UNDP Peace And Community Cohesion Project

Understanding Youth Subcultures in South Sudan: Implications for peace and development

2020

Contents

## *Study areas*

WARRAP

NORTHERN BAHR
EL GHAZAL

UPPER NILE

UNITY

JONGLEI

WESTERN
BAHR
EL GHAZAL

WESTERN
EQUATORIA

LAKES

CENTRAL
EQUATORIA

EASTERN
EQUATORIA

The study surveys the voices of young people across Eastern, Central and Western Equatoria, Northern and Western Bahr el Ghazal, Unity and Lakes.

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Acknowledgements

South Sudan youth comprise 74 percent of the population. The youth in South Sudan have been, for a long time, the logs that fuel the fire – positively as they drive the rural and urban informal economies, and negatively, as they are easily incentivized to violence and pervasive practices such as cattle raids.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) South Sudan commissioned this study to understand youth and their emerging subcultures in South Sudan. The study sought to understand what motivates the youth to join both negative and positive subcultures, what is driving the emerging youth subcultures in different states and how the positive subcultures can be reinforced for peace and development. The study also sought to understand how the youth can be disincentivized from the negative subcultures.

This study was conducted in seven states: Western, Eastern and Central Equatoria, Northern and Western Bhar el Ghazal, Unity and Lakes, areas where the youth subculture groups are prevalent.

We thank the team of eight researchers led by Lina Gonzalez, the lead researcher, and the national researchers, Margaret Tumalu, Machot Amuom Malou, Yohanna Philip Watba, Kalesto Mborimbuko Simon, Mawien Ayom Reec, Ohide Johnson Paul and Tab Gadiet, who despite COVID-19 pandemic limitations, worked tirelessly to reach youth across all ethnic, gender and economic divides.

Special thanks also to many youth, women and civil society organization leaders for their valuable insights into the topic, and especially Esther Yangi Soma, Edmund Yakani, Rita Lopidia, James Mohandis Apugi, John Mabior, Fr. John Ngbapia Bakiri, Wani Michael, Ranga Gworo, Manasseh Mathiang, Bush Buse Laki, Paleki Ayang and Edmund Yakani.

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Let me also acknowledge the contribution of the UNDP Peace and Community Cohesion team, under whose docket the study was undertaken. Thanks to the field teams in Juba, Torit, Wau, Rumbek, Yambio, Aweil and Bentiu, and particularly to Judy Wakahiu, Margaret Mathiang, Irene Limo, Dr. Abel Belony St. Amour and Charlotte Schuringa for their specialized expertise and advice. This study would not have been possible without financial support from the Government of Sweden. We thank them for their continued partnership with UNDP.

The study is relevant, and its findings are timely. It sheds light on the positive aspects of the subcultures and how they can be harnessed for youth empowerment – taking advantage of technology, innovation and a flexible education system are just a few examples. The study also illuminates what drives the negative aspects of the youth subculture – such as inequality, illiteracy, disillusionment – and how to 'disarm the minds' of the youth for productive outcomes.

This report makes recommendations for harnessing the skills, capacities and talent of the youth, including expanding opportunities and tailoring development interventions, including in governance and decision-making, to the needs of youth. The study confirms that voice and agency are indispensable elements of youth empowerment.

Youth subcultures are not static. This makes continuous monitoring, especially to combat youth extremism, a major recommendation.

Samuel Doe

Samuel Doe
Resident Representative, UNDP South Sudan

Executive summary

The youth of South Sudan cannot be defined under a single age bracket, and nor can they be defined by a single set of cultural characteristics or interests. Nevertheless, there appears to be a similar motivation emerging among South Sudan's youth: a sense of tiredness and not having enough, as well as a desire to take matters into their own hands.

This common motivation seems to be the result of a similar set of issues affecting them, namely:

- limited and unprotected livelihood options;

- low quality of education and inadequate vocational training;

- increase in bride prices and with this a rise in incentives for early and forced marriage, as well as intercommunal conflict;

- entrenched systems of patronage that define/ limit access to resources and services, and which have led to a system of use and abuse of youth;

- lack of rule of law, a sense of disenfranchisement and lack of trust in authorities as a result of the above;

- lack of participation in decision-making processes, with educational and governance systems designed to perpetuate those in power;

- continuing trauma resulting from recurring violent conflict and loss of the protective networks (family, community) that traditionally guaranteed protection and support; and

- the creation of vicious cycles of violence and fragmentation as a result of the collective and reinforcing qualities of the above issues.

This research aims to find a way out of these vicious cycles. It begins by identifying the different youth subcultures that have emerged in response to the above circumstances. This document draws on a broad base of secondary research conducted in recent years, but most importantly it surveys the voices of young people in seven states. More than 368 young people were consulted across Eastern, Central and Western Equatoria, Northern and Western Bahr el Ghazal, Unity and Lakes. Its goal is to gain a better understanding of these youth subcultures and to identify their needs, motivations and means for survival, as well as entry points to actively and peacefully involve them so that they may play a major role in peace and reconciliation, peacebuilding and community cohesion interventions.

As stated in the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2250 and the Youth, Peace and Security report 'The Missing Peace,' the "rise of radicalization to violence and violent extremism, especially among youth, threatens stability and development, and can often derail peacebuilding efforts and further foment conflict." Against this background, this research is motivated by the recognition that "the protection of youth during conflict and post-conflict and their participation in peace processes can significantly contribute to the maintenance and promotion of international peace and security."

For the purpose of this research, youth subculture is defined as youth groupings with distinct styles, behaviours and interests which can be both

consistent with and similar to traditional cultural expectations for this age group, or reactionary, and in some cases, hostile to the traditional expectations; these might be described as countercultures.

Beyond a more academic discussion of the sociological aspects of youth subcultures, this study seeks to understand how South Sudanese society is being shaped, what new customary roles and behaviours are being constructed by youth (which might eventually be transformed into traditional roles), the underlying causes of the consolidation of new youth groups, and what the risks and/or opportunities are related to these changes in societal structure. Accordingly, this study does not just focus on what are perceived as 'negative' or violent youth subgroups. It also includes:

- those that conform to traditional views;

- those that seek to transform traditional views and roles without using violent means; and

- those that have a neutral connotation as they are motivated by common interests (arts, music) and do not seek to change traditional youth roles in their societies.

Initial primary and secondary research has revealed many similar youth subcultures or groups across the seven states covered by this study. To avoid classifying these groups around externally perceived positive or negative characteristics, which could cause further alienation by reinforcing preconceived notions or assumptions that are not valid for all the members of these groups, the research identifies them by their geographical location (urban/semi-urban and rural areas). It has also created a third classification to understand the specific characteristics and challenges of youth from the returning diaspora (whose members could be located either in urban or rural areas).

While there are some common characteristics, the main finding of this research is that youth membership in a subculture is neither fixed nor unique. The research found examples of young people who identified themselves as being part of two or three different subcultures, either at the same time or in different periods of their lives. They

also showed varying degrees of involvement and identification within the youth subcultures they identified with.

In some cases, they noted that they were perceived by others as being part of a subculture to which they had not chosen to belong, but for which they were 'boxed in' by their peers. Despite not having been chosen, these 'artificial externally imposed' identities often determined the range of opportunities the youths were afforded and the kind of relationships they would have with other youths, and thus their level of risk and incentives for violence.

The eight main youth subcultures found were as follows.

Urban and semi-urban gangs, normally seen as negative and defiant to traditional authorities, were seen by their members as the only space that could provide them with the protection and resources they needed to survive and define their own future. These groups tended to have similar references of power or role models and used art and music as a way to express their views, as well as exert their power. These groups were also responsible for providing training, mentorship and loans to their members, thus guaranteeing secondary sources of livelihood. Only in some cases was violence seen as their main mechanism to achieve or sustain power. Furthermore, the motivations and needs mentioned by this group and others were strikingly similar, and many of their members expressed the willingness (or provided examples) to engage with other subcultures and to use sport, arts and dialogue as ways to resolve their conflicts.

Gangs often comprise idle youth, although focus group discussions revealed that in many cases they were only 'accessories' or supporters of these groups, rather than members. Idle youth were mentioned continually as an emerging subculture because of common motivations (in this case finding activities to entertain themselves and have company), but also because they had similar hobbies (playing chess, football or dominoes, and gambling) and in some cases dress codes and music tastes. Idle youth were identified by youth organizations and civil society organizations interviewed as one of the youth subcultures with

the highest risk of being incorporated into cultures of violence. Solutions proposed to engage with this group are in line with responses to the above-mentioned challenges. Emphasis was placed on accelerated learning programmes to ensure that youth who were behind in their studies and ashamed of returning to school, as well as those who were tied to temporary sources of income, were motivated and able to stay in the programme.

On the other side of the spectrum, the research consulted with small business owners in urban and semi-urban areas. Despite members of this youth group having neither distinct styles nor in most cases behaviour, interviews at the onset of the research classified small business owners as a youth urban subculture, given their common motivations and interests, and, in some cases, the similar way in which they operate and mobilize to meet their needs. Within this group, the research was able to find a variety of subgroups, including boda-boda owners and drivers, traders, owners of small stores, construction workers and business owners, and other such entrepreneurs. Out of these, only one category, namely the *boda-boda* owners and drivers, was reviewed in this research. They are homogenous, vulnerable and associated with other groups engaged in violent and criminal practices. For them, the research found evidence of organized associations in all seven state capitals, functioning under a unique motivation, namely of reducing physical and financial risks for their members. These associations, alongside those representing farmers and pastoralists and workers in rural areas, were seen as potential drivers of change. These organizations are key stakeholders, aware of the needs of their associates and able to showcase models in which loans and technical support are given to young business owners and providers of goods and services. Evidence shows, however, that caution and due diligence are required when working with these organizations. There are numerous fake associations taking advantage of support from international organizations which do not represent the interests of the intended beneficiaries.

In rural areas, the three groups identified were the armed pastoralists/youth militias, the *monyomiji*, and other informal armed groups. These are described by some of those consulted as 'rural gangs.' The main finding from these three groups is that traditional institutions of power have always been available to youth in traditional rural societies, particularly to young men. This power is based on the responsibility for youth to provide protection for their communities, and normally implies that they are given access to weapons and means for increasing their mobility. Yet this power is not always linked with a say in decision-making processes, even regarding when and how protection is guaranteed (through the use of violence or negotiated means), or in resolution of grievances with other communities. This discrepancy is seen by those consulted as a key driver of non-conformity among rural youth, and one of the drivers of conflict and unsustainability in rural peace processes.

The example of the *monyomiji,* where those who have the responsibility to protect their communities have a stronger decision-making role, is reviewed in some detail to highlight recommendations for future work. The experience with the *monyomiji* shows that there is the potential to transform rural armed youth and armed pastoralists/cattle raiders into peacebuilding actors. A potential first step is to ensure that, as well as transferring to them the task of protecting their communities, this responsibility is coupled with participation in the decision-making process. It also requires youth to take responsibility for education/mentorship for these new roles. Alongside initiations aiming at demonstrating strength, courage and endurance, youth who are given the responsibility to protect their communities need to gain the skills to negotiate and solve conflicts, and mechanisms to mitigate and de-escalate armed confrontation.

Finally, the research focuses on newly arising youth organizations and movements. Primary data consultations reveal that youth are slowly consolidating themselves as a single movement, including both rural and urban youth. Youth are starting to see that they have common issues around which they could build coalitions. They have been realising that the 'older guard' benefits from fragmentation among youth and, therefore, they have started to fight this. These organizations are beginning to see that change in the country

will come from the bottom: from young people and people in grassroots organizations coming together and using independent thought to unite.

The analysis of these groups also revealed several areas in which peacebuilding and youth programming can add greater value:

1. Restructuring of the educational system, creating a curriculum that is flexible, adaptive and skills-based, and that includes critical thinking, civic education and peacebuilding as key life skills. Education and building of skills also need to be paired with financial mechanisms to ensure sustainability and to increase the motivation for youth, particularly those without a protective network, to engage in the process.

2. Supporting new and innovative ways to create livelihoods that go beyond the provision of vocational training and instead focus on providing youth with the resources and mentorship to consolidate and expand their own businesses, and the technical support to manage them.

3. Addressing traumas and promoting reconciliation. The traumas experienced by youth at all levels and in all geographical areas must be recognized and dealt with. New programmes are required to tackle social and cultural barriers that associate trauma counselling with disease and weakness. Youth should learn that addressing trauma can make them key players in the process of peace and reconciliation.

4. Building bridges between youth across all political, ethnic and geographic divides. This should also involve boosting the capacity of organizations that are already leading this process of dialogue and reconciliation.

5. Focusing on young women and girls. Issues faced by young women and girls are at the core of many of the drivers and triggers of violent conflict in South Sudan (e.g., early marriage, high dowries, lack of decision-making power regarding who they marry). Addressing these challenges will have a double benefit in mitigating violent behaviours.

6. More evidence-based, coordinated and long-term programming. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has a special capacity to coordinate. Under the One UN approach and the Youth4Peace framework, UNDP should promote the development of coordinated strategies among United Nations agencies. It should also reach out to local and international organizations with expertise in the area to share research, experiences and models, ensure that new programming is implemented through common strategies and build upon critical learning points.

7. Related to the above, youth programming should become a crosscutting issue rather than a 'silo-based' programme. This will require the consolidation of youth-sensitive approaches in all programmes. There is a need to avoid working on the basis of preconceptions about specific communities and youth groups and instead use evidence-based and localized approaches to design and implement programmes. This also implies ensuring flexibility and adaptability in programming by including consultative processes, feedback loops and learning mechanisms, and setting flexible budget mechanisms that allow programmes to adapt.

In general, a key message from the research is the need to take a long-term and informed approach when designing and implementing interventions for and with youth. Approaches that are transient and not based on coherent strategies will either fail or not be sustainable. They risk causing more harm than good. The existence of a wide variety of youth subcultures does not point to a need for specific programmes for each group, but rather to a need for programmes that can create individual interventions while promoting integration across activities and outputs, including the youth initiatives that humanitarian and development agencies are already promoting.

1. Introduction

Background

South Sudan is a young country in more than one sense. It is not only the most recent to achieve independence (2011) but also is among the countries with the highest proportions of young people, with a median age of 19 years and 74 percent of people being younger than 24 years (United Nations Population Fund, South Sudan Population Dashboard). Youth were instrumental in achieving independence, contributing through armed involvement, student union advocacy and community sensitization (Martin & Wani, 2018). Youth have powered the economy since independence and the armed struggle since the civil war began in 2013.

A common conclusion from those consulted for the research is that young people in South Sudan have always been the 'logs feeding the fire.' Regardless of gender, South Sudanese youth feed the fire of the rural economy by being responsible for the protection and herding of cattle, and helping with farming and house chores, from water collection to ensuring the safety and dignity of the community as a whole. They feed the fire of the day-to-day service economy in the cities as boda-boda drivers, entrepreneurs and business-owners, as large-enterprise entrepreneurs fled the country in the midst of civil war. Finally, they were used to feed the fire of war as armed pawns in a power game orchestrated by political elites that did not even live in the country.

Youth dissatisfaction has grown as they continue to be 'used' as weapons of war and political conflict. Youth interviewed expressed feelings of fatigue and hopelessness. They felt that for the past 10 years they have been at the service of selfish elites, deluded into ethnic frames of thinking and thus divided as a "way to reduce the power [they] are meant to have as a result of their effort." Furthermore, as peace processes continue to fail and ethnic fragmentation grows, they feel that traditional leaders and those in power have failed to deliver what they have promised, and that the means for survival (and in some cases peace) is in their hands. Either by violent or peaceful means, youth in South Sudan are now joined together in a quest to achieve their independence and guarantee their survival.

Alongside the reduction of trust in community and governmental leaders, "a high proportion of South Sudanese youth have been deserted by armed and in some cases humanitarian actors and find themselves without a family, community, school or cultural reference to go back to" (civil society organization (CSO) leader, Torit). Without a protective network or figures of authority, they create their own sources of protection and means to identify themselves. This has led to a surge of urban and semi-urban armed subcultures (Niggas)[1]

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1   This term is a self-adopted name used locally to describe several groups of youth gangs in South Sudan. Further reference to these will be N*****.

BOX 1

Research key objective

As stated in the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2250 and the Youth, Peace and Security report, 'The Missing Peace,' this research arises from the recognition that "the protection of youth during conflict and post-conflict and their participation in peace processes can significantly contribute to the maintenance and promotion of international peace and security" and that the "rise of radicalization to violence and violent extremism, especially among youth, threatens stability and development, and can often derail peacebuilding efforts and further foment conflict."

and Toronto Boys gangs), an increase in power of armed youth groups (Arrow Boys, Gelweng, Mathiang Anyoor, Tit Baaj, Titweng, Machar Anyar) and youth pastoralist protection, and, more positively, to the flourishing of youth organizations working on peacebuilding, livelihoods and prevention of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), amongst others.

This research analyses these youth subgroupings, referred to here as 'youth subcultures' in seven South Sudanese states (Central, Eastern and Western Equatoria, Northern and Western Bahr el Ghazal, Unity and Lakes). The objective is to understand the ways in which youth in South Sudan are organizing and grouping themselves to cope with dissatisfaction and achieve economic independence. In line with the objectives of the Youth, Peace and Security Report, the Youth Action Agenda to Prevent Violent Extremism and Promote Peace Agenda and the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 2250, 2419 and 2535,[2] this study aims to further the understanding of South Sudanese youth living under the threat of armed conflict (see Box 1).

The overall purpose is to gain a better understanding of these youth subcultures, and

identify their needs, motivations and means for survival, as well as entry points to actively and peacefully engage them so that they play a major role in peace and reconciliation, peacebuilding and community cohesion interventions. Specifically, this document aspires to:

- increase the understanding of youth needs and motivations in South Sudan, the ways they differ across youth subcultures, and the root causes leading youth to the creation and strengthening of violent cultures;

- assess ways to ensure positive contributions of youth to the South Sudanese peace processes and conflict resolution at the local/ethnic level;

- increase the level of detail in the mapping of local interventions working with youth, particularly those working with armed/violent youth subgroupings and/or engaging them in peacebuilding efforts; and

- recommend effective responses at local and national levels relating to the prevention, participation, protection, disengagement and reintegration of youth in South Sudan, based on best practices and learning about what not to do.

