become a means through which POCS residents explain both the spiritual causes of war and their current predicament.
Speaking Truth to Power focuses on the life of Kolang Ket—a major prophet in the early twentieth century. His story, as recounted in the Bentiu POCS, includes his seizure by the deity known as MAANI, how he has wielded political authority and his legacy, which extends to the present day. Acknowledging the influence of the prophets is important to those trying to understand the contemporary political reality of South Sudan. This, by extension, can help external actors to assist the South Sudanese population in shaping a more sustainable, locally relevant peace, which goes beyond the fragile elite deals normally agreed by the country’s politicians.

South Sudan, which separated from Sudan in 2011 after nearly 40 years of civil war, was embroiled in a
new devastating conflict at the end of 2013. This happened when political disputes coupled with preexisting ethnic and political fault lines became brutal. This conflict has mostly targeted civilians and most often, ethnic groups, and warring parties have been accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The conflict has resulted in a major humanitarian crisis, mass displacement and mass atrocities against South Sudanese citizens. Notwithstanding, instability in South Sudan has made the country one of the most dangerous countries for humanitarian aid workers in the world, especially as majority of them have lost their lives during their operation. In view of this, the article seeks to interrogate the main driving forces that triggered the deadly conflict and also the ramifications brought upon the population as well as the country.

Previous research has primarily focused on the EU’s high-profile involvement as direct mediator in peace negotiations. Conversely, less attention has been devoted to the EU’s support to third parties’ mediation efforts, which is a significant component of its mediation activities. Addressing this research gap, this article develops a conceptual framework for the systematic analysis of EU mediation support, identifying key mediation support techniques and the conditions for their success. In terms of mediation support techniques, the EU may rely on “endorsement”, “coordination”, “assistance”, and “lending leverage” to empower and steer third party mediators in line with its mediation objectives and values. We illustrate the utility of the conceptual framework for the EU’s support to IGAD in mediating in South Sudan’s civil war. We find that the EU has contributed significantly to IGAD’s empowerment in terms of endorsement, coordination, assistance, and lending leverage. Simultaneously, our analysis also points to important challenges in the EU-IGAD relationship, which relate to challenges concerning strategic engagement with IGAD’s internal politics that are marked by diverging interests and ties of its member states to the conflict parties.