Governance

On August 25, Transitional Justice Working Group of South Sudan, Human Rights Watch, and Institute for Security Studies held a webinar for the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) members and other officials to discuss the urgency for the establishment of the AU Hybrid Court for South Sudan, as a key factor to ensuring long term stability and accountability for serious crimes in South Sudan.

The initiative came on the heels of a joint letter, signed by 24 South Sudanese, regional and international civil society organizations calling upon the AU PSC to take concrete action to enable the immediate creation of the Hybrid Court on South Sudan (HCSS). In preparation for the webinar, Human Rights Watch published a question and answer document on the three accountability mechanisms provided for in South Sudan’s 2015 and 2018 peace agreements and the rationale for the AU’s unilateral establishment of the hybrid court, available here. On the day of the webinar, the panelists – who represented perspectives from AU officials as well as South Sudanese and international lawyers and activists –presented on accountability mechanisms agreed to by the parties to the conflict and opportunities and challenges to achieving accountability to break the cycles of violence and impunity in South Sudan.

In October 2015, the president of the Republic of South Sudan, Salva Kiir Mayardit, decreed a change in the country’s administrative structure and increased the number of states from 10 to 28.

The entire process had been accompanied by much political speculation and confrontation. What were the reasons for this decision? Was it a good decision for South Sudan? What interests did it serve? Why did it happen at this time? Was dividing South Sudan into 28 states legal and constitutional? What would the consequences be? How would the subdivision into 28 states relate to what had been agreed in the Agreement for the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS) that was signed in August 2015?

The creation of 28 states and the aftermath are only the latest events in a long history of debate and practice on how to divide South Sudan administratively. Recent steps have further invigorated a discussion that has been at times acrimonious, at others exploratory. It is intensely political, as the latest events have shown.

The purpose of this report is not to comment extensively on the latest events, or to recommend what might be the best structure for South Sudan. Rather, its starting point is the persistence of the debate in South Sudanese history. It acknowledges that, regardless of the next developments, there is a need for a structured and informed review of the myriad challenges and opportunities that arise from different administrative structures.

Despite moderate levels of external debt, the combined impact of a civil conflict, a large fall in oil prices, and high levels of fiscal spending has left South Sudan in debt distress. This crisis has caused payment delays on international obligations, on civil servant salaries, and other government obligations. Moreover, international lines of credit have been restructured on longer maturities, international reserves have declined to near exhaustion, and the country is currently constrained from accessing long term external financing. However, assuming implementation of the recently adopted economic adjustment policies and a successful peace process, the debt outlook would improve considerably which could allow for a gradual resumption of external financing. However, vulnerabilities remain high and a
prolonged period of lower oil prices or failure to address the country’s economic and security problems could cause continued debt sustainability problem.