Key definitions

Youth defined in the context of Security Council Resolutions 2250 and 2419 includes persons aged 18–29 years. Yet, as stated in these resolutions, variations of the definition exist at the national and international level. To define an age bracket appropriate for the context of South Sudan, this research will follow the Conciliation Resources report, Youth Perspectives on Peace and Security in South Sudan (2017) (Tumutegyereize & Gew Nhial, 2017), which defines youth as: "the stage during which a person moves from dependence (childhood) to independence (adulthood). This transition involves several shifts, which present unique challenges: (1) moving from attending school to seeking work and independent sources of income; (2) moving from the parental home to new living arrangements; and (3) forming close relationships outside the family, often resulting in marriage and children."

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2 UN Security Resolution 2250/2015: https://undocs.org/S/RES/2250(2015), UN Security Resolution 2419/2018 https://undocs.org/S/RES/2419(2018), UN Security Resolution 2535/2020: https://undocs.org/en/S/RES/2535(2020).

The above transition can happen very early in some cultures, or when might be considered to be late in others. In South Sudan, according to the information collected in semi-structured interviews, this process starts across the different states any time between 14 and 18 years. It does not have a defined end, as in many cases economic independence is not achievable, but it is expected to finish between 20 and 45 years. Youth is thus not a fixed biological category but a fluid social construct (Price & Orrnert, 2017). An example is the *monyomiji* which are seen as youth decision-making structures that range traditionally from 18 to 45 years of age (Bedigen, 2019). Membership depends on either a temporary opportunity (e.g., a member retiring or an age group taking leadership, ousting the previous group), being a "naturally gifted, spirit-possessed individual," or even being a woman marrying a member (*honyomiji* or *angote moyomiji*).

To find an adequate measure among international and national definitions, as done by Conciliation Resources, this study will use that of the 2008 South Sudan Housing and Population Census and Word Bank data,[3] which consider youth to be in the 15–35-year age bracket. Certain flexibility was applied when interviewing youth leaders who fell slightly outside this bracket, particularly in rural areas.

For the purpose of this research, youth subculture is defined as youth groupings with distinct styles, behaviours and interests. These can be both consistent with and similar to traditional cultural expectations for this age group, or reactionary and in some cases hostile to the traditional expectations. The latter might be described as countercultures.

Beyond a more academic discussion of the sociological aspects of youth subcultures, the intention of this study is to understand how South Sudanese society is being shaped, what new customary roles and behaviours are being constructed by youth (which might eventually be transformed into traditional roles), the underlying causes of the consolidation of new youth

groupings, and what might be the risks and/or opportunities related to these changes in societal structure. For this reason, the study will not only focus on what are perceived as 'negative' or violent youth subgroupings, but will also include:

- those that conform within traditional views;

- those that seek to transform traditional views and roles without using violent means; and

- those that have a neutral connotation as they are motivated by common interests (arts, music) and do not seek to change traditional youth roles within their societies.

For the purposes of this report, the research classified youth groups in South Sudan based on initial consultations with youth researchers and local and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working in the field, as well as documentary research. The cohorts are based on geographical location and common cultural and historical background and include urban and rural locations, as well as a specific section for diaspora youth in both rural and urban settings, given the specific characteristics of this common background (see detail in Annex A). These cohorts were then used to consolidate the mapping of the stakeholders to be interviewed, as will be explained in more detail in the next section.

Methodology

With increasing agreement about the importance of youth voices in decision-making, governance and the peace and reconciliation processes, the amount of research, data collection and evidence base around the structure, characteristics, needs and motivations of South Sudanese youth have increased in recent years. The objective of this research is to add value to the wealth of knowledge already collected. Accordingly, a large part of the analysis and findings of this research takes on lessons, recommendations and information available through a literature review. The lead researcher used secondary data to guide primary data collection, and also to validate, triangulate and complement information collected in the field. The complete list of the research consulted is given at the end of this document.

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3 Available at https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/1631

Context and a light-touch political economy analysis were used to determine the population, context and boundaries of the research. This analysis also provided guidance on the key youth subcultures and groupings that needed to be analysed, determined the work plan for data collection and identified the possible gaps once field data collection was finalized.

The largest set of information was collected directly by local young South Sudanese researchers located in the seven areas of study (Central, Eastern and Western Equatoria, Northern and Western Bahr el Ghazal, Unity and Lakes) and remotely via online semi-structured interviews, between 13 July and 25 August 2020. Data collection was conducted using the questions included in Annex B, with some questions being directed solely at certain groups.

Because the study has sought to widen the spectrum of South Sudanese youth voices, the researchers interviewed a total of 368 young people through 48 focus group discussions (FGDs), with most of the participants (78 percent) being within the 18–35-year age bracket. Furthermore, 37 local CSOs and youth organizations were consulted (39 people), as well as 11 researchers and representatives from international NGOs and aid agencies. A total of 431 people was interviewed. A short analysis of the sample is included below, and further details of the FGDs done in the field are in Annex C.

The sample includes a broad range of ethnicities and age groups. The FGDs and KIIs (key informant interviews) included members of Dinka, Nuer, Anyuak, Acholi, Lopit, Lotuko, Lulubo and Shilluk ethnicities. Youth associated with armed groups also participated.

The research aimed to amplify the voices of women. For that purpose, an initial target of 40 percent female participants was set. Field research work plans included mandatory requirements to consult with at least one women's organization and, when possible, incentivize local CSOs and NGOs to include female members in the KIIs. Separate FGDs were also organized to improve female attendance and ensure the participation of women. Despite these efforts, female representation of 34.5 percent

was achieved. This was then supplemented by consultations with 15 additional local women's organizations and leaders. Additional secondary information was also used to validate the findings.

As mentioned above, KIIs and surveys were also done remotely with a sample of the 43 CSOs and local NGOs identified during field research. These organizations were selected based on whether they were youth organizations themselves or were recognized by those interviewed as providing services and programmes for youth in the states. These organizations were also consulted through an online survey aimed at consolidating mapping of youth interventions in each state. The full list of the organizations consulted is included in Annex C.

Data analysis was carried out by triangulating and validating information collected in FGDs, KIIs and the documentary review. When inconsistent data were found, transcripts of the FGDs were reviewed with the local consultants and in two cases this led to additional questions being asked of some of the FGD participants.

Limitations and challenges

As mentioned before, in South Sudan, "youth is not a fixed biological category, but a fluid social construct." Thus, the first limitation to be considered within this research "is the diversity of youth and their motivations [...], the complexity of its different ethnicities and cultural identities, and that these identities remain highly flexible and may change in response to the dynamic environment" (Price & Orrnert, 2017). Youth cultures and subcultures are by definition highly variable, and their needs, motivations and objectives can vary between members. Given the variable and dynamic context in South Sudan, it is difficult with a single study to achieve a complete understanding of youth perspectives in South Sudan that go beyond generalization or a point in history. Therefore, this study does not intend to provide an in-depth study of specific youth subcultures in South Sudan. It focuses on understanding the dynamics driving the consolidation of emerging youth subcultures; the similarities, differences and potential sources of conflict between groups; the ways in which these subcultures support or challenge national

Sampling summary

	# KIIS	# FGDS	# MALE	# FEMALE	GROUPS
CENTRAL EQUATORIA	5	7	37	24	Youth unions, women's organizations, small business owners/ *boda-boda* drivers, vocational centre trainees, gangs, orphans and unaccompanied minors.
WESTERN EQUATORIA	5	9	37	23	Traditional leaders (Ezo, Nzara), youth unions, women's organizations, farmers, religious groups, small business owners, vocational centre trainees, former child soldiers
EASTERN EQUATORIA	9	5	28	17	Youth unions, *monyomiji*, women's organizations, *boda-boda* drivers/idle youth, vocational centre trainees, gangs
NORTHERN BAHR EL GHAZAL	5	7	38	23	Government institutions and traditional leaders, (Criminal Investigation Department, Ministry of Youth, Aweil), youth unions, women's organizations, farmer's/pastoralist's union, music union/ religious groups, *boda-boda* drivers, vocational centre trainees, gangs
WESTERN BAHR EL GHAZAL	3	7	39	17	Traditional leaders (Nazareth), youth unions, women's organizations, artistic associations/religious groups, *boda-boda* drivers/small business owners, vocational centre trainees, gangs and former members of Arrow Boys Army
LAKES	6	6	40	11	Youth activists/researchers, women's organizations, cattle traders, religious groups, *boda-boda* drivers, vocational centre trainees, former combatants from armed youth groups (Gelweng, Titweng)
UNITY	6	7	49	24	Local authorities, youth unions, women's organizations, farmers' associations, religious groups, *boda-boda* drivers, Bentiu Youth Club, former/current militia (White Army/Gojjam, see definition on page 28)
NATIONAL	26	–	8	16	International and local organizations, local and international experts and researchers

and intercommunal peace processes; the best and worst practices in working with these youth groupings; and specific recommendations to integrate both 'violent' and 'peaceful' youth subcultures within peacebuilding and reconciliation efforts.

Limitations need to be noted regarding the timeframe (data collection in the field was limited to eight days per state), security (with incidents reported on main roads outside of the state capitals, thus restricting movement), and context (field research was done during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic and the rainy season, and coincided with the confirmation and arrival of local governors in the state capitals). These limitations reduced the understanding of some youth subcultures and female participation, as well

as reducing an in-depth understanding of certain geographical areas.

The most significant limitation to the study was the inability of the local researchers to travel and collect primary data in rural areas. In only one state was travel to other counties possible (Ezo and Nzara in Western Equatoria). Travel and consultations initially planned to Ikwotó (Eastern Equatoria) and Raga (Western Bahr el Ghazal) counties had to be cancelled due to insecurity, lack of time and limitations in the capacity to care for local consultants. The rainy season also meant that cattle herders and camps had moved far away from urban areas. Therefore, FGDs with these groups were only done in areas where security and transport were deemed safe and possible, using United Nations vehicles.

The gap in rural analysis has implications for the ability of this research to provide in-depth information about the needs, motivations and perspectives of pastoralist and farming youth.

This is particularly important if we consider the importance that cattle raiding is playing in the exacerbation of intercommunity conflict. Despite cattle raiding being "a longstanding feature of many East African pastoralist societies [...] the ready availability of arms and the incorporation of this practice into the larger political conflict in South Sudan have intensified the violence to unprecedentedly deadly levels" (Wild et al., 2018).

According to data collected by ACLED (2020), escalation in intercommunal conflict was on the rise in the first seven months of 2020 – particularly in Warrap, Lakes and Jonglei. During May 2020, monthly conflict events were higher by 20 percent relative to the same period in 2019. These events were, in many cases, linked to cattle raiding or revenge killings that had a starting point in a cattle raid event. Therefore, for the analysis of pastoralist youth subcultures, data were complemented with a literature review and particularly with data collected by a recent cattle camp research project conducted by Oxford Policy Management (OPM), supported by the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID) Peacebuilding Opportunities Fund (OPM, 2020).

Finally, the FGDs tended to be mainly attended and dominated by male participants. FGDs with gang members, armed pastoralists and armed youth groups were (because of their natural composition) mainly attended by men. Also, female participants felt restricted by culture to speak in the presence of men.

Safeguarding

In compliance with best standards of data and information management, safeguarding and gender/conflict sensitivity, participants were informed of the research objectives and the methodology used in an accessible, plain language format. Participants were provided with sufficient time to consider the information and raise any queries before deciding on their involvement.

Mixed-gender discussions were only held in safe spaces and for groups where mixing of genders was already a practice (e.g., vocational training centres, cultural activities). FGDs for survivors of SGBV were held only in smaller groups, on a one-to-one basis, and only with women. As most of the local consultants were male, they were asked to approach female members of women's organizations working with this vulnerable population and request that they accompany them to the interviews in order to guarantee safeguarding protocol.

Given that most of the information was managed online, the lead researcher ensured that local researchers avoided personally identifiable data, and when these were collected, the researchers were requested to delete them from the consultants' databases. Consent for each of the photos taken during the research was also requested orally and in writing, and forms were provided for the purpose.

Regarding COVID-19 measures, following public health best practice, local consultants were instructed to maintain social distance and to use facemasks. Meetings were also limited to a maximum of eight people and conducted, when possible, in open spaces. When possible, local researchers were provided with masks and hand sanitizers, and instructed to use them during and after each of the KIIs and FGDs. When possible and adequate given local connectivity, KIIs were done via phone or the internet to avoid physical contact. The lead researcher decided against travelling to the main locations given limitations on international travel and quarantine times.

Surveys were eliminated from the initial data collection given the risk to the consultant and participants with the possible sharing of paper, phones and pencils. Some local researchers indicated that in recent data collection exercises survey participants in remote areas were asked to pay a fee as it "would ensure the possibility for the person to be a beneficiary of a future international aid programme." In view of the risks, this tool was eliminated from the work plan.

2. Changes in context and their effects on youth subcultures

The first part of the research consisted of consolidating a light–touch political economy analysis highlighting the main issues that were affecting youth in each of the seven target states. The detailed results have been included in Annex E.

Below, information has been consolidated on the common trends and issues identified, as well as a short review of issues unique to some of the states. The information has been supplemented with secondary information, but it mainly uses and analyses the ideas and concerns shared by the young South Sudanese interviewed.

The aim is not to provide an in-depth analysis of each of the issues (which has already been done in literature quoted in this section), but to consolidate mapping of the key needs and motivations affecting youth in the seven target states and review how these common trends have led to the emergence of particular youth subcultures.

Similar trends and issues

Limited and unprotected livelihood options

In around 90 percent of the KIIs and FGDs conducted during the research youth unemployment, lack of livelihood opportunities and lack of support to protect sources of livelihoods were cited as critical needs for young South Sudanese. Groups identified with 'bad' or 'violent' behaviours (gangs, idle youth) saw a reliable source of income as the only mechanism that would bring them out of the cycle of violence and despondence. Members of gangs across all

seven states mentioned that joining these groups had not been "their initial intention" but that "after encountering close[d] doors everywhere, [this] was their only option for economic sustenance and independence."

Small business owners (e.g., shop owners, technicians and *boda-boda* owners and drivers) mentioned that possibilities to increase their income or establish their own business were limited, with their assets continually at risk and a lack of safety networks to protect them. High levels of insecurity and a very limited market (with customers increasingly unable to purchase the same goods and services as they did months earlier) also resulted in a sense of permanent alertness and "competitiveness and in-fighting" amongst them. This limited the prospect of their coming together to expand or diversify their businesses.

Women complained about the even more limited range of options for them to become independent, with marriage being their main option, particularly if they remained in rural areas. Young single mothers said that "traditional community protection networks disappeared" or they had been cast out from their communities, further limiting their options and forcing them into poverty, forced marriage, prostitution and/or association with and support of local gangs.

Even employed youth with some level of education and/or technical training reported that their jobs were highly dependent on external factors. They mentioned that family or personal connections were in many cases responsible for getting them a job in the first place (particularly within the public sector). This made their work dependent on their relationship with their patron, and made them vulnerable to the same cycle of patronage in the future to repay the favour. Ability to progress and achieve stability in existing jobs is limited, even for those able to work in international organizations. The risk of losing their jobs "as a result of a growing international community disinterest in the (protracted) situation in South Sudan" and the high risks associated with starting their own businesses meant that jobs "needed to be lasting" even if that meant reducing options of employment for others.

The other issue for skilled youth is that government, army or education-linked jobs are poorly paid. As a young academic interviewed mentioned, "there is no difference between a salary earner, a *boda-boda* owner and unemployed youth on the street. If a lecturer is getting 3,000 SSP [South Sudanese pounds] that is equal to $10 a month, what difference does it make? You cannot live on $10 [...] even less if those $10 take seven months to arrive to you and then they are not even [worth] $10."

Rural youth mentioned droughts and insecurity as the major threats to their livelihoods. For them, diversification of agricultural activities is essential so the youth does not depend on a single source of income. They also need access to farming tools, more resistant seeds, the "improvement of agricultural techniques, eradication of cattle diseases and improvement of physical infrastructure to encourage trade activities among communities." These have not yet been "received after 10 years of unaccomplished promises by the government and the international community."

Youth from protection of civilians (POC) camps or those that have returned from other countries (mainly from Khartoum, Kampala, Cairo and Nairobi) felt that job opportunities they had enjoyed in their home areas were not available to them anymore. Arab speakers complained that lack of knowledge

of local languages or English limited their options. Furthermore, their "lack of connections" implied that they had to compete unfavourably against local youth, and in some cases were discriminated against by their peers as they (particularly 'Khartoumers')[4] were seen as traitors. These groups also felt that farming or pastoralist jobs were not appropriate for them, as they lacked the training or knowledge, but also because they had been able "to achieve more when living abroad, even when living with the enemy [in Khartoum]."

Finally, an issue mentioned by all groups is the effect of inflation on livelihoods. "The costs of living became so high, that [they] sometimes failed to provide for their own needs and even for our families back home." The interviews showed that overall this instability and the low incomes are highly embarrassing. As economic success is the main way in which they can prove themselves to be worthy of respect from their families, the lack of a good income meant that they were "still [considered to be] children." Educated youth in the cities, and those from rural areas and POC camps who had migrated looking for opportunities, as well as those who had returned from neighbouring countries, were in many cases the only hope for their families and communities. When they did not succeed, their families believed they were failures, and this strengthened the belief that investing in education would not necessarily provide the benefits that teachers and international organizations had promised.

The above information is fully borne out by findings from the literature review. According to information collected by the UNDP's Accelerator Lab, more than 90 percent of South Sudanese youth currently lack formal employment opportunities, and the population largely relies on subsistence livelihoods to provide for their families.

