Governance

There are numerous issues that continue to undermine the full realisation of HLP rights for the people of South Sudan and HLP is recognized as a growing key protection concern across the country. The HLP Technical Working Group (HLP TWG) strives to ensure the integration of HLP rights and concerns in humanitarian responses, and to ensure that key affected populations are supported. This note summarizes the key HLP challenges in South Sudan and provides recommendations for various stakeholders to better inform advocacy and programming.

The relationship between what would become South Sudan and China started with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 between the old Sudan and Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). Oil, a major trigger of the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005), continued to fuel the violent conflict, which led to the partition of the largest country on the African continent. Driven by the opening-up policy as an important vehicle of the Chinese reform trajectory, China found itself drawn into the Sudanese conflict. Underpinned by its scramble to invest in the oil industry overseas and to acquire energy to fuel its booming economy, China took part in the conflict by supporting the government of Sudan militarily, economically and politically against the SPLM/A. As soon as the CPA was signed, China started to court the SPLM and newly formed Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) led by the SPLM in Juba. Surprisingly, the leadership of the SPLM overlooked the belligerent past and opted for cooperation with China. Why?

This paper will discuss a handful of issue: the pragmatic approach to cooperation in the light of the opening-up policy of China and its role in the war of liberation of South Sudan; how the realities of The Comprehensive Peace Agreement drove China’s quest to court the SPLM and GoSS during the interim period; how oil became a double-edged sword in the context of African agency; and role of China in the partition of old Sudan and the challenge to the doctrine of non-interference. This paper has mainly utilized data collected during fieldwork research in the form of interviews with so-called elites and the review of official documents.

The implementation of the R-ARCSS is stalled, as the parties have had difficulty gathering sufficient momentum to push the Agreement forward.
The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic has had serious negative impacts on the ability of the parties to implement the Agreement.
The crush of oil prices in the global market, South Sudan’s lack of credit worthiness internationally, US Treasury’s warnings, corruption, and South Sudan’s weak fiscal and monetary policies, all make it difficult for the country to access external resources to cushion budget shortfalls.
While the economic downturn as a result of the pandemic has dried up the public coffers, a combination of distrust among the parties and lack of political will is the most important factor hampering the implementation of the R-ARCSS.
To turn things around, leadership of the parties to the Agreement must renew their commitment to the Agreement and show by actions their willingness to move the country forward, possibly attracting external budgetary supports.
The international community needs to push the parties to live by their commitments and also contribute necessary financial and material resources to enable the parties to overcome the economic consequences of COVID-19. Significant donor reengagement will require evidence of significantly higher political will for peace in South Sudan.
The formation of state government is extremely critical to combating the pandemic and to restoring peace at the grassroots, which will help protect people from the virus and reduce cattle raiding and communal violence. Recent developments toward this issue are commendable.
Provisions aimed at returning to democracy and good governance such as election and constitutional making processes should be expedited and started early so as to build confidence in this transition. The parties to the Agreement blame current deficits in democracy and governance on COVID-19.
Should the parties fail to implement governance protocols fully, the potential for national elections to be conducted will have been thwarted, risking a return to an all-out war.