In "urban and semi-urban areas, youth employment is characterized by low-productivity and informality" (Price & Orrnert, 2017). Job allocation also commonly reflects ethnic affiliation and often relies on kin networks, placing uprooted returnees

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4 'Khartoumers' are people who moved from Khartoum (Sudan) to South Sudan after independence.

at a clear disadvantage (Ensor, 2013). The best opportunities are linked with work with local or national governments (which is linked to nepotism and corruption) or international companies and the aid sector (which offer a chance to a limited number of well-trained, 'lucky' or well-connected youth). In rural areas, traditional livelihoods rely on a combination of agricultural production, cattle rearing, fishing, gathering of wild foods and trade (Afeti & Thomas, 2014), with rural households depending almost exclusively on their own agricultural production to sustain their livelihoods (Mawejje & Finn, 2020).

Sommers and Schwartz (2011) argue that the youth unemployment situation in South Sudan persists due to an overwhelming focus on a finite number of government jobs; widespread nepotism; the refusal of South Sudanese youth to do many jobs (e.g., youth reported being criticized by peers, relatives and elders for selling water, clearing land, cleaning buildings and working in hotels); and unrealistic views by some South Sudanese of their earning potential and viability as workers.

All this is combined with a highly unstable, stagnated and oil-dependent economy (Mawejje & Finn, 2020). A series of recent internal and external shocks seriously destabilized the economy. Conflict, drought and a rapid depreciation of the South Sudanese pound have contributed to propelling the country into a severe crisis, with particularly serious food security issues (Pape, 2017). Prices and foreign exchange rates have continued to soar, eroding the purchasing power of salaries and economic remuneration paid in the local currency. Finally, slow growth in the non-oil sectors, coupled with low expenditure on service delivery and limited linkages between the oil and non-oil economy create a disconnect between the observed oil-led growth and citizen welfare (Mawejje & Finn, 2020).

Based on the assumption that conflict had been the factor driving vulnerability, and that after the civil war (with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)) recovery would take off (Maxwell et al., 2012), all of the above is leading to growing dissatisfaction and hopelessness amongst young South Sudanese. In rural areas,

despite signing the CPA in 2005, only 4 percent of arable land is cultivated, and livestock production is estimated at only 20 percent of its potential (Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium, 2016). Moreover, only two years after independence was obtained, old political elites returned to civil war, taking with them the few medium- and large-sized entrepreneurs that had arrived looking to reap the benefits of peace and international investment after the signing of the CPA.

There is now a crisis of expectation among young people. They were expecting a 'peace dividend' which did not materialize. A further difference is that of education levels and aspirations of returnee youth and those who remained in South Sudan during the civil war. Returnee youth also have views on education, repatriation and integration that often differ from those of their Sudan-born elders (Price & Orrnert, 2017).

"Structural exclusion and lack of opportunities faced by young people effectively block or prolong their transition to adulthood and can lead to frustration, disillusionment and in some cases their involvement in violence" (Hilker & Fraser, 2009). Idle youth can become a risk factor for relapse into conflict. Although prioritization is challenging in a fiscally constrained space with continuing insecurity, it is important to focus interventions on providing opportunities for at-risk youth. Participation in non-politically-motivated mercenary work and crime has been found to respond to monetary incentives in this kind of context (Mawejje & Finn, 2020). Now, with a growing number of young people expecting livelihood opportunities as one of the peace process's dividends, this makes addressing the challenge of youth empowerment and employment an urgent issue (UNDP, 2019).

Low-quality education and adequate vocational training

According to the latest World Bank Economic Report (Mawejje & Finn, 2020), South Sudan has exceedingly low rates of adult educational attainment, and one of the lowest adult literacy rates in Africa. This is largely explained by limited availability of, access to and quality of education. Nonetheless, youth educational outcomes show an

improvement over those of previous generations, with the gender gap continuing to close. Despite these improvements, net attendance rates remain lower than in most other countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, the conflict continues to jeopardize the progress in education achieved between 2009 and 2015, with school attendance rates falling to 2009 levels since the intensification of the conflict and acceleration of inflation in 2016.

Quality education and vocational training is the second most frequent need identified by youth and youth organizations in the interviews and FGDs. Education, particularly vocational training, is seen as a factor directly connected with the lack of livelihood options and therefore key to achieving progress therein. Regardless of the youth subgroup they belonged to, young South Sudanese complained of five main issues with the current educational system.

Education beyond a bare minimum (primary school) is only accessible to youth who have a support system, and whose families can afford it. Educational facilities are not available everywhere, particularly in rural areas. Existing facilities are badly staffed, poorly administered and under-resourced. Flexible schedules, adaptable for rural areas (particularly for pastoralist communities) are rarely offered. And given the economic hardships of many families, losing a pair of working hands to education is only affordable for some families and perhaps only for one of the children. The lack of universities, colleges or vocational centres in some states or counties, and the lack of jobs for skilled workers, dissuades parents from keeping their children in schools beyond the primary system. Girls and young women are those most affected. With increasing dowries, and thus the 'monetization' of the marriage system, the opportunity cost of allowing girls to stay in school is too high to incentivize their parents to keep them in school.

The above also applied to vocational centres. Youth and particularly experts and researchers regularly mentioned that the choice of skills offered in vocational centres is limited and causes the labour market to be inundated by a large number of mechanics, hairdressers, tailors, carpenters

and cooks, for which there is inadequate demand. Vocational centres had "popped [up]" around the country in response to international community interest, following a similar recipe and offering the same courses. There is rarely innovation or market/need research supporting what they offer, and after a decade of repetitive efforts, the market is unable to provide jobs for youth with the same skills. Around 2 in 6 of the former vocational centre trainees interviewed said that despite the training, they were not working or not working with the skills they were trained in. They mentioned the need to be "more innovative" to respond to an economy in which the market for goods and services is restricted and narrowing, "instead focusing on creating jobs to increase the market and add services and goods not available locally."

The respondents felt that the curriculum differs between regions, and skills (if any) learned before are not transferable between schools. Those most affected are the children in POC camps or those who have migrated from rural areas. Even if they have the means and want to continue studying after migrating back to or from rural areas, the incompatibility between the provincial and sometimes county systems makes it too difficult for them to successfully adapt. In some cases, it results in a regression from what they have learned, disincentivizing them to continue.

According to the KIIs and experts consulted, the curricula are old and not adapted to the needs of the job market. The teaching methodology is not based on skills and does not create mechanisms for learners "to think critically, but rather focuses on memorization and repetition." Those interviewed saw in the system "a trap that is closed within itself." Teachers teach the children the same content and in the same ways that they had been taught years back, so those children that did not "give up because of boredom, lack of resources, or war," in turn "teach other kids in the same ways and manners that had been done for at least 50 years." For the organizations consulted, this perpetuates a system in which youth can only have a say in decision-making if they remain content with the traditional system or represent the views of those in power, thus reinforcing patronage systems of those in power.

The curriculum does not include critical skills such as civic education and peacebuilding and teaches a history and system of values that is concentrated on the fight for independence. The history since independence (and "thus the mistakes of [those] currently in power"), as well as that of the diverse ethnic groups that live in South Sudan is not included in the history books. Skills such as peacebuilding and conflict resolution and an understanding of civil rights and the rule of law are not taught. There is also a lack of instruction on the "history and customs of other ethnicities, and even perhaps their languages." Education as it is now will thus not allow ethnic groups to see what they have in common, nor emphasize the importance of peaceful conflict resolution as a means of progress.

Participants also mentioned that access to education and especially vocational training is not geographically available for all youth, and especially the most vulnerable. Rural youth consulted mentioned that the lack of vocational centres outside semi-urban areas is one of the major causes of the stagnation in agricultural and pastoralist practices, and helps explain the lack of progress in those sectors. Gang members in Torit, Wau and Bentiu stated that even though vocational centres are available in the semi-urban areas in which they operate, the centres are located in remote areas or in places where the gang members are not well received or are persecuted. Therefore, efforts to tackle gang violence through education will fail.

Increasing bride prices and cattle dependency

Marriage is one of the mechanisms through which youth in South Sudan can announce their arrival at adulthood. To be recognized as full adults, male and female youth in South Sudan must marry and build a family (Danish Refugee Council, 2017). Ever-increasing bride prices are having a devastating effect on the ability of male youth to achieve their independence and recognition and respect from their communities. For girls, the increase in dowry prices also means less incentive for parents to allow them to continue their education, decreasing their means of achieving independence outside marriage. It represents a monetization of their

bodies and dignity, and increasing risks of them becoming victims of intrafamilial violence.

The increase in bride prices is not a new phenomenon and has been reported in studies as far back as 2005 (Jok et al., 2017). In fact, KIIs with local researchers felt the signing of the CPA in 2005 was the key trigger of the increase in bride prices. With a path set for independence, or at least greater autonomy, members of the South Sudanese diaspora who had fled the country started to return, at least on a temporary basis. This was accompanied by more capital and the ability to pay higher prices for dowries.

Paying higher dowries was not necessarily intended to harm the economy. According to research (Krystalli et al., 2019) and information from interviews, South Sudanese who lived abroad did not have a prior understanding of traditions, especially as they related to 'prices.' Paying higher amounts was also seen as a way to show success, gaining respect and supporting the communities they belonged to back in South Sudan. Even in areas where dowries were not connected with monetary or cattle payments, but with "shows of worthiness through manual labour and support to in-laws" (Western Equatoria), local traditions were changed as a way to take advantage of "this arising economic opportunity." With no regard for the girl's right to marry a partner of her choice, families tend to accept the man who pays the highest bride price (Price & Orrnert, 2017).

At the same time, with the lack of a stable currency with which to pay these ever-increasing dowries, cattle payments started to grow in importance. Livestock has historically been critically important in South Sudan. The livestock sector is the main source of income and food for the majority of the population, as pastoral farming is appropriate for South Sudan's challenging ecology, characterized by flooding, drought and swamplands. Livestock traditionally bestowed social status and prestige, and as they were increasingly used for payment of dowries, to pay compensation and settle disputes. In the absence of an established banking sector, they serve as a reliable way to keep assets (Idris, 2018), adding to their importance.

Cattle are equally important to women as to men (Wild et al., 2018). "Significantly, they represent survival and wealth and a woman's ability to feed her children" USAID (2015) in Idris, 2018). By securing bride wealth (dowry) a woman is contributing to the welfare of her father's family, but this also serves to bind the woman to her husband, because the cattle must be restored to his family if the wife leaves the marriage.

Widespread economic dependence on dowries and the objectification of women often leave female youth with limited control over their lives. High dowries are related to domestic violence, as there is the perception that because of the large payment given there is a justification for mistreatment or adultery (Sommers & Schwartz, 2011). High cattle prices discourage a woman from leaving an abusive marriage, as her family would then be expected to repay the bride price to her husband's family (Saferworld, 2019).

With increasing inability of male youth to meet rising dowry demands, many enlisted in militias or joined cattle raids (Price & Orrnert, 2017). In some cases, elders even encouraged youth to go raiding cows for their dowry payments and to gain prestige in the community (Lehman, 2015). Studies by Lehman (2015) in Budy County and the Danish Refugee Council in Rubkona (2017), Idris (2018), Wild et al. (2018) and Saferworld (2019) found that one of the prime motivations to raid cattle is infighting among communities and the need to pay ever-increasing bride prices. These developments threaten peaceful coexistence within and between communities at risk and incentivize a negative role of youth.

Patronage, disenfranchisement and loss of trust

Kuol (Saferworld, 2019) also highlights rising bride prices in the post-2005 period as increasing the susceptibility of young men to patronage by elites, where cattle protection and military loyalty are exchanged for gifts of guns and ammunition from elites (Price & Orrnert, 2017).

According to the interviewees, this is not only a phenomenon linked with dowry prices or cattle ownership. Young people have been heavily engaged in "the armed conflict, recruited by both

the rebels [opposition] and government forces to fight against each [other] for the vision of their elders or leaders." Most of these young people lost their lives on battlefields, and those that survived have grown to distrust traditional authorities and local and national leaders. FGDs with former militia combatants (Lakes State), cattle raiders and gang members (East Equatoria, Unity, Northern and Western Bahr el Ghazal) revealed that youths within these groups felt they had been used at some point in their lives by traditional leaders using patronage systems. They often felt they were abandoned when they were no longer needed. The consolidation of gangs and armed youth groups is seen by many of their members as a direct response to the perceived lack of leadership by and trust of traditional leaders and a way of conveying that no one else "will use them again" and "[they] will now work for [their] own benefit."

Regardless of by whom (opposition, government or traditional leaders), South Sudanese youth consulted by the researchers feel they have been the object of continuous political exploitation. They also now feel they face the options of continuing to be exploited or of taking matters into their own hands (either by violent or peaceful means). The literature supports their views. Research by Jok et al. (2017) found that both the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLA-IO) and the SPLA had undermined cultural institutions (both for Dinka and Nuer) in order to foster recruitment for their armies. Exploitation of ethnic divisions by political elites and rivalries between pastoral communities also aided the formation of armed groups such as the Nuer White Army and the Dinka Titweng (based on pre-existing community defence groups) who engaged in cattle raiding and conflict on their behalf, as well as independently (Idris, 2018). Finally, easy access to guns, in many cases provided by either side, was responsible for increasing the spiral of violence and revenge.

According to Conciliation Resources research on youth perspectives on peace and security in South Sudan (Tumutegyereize & Gew Nhial, 2017), the proliferation of small arms and lawlessness result in increased criminality in the context of high unemployment: "Youth are armed and more powerful than police. So, the police cannot control

the rampant youth criminality in the country […]. Excessive small arms sustain destructive conflicts and reduces youth productivity." The absence of an effective government and policing encourages elders to provide arms for the youth: "There is no effective governance, either by the interim government or the opposition. Elders have become part of the problem, women too in that they encourage cattle raiding, both to support livelihoods and to collect dowries."

The above machinations have eroded the rule of law. With the police and army being controlled by the government, and local leaders divided along political lines on the basis of their own interests or ethnicity, human rights abuses committed by either side were "erased, forgotten or quickly legitimized." Furthermore, traditional mechanisms for intercommunal/intertribal conflict resolution were discarded. Without working judicial and conflict resolution systems, these youth groups could be incentivized to take justice into their own hands, perpetuating the spiral of violence and further undermining the ability of the judicial and police systems to work and thus be trusted and respected.

No say in decision-making processes

Despite having increased access to power through weapons and cattle, youth in these groups said that they felt excluded from the main decision-making processes affecting their futures. Youth leaders, including gang and former militia/youth army leaders, reported that they are rarely included in consultations or reviews of decisions pertaining to local or national peace and reconciliation processes. Those that are, participants argued, are affiliated to a specific political faction, and in many cases are messengers for decisions taken by others, or are driven by the views of the political groups they represent, failing to look beyond ethnic and political divides to find common agendas.

In rural areas, members of the *monyomiji*[5] affirmed that the institution had recently become more of a formality. In particular, as more of its members migrate to urban areas, fewer youth are willing to fully take on the responsibilities that being a

member entails. Consistent with the previous section, young participants across rural areas mentioned that they had been "the pawns in conflicts they did not understand, against people who at some point had been [their] friends and in which they could not make decisions regarding whether or not the fighting could be postponed, avoided or negotiated peacefully." They "only had to obey orders, in order to gain the respect from their communities."

Similar claims have been made by youth in other fora and research. In a Chatham House conference on peacebuilding, reconciliation and community cohesion (2016), participants claimed that youth are not truly free or independent to have their say in decision-making due to community constraints placed on them. One speaker argued that, although youth are given leadership positions in political parties, they "could not necessarily be seen as decision-makers," as they are "supposed to carry out their particular functions in accordance with instructions from the elites that are causing the problem."

The reason for this lack of involvement, according to FGD participants, ranged from "traditional cultures and roles," to "lack of sufficient economic power to be considered" to "the fragmentized nature of youth [political] organizations." Due to the systems of patronage and political 'use and abuse' by the elites described above, youth and their representative organizations were highly divided across tribal and militia lines.

At the rural level, young people "who are both the primary survivors as well as the main perpetrators of violence are largely excluded from national peace processes and dividends. White Army leaders are rarely given prominent roles in regional and national peace processes. Instead, educated youth representatives and politicians are prioritized, which deprives the cattle camp youth directly involved in these conflicts of representation and a sense of ownership over agreements and their implementation" (Breidlid and Arensen in Saferworld, 2017). Young cattle camp women are doubly discriminated against, expected to only have roles as wives, without any say in who they marry or when. They are also seen as rebels and

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5   See more on page 40.

outsiders within their communities if they decide to take a more active role (Chatham House, 2016).

Experts and young women leaders consulted mentioned that youth spaces are dominated by men, with girls and young women encouraged to speak only on behalf of their condition as women. As "spaces within the women's coalitions are more democratic, organized and open than those of youth movements," politically active girls find it easier to express themselves in women's organizations, thus reinforcing the male monopolization of youth spaces.

Yet some changes are occurring, with Conciliation Resources (Tumutegyereize & Gew Nhial, 2017) finding that at "local, rural levels, youth are included in intercommunity dialogues because elders know that if they are not, they may disrupt peace efforts through their armed presence in cattle camps. Most decisions are taken by chiefs, and local authority elders and leaders. Thus, while youth may not make decisions, their active participation is often seen to increase the likelihood of sustained peace." At the national level, experts consulted also pointed to the growth of political and artistic youth movements, and to more of these organizations being led by women. These spaces need to be nurtured and encouraged, while care must be taken not to incentivize triggers of conflict and division.

Furthermore, youth leaders who have been part of the peace negotiation process (including young women) mentioned increasing examples in which youth across political divides have joined forces to consolidate stronger participation in political processes and the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS). A good example is the lobbying in international arenas between 2017 and 2018, which led to the inclusion of article 1.4.5 in the R-ARCSS. This article advances youth interests relative to previous agreements. Parties gave their commitments to "include people of young age in their quotas at different levels" of the political parties and "ensure that the Minister of Youth and Sports in the RTGoNU [Revitalised Transitional Government of National Unity] shall be less than 40 years old."

Loss of protective networks

The last of the common issues described during fieldwork is the fact that many young people have lost their families or community protective networks. The civil war has separated families through forced recruitment or the killing of one or both parents. Unwanted pregnancies or lack of conformity with traditional structures also result in male and female youth being marginalized by their families and communities. Without this support system, and institutions that are able to assist these orphans and disenfranchised youth, these children and youth were forced by circumstance to form and consolidate their own artificial families and community support systems.

Some of the gang members consulted tracked their origins to groups of orphaned and disenfranchised youth who had joined up initially as a mechanism for survival and companionship. During FGDs they mentioned that they "had joined to feel like they belonged somewhere" as they "feel [they] are neglected by their parents and family and left out by the system." Without livelihood opportunities, education or training, members of these artificial networks end up engaged in criminal activities, either by choice or after being incentivized by others.

Furthermore, many of these unaccompanied youth were also at some point child soldiers and/or survivors of human rights abuses. Besides the loss of their families, these young people recognize being "tormented by nightmares and traumas, [but are unable to] openly admit it, as their new support network required them to not show signs of weakness. Even if they decided to look for help, "there [is] none available" or at least none that they knew of. As a result, sometimes their traumas would be faced better through exercising the same abuse they had received.

As mentioned by one of the youth organizations working on trauma and reconciliation, "young people have been survivors of [all kinds] of human rights abuses during the conflict. [But also, these] young people [became the perpetrators] of those offences." When working with these youths, they would choose to see "both their sides, the victim

and the aggressor" and work with them without judgement and with complete confidentiality.

Young girls and women are probably most victimized by the conflict. SGBV is rampant and the lack of support systems had strongest consequences for them, given that their traditional roles in the economy are mainly within their households. As a result, they were and are the most vulnerable to being re-victimized. Unaccompanied young girls are prone to prostitution, and in some cases even join the support network of existing gangs or form their own gangs. For example, young girls in centres for unaccompanied children expressed feeling particularly vulnerable to the "cases of kidnappings, killings and rape that were common in the areas they lived in" and said that in some instances they had to "create a system to protect themselves." Female gang members interviewed said that their participation in these groups is "the best way to protect [our]selves."

Vicious cycles

The sections above show significant common features across youth in different states and youth subcultures. They also highlight the interlocked nature of all these issues, and the vicious cycles they create for youth.

As observed in Figure 1, at the core of all the above issues is the fact that with the CPA in 2005 and then the achievement of independence in 2011 there were very high expectations from all of society, but particularly youth, about the economic and 'opportunity' dividends of peace. Part of the diaspora also returned, bringing with them new cultures and practices, some of which had unintended negative consequences for the youths' independence (increased dowry and a more competitive labour market without a supply to respond).

With civil war and unrest returning in 2013, and instability in the peace deals signed in 2015 and 2018, economic and governance collapse occurred, leading to a state of lawlessness in large parts of the country, with many families and communities being displaced and/or separated. Large segments of South Sudanese youth lost their

protective networks and were recruited to do most of the fighting. In this way, young girls, who are particularly vulnerable to abuse, became both the main perpetrators and the survivors, and "youth circl[ed] into a path of trauma and abuse" (KII with trauma experts).

Without a working economy and functioning state, both of which undermined the quality of the educational system, opportunities for youth were reduced to the minimum. The lucky ones could use a system of patronage to find jobs in the government or the shrinking private sector. Rural youth became embroiled in intercommunal fighting or saw their agricultural earnings eroded by a falling currency and lack of purchasing power in the market. Many others, both in rural and urban areas, had to create their means for survival on their own, which in too many cases meant joining gangs, militias or armed youth groups, or being part of illegal economies. This cycle of violence and lack of rule of law was self-reinforcing, creating a vicious cycle within which opportunities for youth continue to narrow.

Yet an opportunity has risen with new youth organizations being formed, trying to work across political and ethnical divides and aiming to create peaceful solutions to all the above issues, to break this cycle of violence. Whether the cycle is amplified or interrupted depends on how these common issues and interests of youth are addressed, and how new youth subcultures, to be analysed in more depth in the next chapters, can become channels of peace and peaceful change.

Legend:
- Positive reinforcement
- Leads to/causes
- Negative reinforcement

Proliferation of youth organizations looking to increase youth political involvement and create their own peaceful solutions and participation in government

Peace dividend never achieved

Increasing bridal prices (dowries) and cattle dependency

Diaspora youth brings new set of skills, cultures and expectations

Limited and unprotected livelihood options (and increasing food insecurity)

Partial return of diaspora transforms traditional practices and/or creates cultural shocks

High expectations with CPA and achievement of independence

Youth lack of participation in decision-making processes

Economy (markets and currency) collapse

Civil conflict and unstable peace negotiations

Youth now has a common interest: taking the solution into their own hands

Lack of quality education and adequate vocational training

Lack of rule of law and inadequate service provision by the state

Proliferation of small arms

Youth used/recruited and divided by political and armed elites

Children and youth lose protective networks

Ethnic conflict and divide fomented

Gangs, militias and illegal activities are seen by many as the only mechanism to achieve needs

Patronage, disenfranchisement and loss of trust in authorities

War traumas created and never addressed

Communities not protected (or instead attacked) by the state

Specific issues and subcultures by state

After the analysis of the common issues and needs of the youth consulted in this report, the section below will provide information about the specific issues highlighted by those interviewed in each of the states (mainly using quotes from the FGDs and KIIs) and a review of the main youth subcultures reported in each state (which will be analysed in more depth in the next chapter).

STATE

Central Equatoria (Juba)

MAIN CONTEXTUAL ISSUES TO CONSIDER

- Juba has been the epicentre of the political struggle since the beginning of the civil war. Many of the "youth in Juba are either people who were displaced from other areas during the conflict with the North and then the civil war, or returning refugees who are settling back and feel disengaged as they were raised in different cultures which do not fit [in] with traditional settings and customs" (combined information from KII with national youth organizations).

- The best-known youth groups from the diaspora are the 'Khartoumers' and East African refugees. One of the biggest issues with these groups is the "lack of economic opportunities that fit with their expectations, thus many of them are idle" (KII with local organizations). They also do not want to engage

in economic activities for which they feel both "badly prepared and [that are] below [their] standards" (e.g., agriculture and fishing), and feel cheated by their families and government, as they "don't have the economic [and entertainment] opportunities that they had abroad" (FGDs with idle youth). They are therefore the most vulnerable to alcohol, gambling and drug addictions, and many of them end up as members of local gangs (KII with local NGO). Finally, "[they] are seen as outsiders and traitors, and [they are] discriminated [against] by their peers" (KII with local youth organization).

- Many of the "unaccompanied young women living in Juba are either orphans who had to run from their places of origin as a result of violent conflict, or who ran from their houses to avoid being forced into early marriages, or were taken from school by their parents" (from various responses in FGD with women's groups). Most are survivors of SGBV.

- There "are also lots of [unaccompanied minors in Konyo-Konyo area], who are engaged in drug and alcohol addiction and are then utilized by gangs to commit petty crimes, or prostitution in the case of girls." They are "either orphans or live in households where the parents are too busy working in informal economies to provide them with support [… and] many of them have dropped out of school" (combined information from KII with local NGOs).

- Juba is also the centre of a significant number of new youth-based organizations and movements working on supporting each other through the arts, business creation, vocational training and political lobbying.

Youth subgroupings identified

- Criminal subcultures:
    - ✓ N*****, Toronto Boys, HighWays and Thug Life gangs, cattle keepers engaged in cattle raiding Former members of government or opposition militias (membership and culture in many ways coincides with previous group).
- Diaspora youth. Many of them belong to previous groups but have particular cultures and sometimes face discrimination within their own groups.
- Young small business owners (*boda-bodas*, shops).
- Youth engaged in youth organizations and movements linked with the arts, religion, economic matters, women's rights and political activities (see list in Annex E).

STATE

Eastern Equatoria (Torit)

MAIN CONTEXTUAL ISSUES TO CONSIDER

- The state has a plurality of tribes (Lotuko, Acholi, Madi, Lopit, Pari, Tenet, Buya, Didinga, Toposa), with Ikwoto being one of the most diverse and multilingual counties in South Sudan (including Dongowtono, Lango, Imotong, Logir, Eastern Lotuko and minor sub-tribes). Tribes are semi-pastoralist or purely farmers (KII with local researcher and local NGO).

- The state is fragile and prone to conflict as a result of intertribal conflict, which has increased, particularly in the northern areas. Just after independence the state continued being characterized by several issues related to violence, including cattle raids, revenge killing, blood compensation, land conflicts and struggles for scarce water points for the animals. These drivers of conflict are the result of lack of clear land demarcation and fights over access to water points and grazing land. Conflicts are solved only temporarily, and with the proliferation of light/small weapons, control and the possibility for peaceful coexistence is diminishing (KII with local NGOs).

- As in Juba, stereotyping is common towards youth who travelled abroad with their families, as they are not seen as real South Sudanese, and some are regarded as traitors (particularly 'Khartoumers'). They are perceived as being people who have not suffered, did not fight for the country and have a different culture. Yet some of them tend to be more successful in getting better-paid jobs as they are seen as being more knowledgeable, or have completed their education. This can lead to even

more envy and discrimination from local peers (KII with KII with local NGO and information supported by FGD with idle youth and gangs).

- This is one of the states where bride wealth/dowry is increasing substantially, as a result of the issues shared before. This has fed the instances of cattle herding and raiding, as well as increasing attacks on the road, which are leading to even less connection between Torit and the other counties, with fewer resources, markets and services being available in rural areas (KII with INGO researchers).

- Youth in the towns are engaging in "more lucrative" jobs (such as driving *boda-bodas*, laying bricks and working in hotels and restaurants), but those that cannot find employment end up being part of local gangs. In villages, the main activity is agriculture or looking after cattle, but when youths see opportunities in the cities they migrate (information from FGD with *boda-boda* drivers and local NGO).

- *Monyomiji* as a traditional institution is strong in this state, but with many young people having left the rural areas and moved to urban centres only those with "more entrenched conservative (and particularly violent) views are taking power." "When these groups engage in bad practices regularly, the elders or peers in younger age groups take their positions, leading to confrontations, resulting in some *monyomiji* leaving their communities or taking revenge by engaging in cattle raiding against their own community" (KII with former *monyomiji* member).

Youth subgroupings identified

- Pastoralist and semi-pastoralist groups:
  - ✓ *Monyomiji* and *honyomiji*
  - ✓ Young farmers
  - ✓ Informal pastoralist armies.
- Gangs, idle youth.
- Diaspora youth. Many of them belong to other groups but have a particular culture and sometimes face discrimination within their own groups. Their acceptance of economic activities they want to engage in is limited.
- Members or former members of armed youth groups, South Sudan Defence Forces.
- Youth engaged in youth organizations and movements linked with the arts, religion, economic matters, women's rights and political activities.

STATE

Western Equatoria (Yambio)

a different cultural background (i.e., dress codes, attitudes towards sexuality, drug and alcohol abuse). Traditional leaders sometimes request government to collect these youths and train them, but this has been received negatively by these groups" (KII with local organizations). "[These] youths are in many cases unwilling to get involved in what they consider lower jobs, particularly in farming and fishing" (KII with local organizations).

Youth subgroupings identified

- Young farmers.
- Youth from the diaspora.
- Idle youth in all semi-urban areas.
- Small business owners (particularly local traders).
- Rural/semi-urban armed youth groups/gangs (White Arrows).
- Youth engaged in youth organizations and movements linked with the arts, religion, economic matters, women's rights and political activities.

STATE

Northern Bahr el Ghazal (Aweil)

MAIN CONTEXTUAL ISSUES TO CONSIDER

- Western Equatoria has been a mostly peaceful state with the exception of incursions from the Ugandan Lord's Resistance Army. These incursions were very violent and led to the displacement of many families to Central Africa, Uganda and Juba. "Possibly the biggest effect of this is that the 'petty traders,' those responsible for 'monetizing' the local economy, left" (KII with international organization, Western Equatoria).

- "Returning families have lots of needs which humanitarian organizations are trying to cover, and as a result there are many livelihood recovery programmes for farmers and youth. Yet women are rarely targeted in these projects" (KII with local youth organization).

- Most youth from the state joined the SPLA-IO, especially boys and girls under 18 years. This led to school dropouts and idle youth, who now concentrate in urban areas. Some of these youths have been involved in livelihood training programmes, but not all of them find jobs. There are also youths and children who were abducted by militias and are in the process of being reintegrated, but reintegration programmes do not always provide sufficient support (joint information from local organizations).

- There is a lack of technical training programmes in counties outside of Yambio, which leads to some youth migrating to urban areas in search of opportunities (KII with traditional leader in Ezo and Nzara. The same was said by local youth in FGDs).

- Most of the youth who returned from Uganda "bring

MAIN CONTEXTUAL ISSUES TO CONSIDER

- This is one of the most conflict-affected areas in the country, both before and after independence, as a result of its border with Sudan and historical competition for natural resources and wealth between

the two main tribes: the Lou and Dinka (KII with local organization). Interstate conflicts are particularly linked with the long and continued border disputes between Dinka Malual in South Sudan and militias and nomads of Rezeigat and Misseriya in Sudan (KII with local government representatives).

- The economy is dependent on crop farming and keeping of livestock and only a small minority own small business enterprises or are government (or local and international NGO) employees. The main source of livelihood for youth of all levels is cattle and crop farming, but those who came from the bigger cities are not attracted to these jobs and depend on microbusiness in the urban areas (e.g., *boda-boda* drivers, serving in restaurants and hotels) or illegal activities (information taken from different sources including FGDs with local business owners and KIIs with traditional leaders, local organizations and government representatives).

- As with the other states, there are many idle youths from the diaspora. "They feel alienated as they have got adjusted to urban life, are unwilling to return to agricultural labour (which they don't know or find demeaning) but encounter very limited economic opportunities" (KII with local NGOs).

- This is compounded by hyperinflation, which drives youth to dangerous livelihood options. This situation has forced many young people to deviate from and violate the traditional norms and values of their local cultures or to engage in illegal group activities, which they see as their only choice (information taken from different sources, KII and FGDs with local gangs, youth groups and local organizations).

- For girls, "because of the increase in household poverty and lack of opportunities, many end up having earlier pregnancies and [being] forced into early marriage. Many young girls believe that getting married is the only way to improve their standard of living" (KII with local women's association). For many, the dream turns into a nightmare as a result of domestic abuse or the death or disappearance of their husbands, with many not being accepted back at home and thus driven into prostitution (KII and FGD with local women organizations).

Youth subgroupings identified

- Criminal subcultures:
  - ✓ Current or former members of gang groups (N*****, Rud Boys, Young BK, YCMB, Future Boyz and Friends Forever)
  - ✓ Youth involved in cattle raiding and theft.
- Small business owners and beneficiaries of vocational training.
- Diaspora youth. Many may belong to gang groups but, as in other states, they feel different and alienated.
- Rural youth:
  - ✓ Young farmers
  - ✓ Young pastoralists, with some included in criminal subcultures.
- Youth engaged in youth organizations and movements linked with the arts, religion, economic matters, women's rights and political activities.

STATE

Western Bahr el Ghazal (Wau)

MAIN CONTEXTUAL ISSUES TO CONSIDER

- In Western Bahr el Ghazal there are more than 12 tribes, but all of them are from three ethnicities: Fertit (located mainly in Wau and Raja/Raga counties), Luo/Jur (Jur River County), Dinka (smaller, in Jur River County) (KII with local youth organizations).
- There has been a series of communal and political

conflicts in the state after independence in 2011. The first was in 2012 when authorities decided to relocate the city headquarters outside of Wau County. The initial development plan for South Sudan was to turn all major cities into urban hubs, and the decision to relocate the headquarters of the state was supposed to allow better communication and consolidation of the city space. But for the Fertit this was seen as a displacement of their centre of authority, thus allowing other communities to come and grab more power. Since then, this has become a key source of conflict between the Fertit and other ethnic groups (KII with local NGOs). For example, in 2016 there was targeted killing by the South Sudan People's Defence Forces against the local Fertit communities, and in 2017 many incidents of communal and intertribal violence took place in Wau and Jur River counties (KII with local youth organization).

- The above contributed to the displacement of communities, resulted in great loss of life, livelihoods and social fabric, and contributed to the emergence of new violent youth subcultures, particularly armed youth groups (Arrow Boys, Döt ku Beny, Titweng and Mathiang) (KII with local NGOs) and urban gangs.

- Local gangs see themselves as "organization[s] bringing opportunities to youth." They see their main objective as "[teaching] youth how to be independent. This is promoted through regular meetings and compulsory contribution of resources where members have to pay by any means of income" (FGD with local gang). Gangs also offer capacity-building in different areas (e.g., mechanics, carpentry, literacy), with members who have these skills educating and training other youth to give them other means and resources (FGDs with local gang).

- As in other states, return of members of the diaspora (former refugees) has meant that youth are influenced by foreign attitudes, particularly by more liberal views in dress codes, relationships/ sex and aspirations in terms of livelihoods and living requirements. They influence other youth, and in general this is rejected by traditional leaders/ elders. They might be considered to be part of a counterculture (KII and FGD with local religious organization).

Youth subgroupings identified

- Rural subcultures:
  - ✓ Armed youth groups (Arrow Boys, Döt ku Beny)
  - ✓ Farming communities (Raga)
  - ✓ Pastoralist and rural communities, *monyomiji* and those in line to form the *monyomiji*
  - ✓ Gang groups.
- Rural communities (issue to explore is whether Fertit–Luo–Dinka fighting created other youth subcultures besides armed youth groups, including more positive ones).
- Diaspora youth. Many belong to other groups (both positive and negative) but have particular cultures and sometimes face discrimination within their own groups.
- Small business owners.
- Youth engaged in youth organizations and movements linked with the arts, religion, economic matters, women's rights and political activities.

STATE

Lakes (Rumbek)

MAIN CONTEXTUAL ISSUES TO CONSIDER

- Lakes was less affected during the war with the North (Sudan) by displacement and as a result social cohesion was stronger than in other areas. Cattle raiding was not common and communities/tribal groups coexist relatively peacefully. Yet as a result of the civil war, and anti-tribal propaganda from both the government and

opposition, even in areas where peaceful coexistence was strongly rooted, neighbouring clans have started to fight each other. This manifests itself in an increase in cattle raiding (local and international researchers).

- A new issue is 'cattle laundering,' where 'rural gangs' that do not belong to specific clans pretend to be cattle herders from a rival clan and engage in negotiations with neighbouring communities. They steal cattle from both communities and disappear, leaving both communities thinking that the other has been "betrayed and offended." These groups also engage in road ambushes and cattle raids at trading centres, disrupting areas that have been traditionally used to create peaceful economic negotiations between clans. They see themselves as "conflict entrepreneurs" and call themselves rebels, with not a political cause but an economic one (KIIs with local and international researchers).

- A new phenomenon is the use of 'insult songs.' Youth use technology to record songs to promote rivalry and assert their dominance over rival clan groups. In these songs they accuse the opposing group of lack of bravery, strength or wealth (KII with international organization working in the state). This has caused fighting between gangs.

- As in other states, youth who arrived from other countries or regions (mainly Sudan and East Africa) feel different and separated from traditional culture and entitled to jobs that are not available (KII with international organization working in the state).

- As with Eastern Equatoria, Lakes is affected by high dowry prices and "economization of women and girls" (KIIs with international organization) as a survival strategy for families and communities. Young women are the main survivors in this, as they are commonly seen as objects, have to learn to fend for themselves and in most cases are survivors of rape (KIIs with local organization). Despite traditional pastoralist views not being open to women's participation in decision-making, women are seen as important contributors to the community and there is increasing space to allow their participation. Young women can also play a role in incentivizing intercommunal fighting. In some cases, young women saw men's participation in armed raids or confrontations as a demonstration of their ability to protect their community and family – and thus a good mechanism for selecting a marriage proposal (KII with international organization working in the state).

- "Traditional pastoralist culture supports a violent culture: as a young man you have to demonstrate your bravery and strength, and [prove] that you have the means to get married and protect your community.

Yet youth are conscious of the harm that this causes and are open to mechanisms that end the cycle of intercommunal fighting" (KII with international organization working in the state).

Youth subgroupings identified

- Youth in pastoralist camps, including:
  - ✓ Males responsible for the defence of their communities
  - ✓ Young girls with increasing say on intercommunal fighting.
- Current or former members of armed youth groups (Gelweng groups) and 'rural gangs.'
- Members or former members of armed youth groups and South Sudan People's Defence Forces.
- Youth engaged in youth organizations and movements linked with the arts (including rappers of 'insult songs'), religion, economic, women rights and political activities (see list in Annex E).

STATE

Unity (Bentiu)

MAIN CONTEXTUAL ISSUES TO CONSIDER

- Before 2011 and immediately after independence, the state had a majority Nuer and minority Dinka population. The state was organized under a strong traditional system, which guided the activities of youth and maintained relative peace (although in some cases youth were sent to defend their communities as cattle herders and raiders).

As government institutions were established, law agencies engaged in some expressions of oppression, and given the composition of the state, political violence spread quickly and lead to in-fighting between the main clans, rupturing the traditional peaceful social structures. The Gojjam, Bul Nuer Jeish in Bor and minority Dinka armed youth groups have been the main youth actors in this conflict (information collected from a variety of KIIs with local and international youth organizations).

- Conflict between different youth groups is high. There is a possibility of conflict due to the land dispute issues between counties, *payams* and *bomas*, and especially along the borders between the Ruweng administrative area and Rubkona, Guit and Mayom counties. There is jealousy between the youth groups (gangs and Gojjam members[6] envy the youth working for NGOs). There is a possibility of conflict because of unresolved issues of cattle rustling/thefts and issues of revenge killings and unsettled blood feuds. These revenge killings normally target educated youth, especially those in the villages (they do not target the perpetrators of the criminal act or act of violence, but rather the educated; this includes youth from the cattle camps) (KII with local youth organization).

- This has resulted in the consolidation of new youth subcultures established around illegal activities: money and arms launderers, and cattle raiders incentivized by the lack of economic opportunities. After 2011, cattle laundering became more violent and led to an increase in intercommunal fighting (information mainly collected from FGD with local youth organization, and also mentioned in KIIs with international researchers).

- The main livelihood opportunities for youth are related to illegal or violent activities: revenge killings, cattle raids, drug abuse, money laundering, violent robberies, gang affiliation, target killings, illicit trade in small arms, and/or illegal activities such as cattle rustling/herding, and provision of services/goods (KII with local youth organizations).

- Civil war created political groups aligned to their own interests, which used the youth to consolidate their power, but also gave youth an opportunity to acquire power that they did not have before (KII with national youth organization).

- Cattle raiding has become particularly prevalent. "Cattle can define your destiny as a young person, determining who you marry and what you can do" (KII with national youth organization).

- There are two main youth categories in the state: youth living in villages in rural areas who are still obedient to traditional culture and leaders, and those in urban centres with a culture that is not particular to Unity State, which in some ways goes against the traditional views. There is a huge gap between these two groups in terms of access to information and opportunities (KII with international peacebuilding organization).

Youth subgroupings identified

- Current and former members of armed youth groups, including the Gojjam, Jeish in Bor and minority Dinka armed youth groups.
- Pastoralist youth: in many cases part of the above.
- Urban/semi-urban gangs.
- Young small business owners (traders, *boda-boda* owners).
- Youth engaged in youth organizations and movements linked with the arts (including rappers of 'insult songs'), religion, economic matters, women's rights and political activities (see list in Annex E).

6 Gojjam is another name for White Army. The name comes from pro-SPLM–IO areas in southern Unity where armed youth groups rejected the name 'White Army,' which was considered to be both dated and limited to eastern Nuer. Instead, the youths adopted the name 'Gojjam,' which was already used as a nickname for the bodyguards of Nuer SPLA leader William Nyuong, who had borrowed it from Ethiopia's Gojjam province, home of some of the Ethiopian SPLA trainers, who were renowned for their bravery (Craze et al., 2016).

3. Emerging and changing youth subcultures in South Sudan: The underlying incentives for violence

The discussion above has shown that there are many common youth subcultures or groups across the seven states covered by this study. The descriptions indicate that it would be relatively easy to try to classify the groups as positive or negative, or either more or less prone to violence. This should be resisted because as one young respondent noted, doing so "creates the risk of creating preconceived notions or assumptions that are not valid for all the members of these groups, and to further create alienation between those groups seen as violent."

Furthermore, "youth in South Sudan are all in danger of being incentivized towards violence; [...] [they] are just a [fire-]match waiting to be lighted if the conditions are there" (FGD with gangs, Eastern Equatoria). "Conditions are set by the continuation of a civil war that incentivizes ethnic and [accentuates] geographical divisions, destroys families and communities, makes weapons more available, and does not allow the state to fulfil its basic roles" (KII with local organization, Western Equatoria). Then, the "lack of sustainable peace, reconciliation, justice and accountability processes" (FGD with women, Lakes), the "absence of spaces for dialogue and participation that allow youth to have a voice" (KII with *monyomiji*), and the "narrowing options to make an honest livelihood" (FGD with gangs, Juba) just further "drives those more vulnerable towards the violence they abhor" (KII with local youth organization, Juba).

The analysis will try to avoid these preconceived classifications and instead focus on understanding

how these subcultures work, their inner structures, their particular motivations and interests, and the extent to which the above incentive structures make them more or less inclined towards violent behaviours. Finally, the analysis will seek to understand how some of the youth subcultures can reverse or stop these violent behaviours, either within their own youth groups or across others. For this, the relevantly neutral geographical classification system in Annex A is used, which is also compatible with classifications in related research (Price & Ornnert, 2017; Sommers & Schwartz, 2011). It is important to recognize that youth membership of a subculture is neither fixed nor unique.

The research found examples of young people who identified themselves as being part of two or three different subcultures, either simultaneously or at different periods of their lives. Youth also had different degrees of involvement and identification with the youth subcultures they associated with

and, in some cases, said that they were seen by others as being part of youth subcultures to which they had not chosen to belong, but in which they were "boxed" by their peers. Despite the identities they had not "chosen," these 'artificially externally imposed' identities regularly determined the opportunities to which they had access and the kinds of relations they had with other youth, and thus the level of risk and incentives for violence.

The information provided below comes mainly from information provided directly by youth and youth movements, but given the limitations highlighted in terms of reaching youth in rural areas, information from secondary sources (particularly recent related research) will be used when needed.

Youth subcultures in urban and semi-urban areas

Gang groups

The phenomenon of youth gangs in urban and semi-urban areas is not new. "Even during the war with the North, there were groups of youth in cities [such] as Juba or Torit whose common point of association was to be working together to commit small acts of armed or non-armed robbery or selling illegal drugs and alcohol" (FGD with youth organizations, Juba). Some of these groups started initially as peaceful youth associations, for example the youth in various neighbourhoods around Juba that formed groups whose main objective was to organize parties (*deejees*) and that were mainly influenced by music cultures, especially old-school hip hop. These subcultures developed their own slang, dress codes and group names, and as economic opportunities diminished, they developed into gangs (KII with national youth organization).

Many of the youth and organizations interviewed mentioned that the situation had worsened in the past five years, "as more and more youth and kids joined the gangs, when no solution for the country seem[ed] to be at hand" (FGD with youth organization, Unity). Urban gangs were mentioned as a strong and emerging youth subculture in most of the capital areas covered in this study. Even where they were not (Yambio, Western Equatoria),

research found an indication that militias/armed youth groups (White Arrows) initially associated with the protection of the state against armed groups from Uganda (Lord's Resistance Army) were now taking on characteristics more closely associated with urban gangs. They were also engaging in cattle raids and robbery in rural areas (see more in the rural section).

Memberships or structures of these groups are not homogeneous. Members come from a variety of backgrounds, from former members of militias/armed youth groups and cattle rustlers, to unaccompanied children or orphans, to children who abandoned their households because of domestic violence or lack of support/food security, to those still living with their parents and using gang membership to support their families economically. Many of their members have dropped out of school, although a few of them with technical training, but unable to find a job, joined the groups to survive. "Many youths who join these gangs [...] said they joined these groups to feel like they belong somewhere" (KII with national youth organization).

Gang structure can be very organized and hierarchical (having 'treasurers' and 'ministers,' e.g., N***** and Thug Life in Central Equatoria and Eastern Equatoria) or less structured but equally focused on ensuring a mechanism to protect each other and "ensure the successful achievement of their businesses" (the Toronto Boys have "a finance/resource manager who keeps all the items [they] get on [their] daily runs"). In some cases they also report having a "main boss with strong political connections who allow[s] them to be released quickly if they are caught" (KII with former gang leader, Central Equatoria) and ensures that their weapons are not confiscated.

These structures also demand, in various degrees, financial compensation from their members, or complete loyalty. This makes it very difficult for them to abandon the groups without fearing repercussions against their life or dignity.

In general, gang members see their common purpose as "to win the future and survive, [...] [because] watching their families not having sufficient food is not easy to do without wanting to

do something" (FGD with gang members, Northern Bahr el Ghazal). Many of them are united around similar views of rejection towards traditional power authorities and see membership of these gangs as a way "to create their own system of justice and authority" (FGD with gang members, Juba) given the failure of "those who tried to control them before." The aim is thus the consolidation of new structures of power that work in their favour, instead of using them.

The result is structures that go beyond the provision of a livelihood or protection network to create a group that provides "entertainment – parties, chaos, women and achieves popularity [shows strength] among other youth" (FGD with gang members, Juba), and more positively, to "encourage each other [including financially] to complete their education or to set their own business" (FGD with gang members, Eastern Equatoria). In all of the FGDs conducted with these groups, members mentioned having other "part-time jobs," including "microbusiness of selling shoes and belts, casual work like building a house or being *boda-boda* drivers" (FGD with gang members, Juba), and described how their membership of the group had allowed them to "strengthen their secondary economic activities" by providing them with loans, mentors and a reputation that "would ensure them authority and recognition."

"Group influence" motivated many of them, with peers in their schools or street "showing how fruitful it was to engage with them" (FGD with gang members, Central Equatoria), or they were "encouraged by the example of successful people from other countries [rappers, urban artists] who achieved power, respect and money and then used their experience to share the common [and untold] stories of youth" (FGD with gang members, Eastern Equatoria). Music, television and movies seem to play a strong part in the setting of group identities, and artistic and music talent within the groups is encouraged as a way of strengthening such identities and narrating members' own stories and ambitions.

Despite the similarities, the level of violence used by these groups varies substantially.

Local authorities, traditional leaders and local researchers agree that the use of weapons and violent confrontation between different groups has increased recently. Groups such as the Toronto Boys were also seen as "relatively peaceful" (youth activist, Eastern Equatoria), mainly "grabbing items like cash, phones and laptops from easy targets that would not usually even notice they were robbed until later" (FGD with gang members, Juba).

As the groups increase in number and size, rivalry around women, territories, fashion, parties and power can lead to verbal or 'musical' confrontations (e.g., by sending each other WhatsApp rap songs humiliating one another). If offence is taken or a worse offence is committed (e.g., stealing the leader's girlfriend) the situation will escalate into violence (information from various FGDs in Unity, Lakes and Juba). For example, in Rumbek youth activists mentioned that "rivalry between street children and gangs and the crimes they are committing is alarming […] with many ending in open confrontations in the streets in which not even the police will intervene as they are at a disadvantage [in numbers and weapons]" (KII with local organization, Juba).

The risk of even more violent escalation (and SGBV) is also increasing as many of the group members are "engaged in drugs [opium, mairungi, shisha, sniffing petrol] and alcohol addiction" or purposely encourage addiction in young members of the groups (who in a few years will become the leaders) in order to "make them docile and courageous, and lead them to commit petty crimes, or prostitution in the case of girls" (KII with local researcher, Eastern Equatoria). Furthermore, as "many of these youths have been the victims of abuse, they suffer from recurrent mental issues, which in some cases can motivate uncontrollable violence" (KII with local organization, Central Equatoria). This leads some to conclude that what is "happening in the country as a whole […] will just lead to an ever-increasing spiral of resentment and killing, if not stopped (KII with local NGO).

So what opportunities exist to break this chain of violence? The needs expressed by these groups are no different from those of other youth groups. They demand: (1) better access to education and

vocational training that is appropriate for their age and adequate for the markets; (2) mentorship, skills and financial support to start their own businesses; (3) opportunities to engage in cultural (murals/graffiti, concerts/parties, being part of musical groups) and sport activities (football, domino, chess) in their free time; (4) freedom of expression to "listen to the music and dress as they like" without being targeted by the police; (5) to express their political positions and participate in political processes; (6) accountability and "justice for the crimes committed against them and their friends"; and more generally (7) basic infrastructure (health, education, roads) that would allow them to live their lives and develop their businesses (collected from the FGDs).

These needs indicate that more general youth programmes can incorporate solutions to tackle violent behaviours within gangs, ruling out having to create specific programmes for these subcultures. A critical recommendation given by organizations working with this type of subculture is the importance of avoiding prejudices and fomenting fragmentation. Assuming that all gang members are prone to violence or illegal activities, or that all gangs can be engaged with in the same manner is likely to create inefficient interventions. Seeing gang members only through the lens of their membership of these groups does not allow them to be integrated into other groups and inhibits naturally occurring reconciliation processes.

For example, gang members participating in youth empowerment interventions in Juba mentioned that "weekly football games, communal parties or teas and meals after the games have helped [them] to unite with the other gang groups, [...] even leading to marriages across groups and opportunities to develop other activities [small businesses] together." Organizations working in the education sector mentioned that successful approaches towards these groups "actually involve not having a differential approach, nor creating exclusive classrooms for them." Instead they "focused on educating teachers to understand possible triggers of conflict, and to give all the students peacebuilding skills and the space to discuss openly [and peacefully] challenges that are common for all."

Finally, youth organizations working with these youth subcultures mentioned the importance of providing psychosocial support to address trauma (this is also applicable to armed youth, idle youth and cattle raiders). Among the recommendations provided was the need for more bespoke research on the South Sudanese context, while allowing for gender and cultural differences to be reflected in the approaches taken. International research and local experience (St. Amour, 2020) also point to the need to make the youth key participants in the process of deciding these approaches, and especially to the necessity of creating a parallel path between programmes focused on community reconciliation and peacebuilding, and one-to-one psychosocial support.

Informed recommendations such as these show that there are already many knowledgeable local and international organizations working successfully with these groups (see Annex E). They could be engaged in any new programmes to achieve greater efficiencies and impact. These organizations have already developed networks of trust and in-depth understanding of the particularities of specific gangs. They have learned that any interventions with these groups need to be "regular, unrelenting, patient and thus long-termed" (KII with local NGO, Eastern Equatoria).

Urban small business owners and providers

Despite members of this youth group not having distinct styles nor in some cases behaviour, interviews at the onset of the research classified small business owners as being part of a youth urban subculture given their common motivations and interests, and, in some cases, the similar way in which they operate and mobilize to meet their needs. Within this group, the research was able to find a variety of subgroups, including *boda-boda* owners and drivers, traders, owners of small stores, construction workers and business owners, as well as other small entrepreneurs. Of these, only one category is specifically reviewed in this research, given their homogeneity, vulnerability and association with other groups engaging in violent and criminal practices: the *boda-boda* owners and drivers.

The research found evidence of organized associations of these business owners in all seven state capitals. Regardless of the state, these organizations had similar objectives, including ensuring good working conditions, avoiding risks (e.g., accidents, robbery and other crimes) or exploitation by other groups, and creating a safety network for mutual support. Group membership provides access to saving and lending arrangements at lower interest rates (to either expand the services provided or engage in other active businesses and investments), and collaboration and support in case of accidents and any damage that requires repair of motorbikes. Many of the youth interviewed in this category also mentioned having grown up together, either in POC camps or as militia/Gelweng members and cattle rustlers (FGDs with *boda-boda* drivers in Juba, Bentiu, Rumbek and Torit).

Yet some of these organizations differed in the way they associated with other youth subcultures, especially gangs. Some organizations, for example, perceived urban gangs as a key risk to their businesses and actively sought to protect themselves from them (given the lack of protection by local authorities).

Many of the members of *boda-boda* associations mentioned having been part of gangs "but reformed with the help of the group to be business entrepreneurs as local transport operators" (FGD with *boda-boda* drivers, Bentiu). Other groups' members said that either agreements were reached with gangs for protection or that a large number of its own owners were gang members, which created an invisible protection mechanism. In some cases, there is even an explicit recognition of a joint history. The Toronto Boys in Juba were described as having been formed from a group of *boda-boda* drivers that used to get together in Juba's Toronto Hotel to play cards. In times of crisis they had turned to robbery as a mechanism to sustain their livelihoods (FGD with small business owners, Juba and KII with former gang member, Juba).

While this youth subculture does not engage in violent behaviour, and in many ways can be seen as a first exit point from gangs or other armed groups, it is a risk group. Gang members and cattle rustlers interviewed mentioned having been *boda-boda* drivers at some point and having turned to gangs and militias as the "number of passengers was not sufficient to give all a good living" (FGDs with gangs, Northern Bahr el Ghazal). Youth organizations, local authorities and traditional leaders also saw some *boda-boda* drivers and owners as facilitators of illegal businesses, and as a group particularly vulnerable to mobilization by armed militias. Finally, in states such as Unity and Eastern Equatoria local authorities and CSOs mentioned an increasing number of violent conflicts between *boda-boda* drivers and associations, either regarding "sharing of territories" or resulting from personal grievances. Many drivers are armed, mainly as a source of self-protection, increasing the risk of escalation of violence.

As with gang groups, interventions do not need to be specific to these groups, but they do need to have a good understanding of their business dynamics and provide skills and financial mechanisms to allow them safety networks and sustainability in their businesses (KII with international organization, Eastern Equatoria).

The provision of skills outside the *boda-boda* business is emphasized as a mechanism that would allow the diversification of their livelihoods. Teaching them peacebuilding skills would avoid the rising cases of violent conflict (KII with local organization, Juba). Finally, rule of law programmes that would guarantee transparent, fair and working local policing authorities (particularly with regard to community policing) were seen as the only long-term solution to ensure that *boda-boda* drivers and associations do not need to take their protection into their own hands (KII with local organization, Eastern Equatoria).

Idle youth

As in the case of *boda-boda* drivers, idle youth is mentioned continually as an emerging subculture because of common motivations (in this case, finding activities for entertainment and providing company), and also because they have similar hobbies (e.g., chess, football, dominoes and gambling) and in some cases similar dress codes and music tastes.

Members of these groups highlighted that in some cases they were "each other's only families [... and had come together] because of the generosity and loyalty they had towards each other" (FGD with idle youth, Eastern Equatoria). Often, they were orphans, former child soldiers or children abandoned by their families for many other reasons (FGD with orphans, Northern Bahr el Ghazal). In all cases reported, they had dropped out of school either because they "do not feel the skills they were taught were adequate" (FGD with idle youth, Eastern Equatoria), because they lacked the resources to continue their studies or because they were embarrassed to study with children younger than themselves (FGD with vocational training beneficiaries, Western Bahr el Ghazal).

Idle youth were identified by youth organizations and CSOs interviewed as one of the youth subcultures at highest risk of being incorporated into cultures of violence. "Idle youth [like me] had a fork road in front of them [...]. There were those that could be taken back into the school system or encouraged to start their own businesses [...]. There were others that would inevitably be driven back into militias, armed youth groups or gangs" (KII with former beneficiary of vocational training organizations).

Similar solutions to addressing youth idleness were recommended by CSOs, including the creation of accelerated learning programmes to ensure that young people who are behind in their studies and feel ashamed of returning school can study with other children their own age and finish their studies quickly (KII with international education association). They could be provided with access to temporary sources of income to ensure motivation and ability to stay in the programme.

The creation of engaging and useful curricula is also a key factor. "Without idle youth being motivated to learn in areas they are interested in, even the more useful skills would seem dull and risk school dropout" (KII with local youth organization).

As in programmes with gang members, it is important to consider from the onset that "the rate of success could be small initially, as youth who

were not used to sitting in classrooms might see their old friends in the streets or making their own money and feel a strong attraction towards their old life."

Only prolonged, long-term interventions are likely to achieve sustainable results, as these can show by example what success looks like, and thus create other examples of success (KII with international education organization).

Urban youth movements and organizations

Fieldwork revealed cycles of violence and mistrust created by years of civil war and division, but there were also positive developments among the youth across all states. Gang members in Juba mentioned that "the youth is now grabbing every opportunity to generate change, they are helping each other to start businesses, constructing houses or addressing past pains and traumas."

Long-time researchers of South Sudan also saw potential for change, as the youth is slowly consolidating itself as a single movement, and even bringing together rural and urban youth. Youths are starting to see that they have common issues around which they can build coalitions. In particular, they are starting to realize that the 'older guard' benefits from fragmentation among the youth and slowly they have begun to overcome this matter. Youth organizations are recognizing that "change in the country will come from the bottom: young people and people in grassroots organizations coming together and creating independent thought to unite [...] with the purpose of being globally connected and locally engaged" (KII with youth organization, Juba).

A key element is the willingness of youth organizations to start working together instead of competing for resources. A consequence of years of development aid being pumped into the country is that the international community has contributed to fragmentation through the rush to provide the new state with resources, a lack of coordination and control, and monitoring difficulties. International organizations have often unwisely assisted too many small, uncoordinated programmes through regional or local intermediaries. Without other sources of support, organizations have been too

willing to do anything they were asked to do, even though they lacked the expertise. Their initial success incentivized the creation of organizations only on paper (KII with international researchers).

Youth and experts interviewed mentioned that in the last five years youth movements had used the arts/music, food, education or dialogue as a way to build bridges across ethnic and geographical divides. Youth groups with religious affiliations were also seen as being on the rise, with local and international churches providing funds to compensate for diminishing flows from the international development community. These organizations use their grassroots movements to design and deliver their programmes (KII with religious organizations, Western Equatoria and Lakes).

Such organizations are already working with youth in rural areas, gang members and idle youth and are supporting entrepreneurship, the arts and music. "During this time the youth have found ways to adapt to the situation at hand. More youth are seeing opportunities to participate in the political environment by joining the parties of their choice. Others have tried to find ways to survive [by] joining the informal sector and starting small businesses, [as well as] exploring business opportunities [particularly in agriculture and fishing] that were initially ignored by the South Sudanese youth." (KII with national youth organization).

Evidence was obtained that in some cases these organizations have found sustainable mechanisms to engage with at-risk groups and slowly start to incentivize them towards more peaceful behaviours. Representatives of international donor agencies and international NGOs are becoming more enthusiastic in their support.

Women's organizations have also flourished. Many of their chief executive officers (CEOs) and members were motivated to work together because of their frustration at continuing to be victims of SGBV while not receiving any kind of support from the state or local authorities.

These organizations began cooperating in the central states (Western Equatoria, Central Equatoria, Lakes and Jonglei) by adopting similar advocacy approaches and using similar frameworks to provide psychosocial, judicial and livelihood support to victims. The organizations have a goal to establish a protection network so that victims may move across states to find new sources of livelihoods and protection mechanisms when needed (KII with local organizations, Northern and Western Bahr el Ghazal).

Worryingly, KIIs and FGDs revealed increasing risks for these emerging groups. A less fragmented youth is not a good outcome for certain traditional elites that rely on sowing division to increase their power. Traditional leaders and even some youth, enmeshed in the cycle of violence and retribution, and affected by years of ethnic cross-fighting, have difficulty engaging with efforts to bring different ethnic groups together (KII with local lecturer and youth expert, Juba). In the case of women's organizations, aggressors or those protecting them could target women leaders or members of the organizations (FGD with local women's organization, Northern Bahr el Ghazal).

There is also the possibility that new leadership has not been built consistently within these groups. This generates dependency on a few leaders, with gaps in leadership leading to groups breaking up (as has happened in the past). A focus on short-term outcomes among many of the members can also affect organizations' sustainability (FGDs with women's organizations and local youth researchers in Juba and Lakes).

Finally, the lack of longstanding youth coalitions, bringing youth together across political and tribal divides, is also linked to the specific characteristics of youth. Youth is a transient stage, as well as a time where capacity and positions are being consolidated. Youth leaders face a dilemma when defining their positions. On the one hand, youth stances are influenced by their family, community, ethnic background and systems of patronage. On the other hand, youth are defined by their own political opinions, which vary over time as new experiences and knowledge are gained. A major barrier for youth is to decide what they represent. A second is when young leaders try to have their opinions heard and considered. By the time a common agenda has been crafted, many of the

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youth leaders are not young anymore, and the views they hold may no longer be in line with the needs of those younger that themselves (KIIs with female leaders).

How can these movements and emerging organizations be supported? In all cases the organizations requested that a more localized approach be taken by international donors and organizations, by involving more grassroots movements in their programmes and delivering through youth within each state (even if that implied creating capacities from scratch).

Increasing or maintaining funding or material support, and particularly joining or at least ensuring coordination across different streams of funding is also highlighted. Creating mechanisms to ensure longer timeframes for implementation (with the recognition that sustainable change needs time), or jointly supporting programmes involving evidence-gathering and flexible funding to deliver in accordance with the findings were also mentioned.

Lastly, international researchers highlighted the need to create mitigation or preventive strategies regarding the above-mentioned risks (including integrating protection mechanisms within rule of law programmes for youth and women's organizations at risk), as well as to continue to support research or evaluation of the programmes delivered by these groups to orientate and improve future interventions.

A question not resolved by this research, and which possibly needs to be reviewed with these new organizations, is how to support more representation of youth within the design and implementation of the peace process. Women's representation is now guaranteed at 35 percent in the R-ARCSS and 25 percent by law in political institutions and related activities, but the same is not true for youth. The absence of "youth platforms across ethnic and political divides is raised as one of the factors that inhibits youth involvement in peacebuilding and contributing to security" (Tumutegyereize & Gew Nhial, 2017). Thus, an area to explore is whether these emerging organizations also offer the chance to create more representative platforms within political arenas and in decision-making.

Women have a long history of political participation in previous national peace agreements and more widely in Africa. This has been strongly supported by the Women, Peace and Security agenda (Security Council Resolution 1325) which is now 20 years old. This agenda has resulted in stronger networks of women's organizations that work across tribal and national divides, understand their common challenges and work together to achieve collective objectives. With the consolidation of the Youth, Peace and Security agenda, women's organizations expect the same to happen to youth organizations and youth participation in political processes. In the meantime, a possible way forward is to use the experience of women's coalitions to explore best practices and accelerate the progress already seen, including the possibility of encouraging young women and girls to be the leaders of change.

Youth subcultures in rural areas

As mentioned in the methodology section, this research was not able to obtain much direct information from youth in rural areas. Therefore, gaps have been dealt with by research from secondary sources or opinions provided by CSOs and local and international researchers working in these areas. We would like to recognize the large contribution here from organizations such as Nonviolent Peaceforce, Saferworld, Ana Taban and Oxford Policy Management.

Armed pastoralists/armed youth groups

According to Saferworld (2017) "youth armed pastoralists are part of a much wider context of community protection forces and informal armed groups."

In the past, these militias were consolidated as a result of (1) the need to protect local communities from pre-independence attacks by Sudanese forces and allied militias, and post-independence attacks by cattle raiders, militias and others; (2) the political contest for power during the civil war, when individual quests for power became conflicts among entire ethnic communities; and (3) localized competition for resources that has occurred along ethnic lines – cattle raiding. These reasons

still hold but the last-mentioned is becoming increasingly important with grazing areas reducing in size and more communities sharing them (KII with local organization, Western Bahr el Ghazal).

The creation of Yirol and Gok as states between 2016 and 2020 made the problems worse. "There were many counties that were created, and even more artificial borders were traced […]. Many issues of fighting over grazing land and water points were then created […] and traditional mechanisms to solve conflicts with other ethnic groups were eroded, with fragmentation happening even within the same ethnic lines […]. Before 2013 there was no limit of movement and travel; politicians then created borders so they could win power."

The increasing importance of cattle as a stable source of economic power and as the main currency used to pay bride prices adds incentives to protect the cattle by any means. In turn, this impacts traditionally accepted ways in which other communities are required to make reparations when cattle is stolen or harmed (KII with local researcher, Lakes). With a statutory rule of law system that is weak and unable to "implement order outside the towns […] youth militias and traditional leaders are taking [the] law into their own hands by raiding and stealing cattle as compensation for past grievances" (FGD with former militia members, Lakes).

As stated by OPM in their research on the dynamics of pastoralist communities in western Lakes State (OPM, 2020), "there is a normalization of violence that permeates the reality of the cattle camps in Lakes State […]. Despite a rich tradition, legacy, community, discipline, organization and an aspiration for a peaceful and prosperous future, the commitment to their understanding of justice, which the government is not guaranteeing even where there are agreements, means revenge becomes the default."

"The cattle camp youth are direct perpetrators of violence, and this is the fruit of carefully planned and coordinated attacks" rather than random, unsanctioned attacks (OPM, 2020). Young women also play a role by encouraging young men in Gelweng groups to demonstrate their value in the ensuing fights (Tumutegyereize & Gew Nhial, 2017).

Treating youth in pastoralist communities as being violent does not help to engage with them, and in fact creates obstacles (KII with international researchers).

OPM has found that "there is strong evidence that an overwhelming majority of the cattle camp respondents are increasingly conscious of the trauma it brings and are desperate for it to end." A number of cultural, administrative and technological shifts are working against this aspiration.

Respondents pointed to the lack of rule of law and incitement by a number of external actors, including members of the diaspora and those from urban areas, as initial motivators of violence. These communities "have different channels/structures to solve issues and conflict, and it has reached a point where they feel that they have tried to engage [at] all levels, and no one really comes to listen to them or solve the problem" (KII with international and local researchers). As a result, "the traditional concept of *kon koc* ('wait a minute'), whereby communities would ascertain the underlying cause of an issue before retaliating, has been almost completely eroded" (OPM, 2020).

Ending this cycle requires reorienting the incentive structure to avoid violence being the default response to violence. This will not result from a single activity, but likely emerge from a combination of different activities over an extended period of time. These might include non-traditional educational programmes, the provision of agricultural equipment and life skills, additional research, 'live' community peacebuilding agreements or the development of regional leadership networks, and recognizing the role Gelweng youth leaders and young women and girls (OPM, 2020).

This also involves a more consistent approach in dealing with pastoralist communities, based on evidence and particularly on understanding and respecting the roles of armed youth groups and their systems of incentives. Researchers and national and international CSOs consulted agree that programmes in pastoralist areas are hugely fragmented and transient portfolios, with no coherence in their approach. International efforts are focused on the number of signed agreements

rather than the long-term approach that is to follow implementation, and monitoring reasons for failure or success. Feedback loops are also often not included.

The focus on results and short timelines to implement programmes also means that preparation is rushed. Research in pastoralist areas done by OPM (2020), Idris (2018), Bedigen (2019) and Simonse (1998) points to the importance of creating relationships with these communities on a step-by-step basis and over an extended period of time. It requires advance research about the specific power dynamics within the communities in which work is to be developed, finding the right entry points, and being open to discussing objectives and timeframes and changing course if needed. The OPM researchers, for instance, found that their initial assumptions on traditional leaders or community representatives in urban areas being the appropriate entry points were incorrect. In fact, Gelweng youth played a large part in the decision-making process. Recognizing that and taking them into consideration played a large part in the success of the research, and left the doors open for future interventions.

Finally, international focus has also changed, continually depending on what the emergency is 'at the moment'. This leaves 'non-priority' communities on their own, and when agreements fail without an understanding of the reasons for the failure there is a sense that peacebuilding and reconciliation interventions are not worthwhile, rather than an understanding that specific approaches might not work.

Monyomiji

This research was requested to review additional information on the changes being experimented with by traditional youth structures known as *monyomiji*. The etymology of the word *monyomiji* is derived from a Lotuko word meaning 'owners of the village.' The word is widespread among the related Lotuko-speaking tribes in Eastern Equatoria. Among the Lotuko, belonging to an age set ranging from 18 to 40 years qualifies one for being called a *monyomiji,* but this happens only once their members undergo initiation. It takes 22 years for

the next generation to take over, but importantly, this will happen next year with strong potential to influence change amongst the new generation. (KII with *Monyomiji* Union and local researcher, Eastern Equatoria).

Similarly, among the Dongotono tribe in Eastern Equatoria *monyomiji* members have to undergo initiation; however, it takes about 5 or 10 years for the next generation to take over, depending on how prepared they are to protect the community. Thus, a key part of initiations is the demonstration of physical power (KII with local researcher). As a result, a *monyomiji* member can be anywhere between 20 and 60 years of age, and thus, despite being a power institution where "youth are represented, [it] cannot be seen as a group composed only by youth" (KII with *Monyomiji* Union, Eastern Equatoria).

"While the basic structure of the *monyomiji* system is the same among the different societies practising it, there is considerable variation in the concrete elaboration of the age system: in the procedures of recruitment, in the length of the period of rule, in the presence or absence of an overlap between successive generations, and in the synchronization of the transfer of power between different territorial levels (section, village, kingdom)" (Simonse, 1998). They are responsible for the welfare of the community, for its security, peace, moral integrity, and also its harmony with cosmic forces; and failure in guaranteeing this, whether or not within their means, can lead to "premature departure" (Simonse, 1998).

Generally, the system utilizes a community's societal customs, laws, beliefs and practices to resolve issues of concern, restore relationships and bring tangible benefits to the aggrieved (Bedigen, 2017; Jok et al., 2004; and Bradbury et al., 2006 in Bedigen, 2019). The *monyomiji* conflict resolution and peace processes are flexible, "taking into account the particular social contexts of disputes, rather than any rigid application of written laws" (Leonardi et al., 2010, in Bedigen, 2019). Because of this, up to 90 percent of criminal and civil cases in the family and intra- and interethnic situations are resolved by the *monyomiji* in rural areas (ibid.). Contrary to other youth systems, the *monyomiji* are

also expected to demonstrate exemplary behaviour at all times (Simonse & Kurimoto, 2011), and as a result are they highlighted as key stakeholders in peacebuilding, mediation and reconciliation processes.

The findings regarding this group are limited to conversations with *monyomiji* members in urban areas, and the considerations of local and international organizations and researchers working with them.

In general, the results provide a largely peaceful characterization of *monyomiji,* who are also important players in local and regional peace negotiations, particularly in Eastern Equatoria. This role seems to be part of the context and history of these groups. According to research from Saferworld (2020), this "collective avoided being drawn into the fighting between the Sudan People's Liberation Army in Opposition (SPLA-IO) and the government, [...] because they were well armed and organized and had clear lines of communication with the state and county government in Torit, and [...] abstained from collectively joining or sheltering the armed opposition." As a result, "the *monyomiji* played an important informal role in local confidence-building and security cooperation between both groups" (Harriman et al., 2020).

The *monyomiji*, according to members of armed youth groups who were interviewed, are also different because "they were traditionally respected as a source of authority and decision-making," and not only as part of the "protection mechanisms of a village or community." This means that decisions taken by *monyomiji* on issues such as resource distribution, ownership, reparation of crimes, and even the "decision to use violence as a mean of solving a conflict, are respected and upheld."

Former members and members of *monyomiji* unions in semi-urban areas mention that their involvement depends on whether "they have jurisdiction" over the specific problem or whether local leaders in the areas in which they are proposed to act as mediators are willing to receive them. *Monyomiji* do not seek to solve problems in areas that are not their own. This avoids confrontations with those local communities.

Pressure by international organizations for them to do so is a potential source of conflict.

An emerging concern seems to be taking place with those *monyomiji* that migrate for economic reasons to urban areas. These youths are normally "not present in their communities at the moment [they] are requested to mediate or sort out any conflicts." Because of this, their decision-making power cannot be exercised, and decisions are taken by the rest of the *monyomiji* who are still living in the community (KII with *monyomiji* member in an urban area). Yet they are perceived by their communities as belonging to the group, and are therefore judged for either the good or bad job that their peers might do. They could potentially lose that power and be replaced by the next group of initiates without even taking part in the decisions.

This is a dilemma between being able to take part in the decisions affecting their communities and being able to provide for their families and achieving a more robust livelihood. They ask: Can new technologies help in ensuring that *monyomiji* can play both these roles, or what role can *monyomiji* who migrated from their communities play? Is there an opportunity for *monyomiji* to become ambassadors *of* their communities to lobby for services and resources that other youths need (education, technical advice, tools)? And/or can *monyomiji* become ambassadors *in* their communities for areas where change is needed (child and forced marriage, decrease in dowries, access to education for young women and girls)?

Furthermore, as women can be part of *monyomiji* institutions through marriage (*homyomiji/angote monyomiji*), there are increased opportunities for building bridges between rural and urban young women. Those interviewed, for example, mentioned the possibility of encouraging *homyomiji* who have completed their education or are employed to be role models for young women and girls (and examples of success for their parents).

Honyomiji are normally not part of decision-making processes, yet their role is considered to be important as supporters of their husbands, and in some cases they are seen as role models within their communities (KII with local researcher and urban *monyomiji*). For this reason, a way

to start generating change from within could be by encouraging their access to education or skills that could increase their importance within the community (FGD with some local organizations working in the area suggested mainly farming and veterinary skills). *Homyomiji* can also be transformed into ambassadors of peace, changing girls' viewpoints regarding the use of violence as indicating courage, and even directly participating in decision-making processes to support negotiated solutions to community problems. This might even open the door for more difficult conversations, including forced marriage (and therefore the institution of dowry), domestic violence and other acts of violence against women.

A question asked by the *homyomiji* is: What can their potential role in the future be and how can the *monyomiji* institution adapt in accordance? This is yet another question that would benefit from further research. For now, the key lesson emerging from this research is the need to avoid cut-and-paste solutions involving *monyomiji* as peacebuilders, and instead look at understanding how the system works to replicate the best practices across other groups.

Finally, experience with the *monyomiji* shows that there is the potential to transform armed youth groups and armed pastoralists/cattle raiders into peace ambassadors. Alongside initiation aiming to showcase strength, courage and endurance, youth who are given the responsibility to protect their communities need to be given the skills to negotiate and solve conflicts, and mechanisms to mitigate and de-escalate armed confrontation.

'Rural gangs' or 'decentralized' cattle raiders

Besides armed pastoralists who act upon the orders of their traditional leaders, there are also youth groups that move across rural and urban areas and engage in cattle raiding for their own benefit (KII with local organization, Lakes).

KIIs with local organizations in Bentiu report that these organizations work as "rural and semi-urban moving gangs." Members normally come from rural backgrounds and they may have been either expelled from their communities or separated from them as a result of violent conflict (local

NGO, Bentiu). In Lakes, similar groups engage in 'cattle laundering,' with youth pretending to be Gelweng youth leaders from clans other than their own to negotiate the purchase of cattle in camps. They then steal the cattle and cross into other states, in many cases causing the affected communities to fight amongst each other. These groups also engage in road ambushes and cattle raids in trading centres, disrupting areas that have been traditionally used for peaceful economic negotiations across ethnic lines. They see themselves as "conflict entrepreneurs" or "economic rebels," and reportedly have tight and organized structures that both reward success and punish failure or disloyalty (FGD with local researcher in Lakes, and KII with local NGO).

These structures are heavily dependent on corrupt urban middlemen and traders who "disregard traditional laws requiring cattle sellers to prove they own the cattle, or use shortcuts and gaps in customary law to bypass controls," for example, by completing sales via phone communication and then "pretend good faith in the negotiation" (KII with local organization, Lakes).

These groups are mentioned by local authorities as a great source of instability and risk as they are uncontrollable and do not have a hierarchical structure with which disbandment can be negotiated. In some circumstances, these youths become increasingly violent as youth militias from the communities aim to find them to "avenge the offence."

The characteristics of and possible ways of working with these groups need to be better researched in order to choose interventions that might work. For now, information collected suggests that as with pastoralist armies, the solution is not to deal with the problem by perceiving these groups as having a senseless attraction to violence, but rather by tackling their incentive structure.

For example, as mentioned previously, one of the key issues that incentivizes young men to be involved in cattle raiding is the rising value of dowries. This has specific effects on girls and women, as they become objects for sale and therefore have less of a say about who they marry, less chance of being able to continue their studies,

and fewer options to escape violence within their households.

Some communities are starting to see the problems that these higher prices bring. For example, efforts by traditional chiefs in Northern Bahr el Ghazal were reported in 2018 to use customary laws called *waathalel* to regulate the bride price between rich and poor families by setting maximum prices (Lyong & Malaak, 2018). Women's organizations and experts consulted also recommend the consolidation of programmes in which youth leaders in rural and urban areas show traditional leaders and parents the negative consequences of forced early marriages and increasing dowries within the traditional fabric of their communities, such as the risk of increasing cattle raids and the resulting possibility of violent conflict.

Offering options for flexible, adaptive and skills-based education programmes for boys and girls is seen as critical across all youth subcultures. This implies education interventions that blend the need for education with the cultural characteristics of the community. Options include mobile, community-based or accelerated educational programmes. These could include short and flexible vocational trainings that provide specific skills rather than complete career frameworks (e.g., teaching youth how to vaccinate cows instead of developing longer veterinary programmes). There should be specific educational programmes for young girls that allow them to fulfil their expected family duties while developing skills that are appreciated by their communities and can give them an opportunity to have a say in community decisions or resource management (e.g., processing of milk and cheese, farming methods, water purification or irrigation techniques).

Finally, educational providers and CSOs point to the need to include peacebuilding skills in any programme to be developed with youth, making peace a key life skill for adult life.

Farming and pastoralist unions/associations

'Urban-based' youth organizations already play a role in rural communities. Ana Taban, Change Makers South Sudan, Whitaker Peace and Development Initiative, Humanitarian Action

for Peace and Development Agency, Maridi Service Agency and Civil Society Human Rights Organization are some of the organizations already trying to create links between urban and rural youth. Some organizations have as their specific objective the creation of that link.

Young representatives and members of pastoralist and farmer unions and associations in Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Western Equatoria, Lakes and Unity share needs and objectives, and see themselves as ambassadors for rural communities. Their priorities are the provision of relevant vocational skills, bringing new tools and technology to rural areas, and in some cases supporting the linkage with 'security institutions' to ensure that communities are protected.

These unions might potentially play a role in peacebuilding in their communities, taking into consideration some of the recommendations and ideas from previous sections. Some are doing this already. However, local researchers and international organizations that have worked in rural areas are cautious about their intentions. Previous experience, for example, shows that these organizations can fake being representative of specific rural communities as a means of obtaining resources from international donors (particularly small, short-term grants, which are difficult for the donors to monitor). Their expertise in peacebuilding or the 'do no harm' (DNH) approach can be minimal, if any, and a potential source of conflict.

Research, such as that developed by OPM, also reveals the need to work directly with youth in cattle camps. Much of the work that has been undertaken in rural areas, partly as a result of insecurity and lack of access, has been done through intermediary organizations. These youths are not characterized by 'innate violent behaviours' and in-depth research and work can be undertaken directly with them and their communities. New peacebuilding programmes can start to approach these youths in a more direct manner and recognize and amplify their voices and decision-making power within their communities. As stated above, programmes working in this area need to be given time to research, analyse and adapt, if necessary.

The key message resulting from this is the need to have a long-term approach towards interventions with youth in rural areas (and in general). Approaches that are transient and not based on coherent strategies are likely to fail or not be sustainable, and even more importantly, risk causing more harm than good.

The space in between: The returning diaspora

Sommers and Schwartz, in their research on youth and state building in South Sudan (2011), argue that different past experiences and a highly competitive present combined to inspire three new identities for South Sudanese youth: those who remained in South Sudan during the civil war; internally displaced people who fled to Sudan's capital city, Khartoum (known as 'Khartoumers' or, disparagingly, as 'Jalaba' (Arabs)); and 'diaspora youth,' including those who lived as refugees in East Africa or beyond.

According to Ensor (2013), many of these young returnees were exposed to functioning cash economies in Egypt, Kenya, Uganda or Sudan, and arrived in South Sudan with relatively high standards of education and expectations that local conditions in South Sudan have not been able to meet. Consequently, many would have preferred to remain in the diaspora or return only once educational and employment opportunities had improved back home. Many are not willing to work for local wages and are only interested in working for international organizations and the government. Those with higher qualifications (education or vocational training, or the ability to speak other languages – especially English) are mostly successful (KII with local organization, Northern Bahr el Ghazal).

The above creates resentment amongst the young South Sudanese who remained. Interviews and FGDs with *boda-boda* drivers, gang members and beneficiaries of vocational training reveal distrust amongst these groups. In some cases, this has even led to the formation of gangs or *boda-boda* organizations comprising only diaspora youth who have grown tired of being side-lined or relegated by their peers. The youth who stayed

also feel excluded from the job market by the diaspora youth, and resentment can play a role in rejecting participation in youth programmes that are led exclusively by them. For example, a gang member and former participant of a peacebuilding vocational training programme in Juba said that "programmes fail because 'Khartoumers' [who normally lead vocational programmes], [choose to provide] training in areas that they know would not allow participants to take their jobs [...] or at least because these 'Khartoumers' don't really understand the issues, traumas and needs of those that stayed."

Traditional authorities interviewed have negative views on youth from the diaspora. Descriptions such as "dangerous,' "unwilling," "reckless" and "disrespectful" were mentioned continually in KIIs with these authorities. Youth from Central Africa are seen as particularly "concerning," as they bring "westernized" liberal cultures that are alien or seem to be incompatible with traditional cultures. In certain cases, youth from these groups are even seen as the main culprits behind the existence of gangs, even though this is a phenomenon preceding their arrival.

All of the above contributes to the state of disenfranchisement and fragmentation amongst youth collectives, which is the main reason for the lack of lobbying capacity amongst youth and a contributor to the vicious cycle of violence that currently prevails.

Rather than arguing for specific programmes for these 'subcultures in between,' this research would instead like to highlight the need to have the above considerations in mind when developing youth programmes, as well as the requirement to advocate for dialogue spaces where the above misconceptions and resentments can be openly discussed.

4. Recommendations

This study has already provided examples of possible interventions that are appropriate for each youth subculture. This chapter summarizes the main recommendations, highlighting spaces in which the UNDP can add the most value and suggesting specific mechanisms for youth-sensitive approaches in programme design, delivery and monitoring.

Additional state-specific recommendations have been added in Annex E, including an analysis of possible institutional gaps.

1. More relevant and flexible education/vocational training opportunities

Access to quality education is a recommendation that recurs across the literature reviewed and is most frequently requested across all youth subcultures consulted. Beyond greater access to education, which is still lacking across South Sudan, the recommendation is to build an educational system based on skills and competencies that are easily adaptable to the different needs and contexts of the youth.

A new educational curriculum should incorporate critical thinking, civic education and peacebuilding as life skills and be an instrument of reconciliation. Examples of this include incorporating narratives from traditional history that show how peacebuilding has been part of local cultures, and exploring the history of all the ethnic tribes in South Sudan. Models such as mobile, community-based or accelerated educational programmes that provide specific skills rather than complete career frameworks would be useful for rural and urban areas. Flexible calendars and schedules would be particularly useful for rural areas.

The content of vocational training programmes also needs to be rethought and regularly updated. Skills provided should be compatible with the local economies with efforts to predict new opportunities, placing innovation at the core of the design processes. To facilitate access, more vocational training centres need to be set up in rural areas. Recommendations also include training on financial management and business models, and financing that could support the consolidation of new businesses, as well as linking training to temporary sources of income that would allow learners to survive while undertaking their studies. Some specific models were suggested, including conditional cash transfers or extra-curricular paid activities where the skills learned could be put into practice.

2. Supporting new and innovative livelihoods

Youths need to be provided with the resources and mentorship to consolidate their own businesses, as well as technical support to manage them.

Research revealed that membership of certain groups (including gangs) is motivated because they offer access to a livelihood, as well as financial resources and the possibility of growing current or starting new businesses. These groups also create a safety net/protection network in case of

emergencies (e.g., accidents, arrest, disease). New programmes could learn from these structures, either by supporting existing community-based models of financing and building new community-based banking systems (e.g., saving clubs and associations) or ensuring access to traditional financial services at sustainable rates and timeframes.

Seed capital and entrepreneurship loan systems also need monitoring and permanent support. Specific cases should be followed up to analyse the reasons behind failure or success. Feedback mechanisms need to be set up for beneficiaries to report and analyse signs of possible failure, and for the provision of financial and technical support to avoid it. Success cases need to be shared, with systems of support amongst participants being built to encourage dialogue and cohesion across ethnic and economic divides.

It is important that these programmes have sustainability and long-term thinking in mind so that failure in specific cases does not trigger wider disappointment amongst participants and reinforce entrenched views about the inevitability of violence as a means of survival.

3. Address trauma and promote reconciliation

The trauma experienced by youth at all levels and in all geographical areas needs to be recognized and dealt with. Young women and girls are likely to have experienced SGBV. Young men might have also experienced sexual violence but are culturally less inclined to share or reveal it. Vulnerable youths may also have experienced other types of violence, or may themselves be aggressors. A young man or woman can be both victim and aggressor, with both conditions feeding each other.

The need for trauma and psychosocial counselling has already been recognized and addressed by CSOs and organizations working with and for youth. Many of the CSOs consulted in this research offer these services and more funding seems to be available. Research is also increasing in the area (Ng et al., 2017). Yet the stigma about mental health remains, particularly around young men who associate bravery and courage with silence and revenge (FGD with local organization).

More evidence-based interventions need to be promoted in this area, including interventions that train teachers, parents and youth role models on how to respond to trauma, or the promotion of specialized centres providing adequate trauma counselling. But possibly the most repeated recommendation is the need to work on destroying social and cultural barriers that associate trauma counselling with disease and weakness, and instead teach youth that trauma (and particularly trauma that has been addressed and recognized) can also make them stronger, more resilient and better at conflict resolution and mediation (KII with CSOs working on trauma in Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Juba and Central Equatoria).

For now, research and evidence point to three main recommendations (St. Amour, 2020):

1. *Trauma healing and reconciliation need to be flexible.* These processes are based on and influenced by culture, and cultural background in all its diverse representations – including values, traditions and beliefs – is key to determining a young person's journey and unique pathway to recovery. Services should be culturally grounded, attuned, sensitive, congruent and competent, as well as personalized to meet each young individual's unique needs. These processes can emerge via many pathways, including professional clinical and medical treatment; support from families and in schools; faith-based approaches; and peer support, amongst others. Therefore, programmes that support trauma and reconciliation processes need to offer the possibility of flexibility and continual adaptation.

2. *Trauma healing and reconciliation need to be supported through relationships, social networks, peers and allies.* Reciprocated support and mutual aid groups, including the sharing of experiential knowledge and skills, as well as social learning, play an invaluable role in the healing and recovery process. Programme design in this area should ensure the existence of such support networks, particularly the creation of supporting

communities that can offer hope and encouragement, and suggest strategies and resources for positive change.

3. *Trauma healing and reconciliation are holistic and are supported by addressing trauma and the protective factors lost.* Addressing the loss of protective networks and ensuring the provision of economic and social protection mechanisms (e.g., livelihoods, creation of new community networks, supported educational offerings) should take place alongside psychosocial support.

4. Building bridges between youth and ensuring participation

As mentioned above, youth face challenges with participating in political processes, particularly with being part of the design and implementation of the peace agreement. Research on this area provides recommendations on how to address this (Chatham House, 2016; Tumutegyereize & Gew Nhial, 2017).

The critical factor to address is the fragmentation and distrust amongst youth, and between youth and traditional leaders and political actors, as well as between youth and local/state and national government authorities. Creating spaces for dialogue where youth can meet across political and ethnic divides is key. Including youth in rule-of-law interventions and strengthening spaces where youth already have a say in decision-making (*monyomiji, honyomiji/angote monyomiji*) is vital. Specifically, engaging youth who are considered to be part of the problem (such as Gelweng groups, armed youth groups and gangs) and transforming their structures into peacebuilding mechanisms is essential.

The arts, music, food and sports were areas often mentioned as means to facilitate these encounters, and which will also address one of the most frequently unmet needs: entertainment. These activities could have the additional benefit of creating new narratives and role models, replacing those referencing money, violence and guns as sources of identity and respect.

Furthermore, women's organizations and the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda offer a model for young people to follow. Women leaders consulted for this research made the following recommendations:

- building coalitions from the bottom up (starting at the local level, encouraging integration with groups in the same ethnic tribes initially, and building from there);

- finding common needs and addressing them first to build trust, as well as consolidating initial drafts of youth manifestos based on these common needs;

- allowing the common manifestos to be shared and used, and being prepared to allow discussion and dissent about them;

- being prepared and proactive – starting consultations well in advance of peace and political consultative processes;

- being prepared to mitigate additional sources of fragmentation within movements;

- using social media and mitigating the effects of disinformation and fake news;

- promoting new leadership; and

- using the Youth, Peace and Security agenda and Security Council Resolutions 2250, 2419 and 2535 for advocacy.

5. Focusing on young women and girls

Issues faced by young women and girls are at the core of many of the drivers and triggers of violent conflict in South Sudan (e.g., early marriage, high dowries, lack of decision-making power regarding who they marry). Addressing these challenges as a priority is therefore likely to have a double benefit in addressing violent behaviours. Constructive interventions include:

- encouraging female education by consolidating systems and curricula that adequately take into account context and culture;

- providing females with skills (e.g., peacebuilding, adding value to raw agricultural products by

processing them, water purification) that are useful and appreciated by their communities;

- making use of 'male ambassadors' and female role models to showcase the benefits of girls being better educated; and

- fostering traditional institutions of 'female power' (*homyomiji*) as ambassadors of peace within communities.

These activities have the potential to open the space for more difficult changes and conversations, including modifications in gender roles, tackling the rising price of dowries, giving women a choice regarding their education and marriage, or tackling SGBV.

6. More evidence-based, coordinated and long-term programming

CSOs, international organizations and researchers concur that the timeframes of many of the programmes directed towards youth are too short to promote sustainable change. In many cases programmes barely last a year, and yet they are expected to deliver results. This is compounded by the fact that there is not a coordinated and evidence-based approach amongst all donors, while resources are steadily diminishing and priorities continually changing. The above seems to have led to a decreasing number of organizations focusing their efforts on research and creation of an evidence base, as can be seen in Annex D.

Coordinating an approach to solve these issues is an area where many of the organizations interviewed see a niche for the UNDP. The UNDP could, under the One UN approach and the Youth4Peace framework, promote the development of coordinated strategies among the United Nations agencies. The agency could also play a role in reaching out to local and international organizations with expertise in the area to share research, experiences and models. The UNDP could also work to ensure that conflict-sensitive approaches are applied consistently and use existing structures of shared learning (for example,

the Conflict Sensitivity Resource Facility)[7] to help mainstream youth-sensitive issues.

7. Adding youth-sensitive approaches across all programmes

The last point opens an additional area for recommendations, that is, how to build youth-sensitive approaches in all programmes. Some of the lessons and recommendations are shared below.

Avoid working on the basis of preconceptions
A key lesson from studying armed youth pastoralists and gangs is that seeing these groups as "having a proclivity to violence" is detrimental in the process of building trust and relations, and incorrect. Local and international experts recommend regarding each community as a separate institution and aiming to understand their power dynamics and incentive structures before designing peacebuilding, training or educational programmatic approaches. The best practices include models in which the evidence base is seen as part of project implementation, and the programme maintains a flexible design.

Local youth as key stakeholders
All programmes, but particularly those that work on rule of law, conflict prevention and governance, need to consider the youth as key stakeholders. This means taking the time to understand the dynamics of power and definition of youth for each community in which they work, consulting the youth in decision-making processes regarding the design, implementation and monitoring of their projects, and encouraging the inclusion of the voices of young women and girls. It is critical to have a localized approach by ensuring that local youth are part of design and evidence-base collection processes, and that they continue to have a say in implementation and adaptation.

Flexibility and adaptability
The definition of youth within a community and the way youth define themselves are dynamic and thus susceptible to change. Consultative processes, feedback loops and learning mechanisms need to

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7   See https://www.csrf-southsudan.org/#about

be incorporated within programmes and used to continually validate that initial assumptions still hold true.

Approaches towards youth also need to be specific to the areas where they are implemented, avoiding cut-and-paste approaches. This involves encouraging specific and locally developed research for target areas and creating learning systems that are connected to programme monitoring, adaptation and evaluation.

Using a localized approach for research and implementation

Many of the youth consulted mentioned that international programmes foster additional grievances and distrust by not considering local talent or fostering it when the level of knowledge and capacity is low. That is, local workers need to be considered when a programme is implemented, and consistent, transparent and visible efforts must be made to employ and/or increase the capacity of local organizations, personnel or vendors.

Annexes

Annex A. Classification of youth subcultures in South Sudan for data collection

GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION	BASIS FOR YOUTH SUBGROUPINGS	RELATED YOUTH SUBGROUPINGS
URBAN/SEMI-URBAN COHORTS	Youth who still remember the pre-independence years (and therefore are likely the oldest), whose education is linked to the North and whose motivations are linked with the final stages of the pro-independence movement. Some of them may have been sent to Sudan during the war for education purposes. Youth in urban settlements from neighbouring or Western countries who were raised abroad and may have returned looking for opportunities after independence, and whose culture, language and education are closer to those of other countries. Youth in urban areas that migrated from rural areas, looking for economic opportunities or running from violence or difficult community dynamics, some with skills, some without.	Criminal subcultures such as N***** and Toronto Boys gangs and idle youth who engage in criminal activities to meet economic needs. Former members of government or opposition militias (members might coincide with previous group). Young owners of small businesses and entrepreneurs: *boda-boda* owners, shop owners (members might coincide with previous group). Youth who belong to the government security forces. Youth engaged in mutual hobbies, including artistic or religious groups, youth unions, and youth or women's organizations. Youth leaders or youth engaged in political activities (members might coincide with previous group).
RURAL COHORTS	Youth who belong to agrarian/farmer societies and that support their families with farming activities. Youth who belong to pastoralist communities and provide support to their communities and families, particularly by herding and defending the communal cattle.	Criminal subcultures: cattle keepers engaged in cattle raiding. Cattle keepers. *Monyomiji*: warrior youth in charge of community protection. Girls and teenagers in charge of helping other women in the community with day-to-day activities. Youth engaged in farming.
DIASPORA COHORTS	Youth in urban settlements from neighbouring or Western countries who were raised abroad and may have returned looking for opportunities after independence, and whose culture, language and education are closer to those of other countries. Youth raised in POC camps abroad or within South Sudan and whose education might have been interrupted or not completed as a result, and whose culture would have developed around the particular characteristics of the camps.	These youths can be engaged in either of the above subgroupings, or still be abroad and engaged in political or economic activities with interest or influence into South Sudan.

Annex B. Research tools (FGDs and KIIs)

Key informant interview form

UNDP would like to thank you and appreciate the time and information you are sacrificing to participate in this important and valuable study under its Peace and Community Cohesion (PaCC) Project. The study is intended to understand different aspects of youth subcultures and social dynamics in the region and is also expected to serve as a reference for possible programming and informed decision-making. This research is being developed by myself _____ , as a local researcher and expert, and led by Lina Gonzalez-Piñeros. You can contact us on our emails _____ and linagonzalezp@gmail.com, in case of any doubt.

Please be aware that you can refuse to answer any of the below questions or stop the interview at any point. If you feel uncomfortable around any of the questions, and you want me to reframe it/explain it in any other way, please let me know and I will do so. By allowing us to continue you agree with us using the information for the purposes outlined below only. Your personal data won't be shared with any other person.

Interview date: _____   Location (town): _____   State: _____

Respondent name: _____

Contact: _____   Gender: _____   Age (years): _____

Occupation: _____

1. What do you think has changed politically and economically in the past 5 years? How do these changes affect youth?

2. What do you think are the main youth subcultures (positive and negative) in the state? How do they differ from other states? How do they differ from the ones that existed 5 years ago?

3. Do you think there is a possibility for conflict (violent or not) between any of these subgroups? Why?

4. How does your organization work with youth? What programmes/activities do you develop for them?

5. How do you think that the programmes offered by your organization address the issues of these youth subcultures? Do you work with a specific youth subculture? Why?

6. What do you think are the main needs of youth at the moment? What do you think are the main obstacles to address them?

7. What do you think should be done by the government to address issues related to youth subcultures and promote youth development?

8. What do you think could be some of the key roles and responsibilities that local and civil society organizations could play to encourage and contribute to youth development? What do you think your organization can do?

9. What do you suggest as some roles parents, guardians, and the communities at large can play to control youth activities and support their future development?

10. What programmes/activities does your group/organization offer now, or can offer to address those needs?

11. Any additional information or recommendation that could be helpful for the study and programming.

Focal group discussion form

UNDP would like to thank you and appreciate the time and information you are sacrificing to participate in this important and valuable study under its Peace and Community Cohesion (PaCC) Project. The study is intended to understand different aspects of youth subcultures and social dynamics in the region and is also expected to serve as a reference for possible programming and informed decision-making. This research is being developed by myself _____ , as a local researcher and expert, and led by Lina Gonzalez-Piñeros. You can contact us on our emails _____ and linagonzalezp@gmail.com, in case of any doubt.

Please be aware that any of you can refuse to answer any of the below questions or stop the interview at any point. If you feel uncomfortable around any of the questions, and you want me to reframe it/explain it in any other way, please let me know and I will do so. By allowing us to continue you agree with us using the information for the purposes outlined below only. Your personal data won't be shared with any other person.

Interview date: _____ Location (town): _____ State: _____

Number of participants: _____ Group type: _____

1. Do you identify yourself with a specific youth group? If yes, with which one?

2. Why do you identify with this group? What motivates you to be part of this group?

3. Does this group have a common purpose or objective? If so, what is it? What does the group intend to achieve?

4. What do you think are the main needs for young people in your town/state?

5. What activities does your group develop? How do these activities help to solve your needs?

6. Does the group have a leader or respond to a specific hierarchy? If so, how does it work?

7. What do you think has changed politically and economically in the past 5 years? How do these changes affect youth?

8. Have you lived outside of South Sudan? If yes, do you think that your way of thinking is different from that of other groups?

9. What do you think should be done by the government to address issues related to youth subcultures and promote youth development?

10. What do you think could be some of the key roles and responsibilities that local and civil society organizations could play to encourage and contribute to youth development?

11. What do you suggest as some roles parents, guardians, and the communities at large can play to control youth activities and support their future development respectfully?

12. Any additional information or recommendation that could be helpful for the study and programming.

Annex C. Detail of field data and sample

(Modified to avoid including personal information.)

STATE/ACTOR	JUBA, CENTRAL EQUATORIA	YAMBIO, WESTERN EQUATORIA	TORIT, EASTERN EQUATORIA	AWEIL, NORTHERN BAHR EL GAZAL	WAU, WESTERN BAHR EL GAZAL	RUMBEK, LAKES	BENTIU, UNITY
LOCAL CONSULTANT	*MARGARET TUMALU*	*MBORIMBUKO SIMON*	*OHIDE JOHNSON PAUL*	*MAWIEM AYOM*	*YOHANNA PHILIP*	*MACHOT AMUOM MALOU*	*TAB GATDIET*
INSTITUTIONAL STAKEHOLDERS: GOVERNMENT, TRADITIONAL LEADERS/ELDERS	Election of governors meant there were no people available to be interviewed. Added additional meetings with CSO directors to complement.	KII in Ezo County with traditional leaders Date: 20/07/2020 #: 1 (male) KII in Nzara County with leader Date: 22/07/2020 #: 1 (male)	Cancelled as a result of busy agenda of local authorities because of reception of new governor, holidays and impossibility of travelling to rural areas.	KII with State Ministry of Youth and Social Development and Criminal Investigation Department chief Date: 20/07/2020 #: 1 KII with chief of locality Date: 22/07/2020 #: 1	KII with traditional leader of Nazareth residential area Date: 21/07/2020 #: 1 (male)	Not able to interview traditional chief and local peace advisor because of court proceedings and reception of new governor. Replaced with KII with political affairs officer and director/police officer, Rumbek	KII with law enforcement personnel (chief police officers) Date: 30–31/07/2020 #: 2 (male) Location: Bentiu, Rubkotna and Guit towns. Status: Delayed because of reception of new governor.
CSOS AND DEVELOPMENT AND YOUTH ORGANIZATIONS	KII with executive director, Humanitarian Action for Peace and Development Agency Date: 24/07/2020 #: 1 (male) KII with director, Ana Taban; executive director, Maridi Service Agency; and Civil Society Human Rights Organisation Date: 21/07/2020 #: 3 (male) FGD with Youth Peace Coexistence Date: 22 July 2020 #: 7 (4 male, 3 female)	KII with programme manager for Civil Society Human Rights Organization; head of programmes for Community Organization for Peer Educators; protection and peace officer for Rural Development Action Aid; communications officer for Star Trust Organization Date: 21–22/07/2020 #: 4 (male) 2 FGDs with idle youth and youth representatives Date: 20–24/07/2020 #: 12 (9 male, 3 female) Location: Community Organization for Peer Educators Organisation Hall	KII with Red Cross Restoring Family Links officer (Torit) and project coordinator (Ikwotó) Date: 22/07/2020 #: 2 (male) KIIs with Whitaker project coordinator and officer Date: 20/07/2020 #: 2 (male) KIIs: CSOs, *Monyomiji* Union representative, Value Interest Non-Violent Alliance and Centenary Legal advocates Date: 21–24–28–31/07/2020 #: 5 (male)	KII with CEO, Aweil Civic Engagement Centre Date: 20/07/2020 #: 1 (male) KIIs with Aweil Community-Based Organization Forum director and Aweil Civic Engagement Centre Date: 22/07/2020 #: 2 (male) FGD with Northern Bahr el Ghazal Youth Union Date: 20/07/2020 #: 6 (male)	KII with CSO, Kindness Community Development Organization and Community Empowerment for Progress Organization Date: 22/07/2020 #: 2 (male) FGD with Wau Youth United for Fashion and Talent Development Date: 25/07/2020 #: 29 (12 male, 8 female)	Replaced with FGDs with teachers' union and KIIs with lecturer at Rumbek University, local researcher and activist Date: 20/07/2020 #: FGD 9 (1 female, 8 male); KII 3 (male)	KII with Hope Restoration South Sudan Date: 20/07/2020 #: 1 (male) KII with Action for Conflict Resolution Date: 20/07/2020 #: 1 (male)

STATE/ACTOR	JUBA, CENTRAL EQUATORIA	YAMBIO, WESTERN EQUATORIA	TORIT, EASTERN EQUATORIA	AWEIL, NORTHERN BAHR EL GAZAL	WAU, WESTERN BAHR EL GAZAL	RUMBEK, LAKES	BENTIU, UNITY
LOCAL CONSULTANT	*MARGARET TUMALU*	*MBORIMBUKO SIMON*	*OHIDE JOHNSON PAUL*	*MAWIEM AYOM*	*YOHANNA PHILIP*	*MACHOT AMUOM MALOU*	*TAB GATDIET*
YOUNG WOMEN'S GROUPS	FGD with Lokwilili Women's Association members Date: 22/07/2020 #: 6 (female)	FGD with widows and single mothers Date: 22/07/2020 #: 6 (female) Location: CSO, Community Organization for Peer Educators Organisation Hall	FGD with women's groups Date: Not done yet #: 5 (female) Date: 05/08/2020	FGD with Aweil Women General Association Date: 21/07/2020 #: 6 (female) FGD with women from New Initiative for Community Education, Women Peace Forum Date: 22/07/2020 #: 7	FGD Wau Young Women Forum Date: 24/07/2020 #: 3 (6 invited but not all came, all female)	FGD with women centre members, VASCO Date: 21/07/2020 #: 8 (female)	FGD with Kurkal Women Group Date: 20/07/2020 #: 9 (female)
GROUPS IN RURAL AREAS (FARMERS, CATTLE HERDERS)	None planned as not as relevant for Juba.	FGD with local farmers, Yambio County Date: 25/07/2020 #: 6 (male)	FGD with warriors/ monyomiji . Not done as travel to rural areas was not possible under duty of care obligations.	FGD with Aweil Farmers and Pastoralist Union Date: 21/07/2020 #: 7 (male)	Planned to meet with a group from Raja but could not get them together in Wau. Some Raga community members showed up in other groups like small business and youth development groups.	FGD with cattle traders (auctioneers) Date: 20/07/2020 #: 8 (male) KII with Cattle Camp Leader Date: 23/07/2020 #: 1 participant FGD with group of farmers or people in rural areas not done because of increase of violent incidents in roads outside Rumbek.	FGD with Maankuai Young Farmers Group Date: 23/07/2020 #: 11 (3 male, 8 female) Location: Maankuai Young Farmers Group offices Missing perspective from pastoralist.
YOUTH ARTISTIC OR RELIGIOUS GROUPS	Most of the churches were locked due to the pandemic so it was hard accessing any religious groups.	FGD with youth from St. Mary Parish, Yambio Date: 25/07/2020 #: 6 (4 male, 2 female)	KII with religious leaders in Ikwotó. Cancelled because of impossibility of travel to rural areas.	KII with Aweil Musicians Union Date: 22/07/2020 #: 5 (4 male, 1 female) Location: Nyajok Kuot's tea place KII with Christian Action for Development and God is Enough Ministry failed to turn up at agreed time twice. Status: Added and not done.	FGD with artists association Date: 23/07/2020, 10.00 to 11.00 #: 7 (1 female, 6 male) FGD with Jol Wo Lieec (God Look Upon Us) group of Episcopal Church of South Sudan Date: 22/07/2020 #: 6 (4 male, 2 female)	FGD with church followers Date: 26/07/2020 #: 8 (3 female, 5 male) Proposed KII with South Sudan Council of Churches representatives not done.	FGD with Inter-Church Committee Date: 22/07/2020 #: 11 (8 male, 3 female)

STATE/ACTOR	JUBA, CENTRAL EQUATORIA	YAMBIO, WESTERN EQUATORIA	TORIT, EASTERN EQUATORIA	AWEIL, NORTHERN BAHR EL GAZAL	WAU, WESTERN BAHR EL GAZAL	RUMBEK, LAKES	BENTIU, UNITY
LOCAL CONSULTANT	*MARGARET TUMALU*	*MBORIMBUKO SIMON*	*OHIDE JOHNSON PAUL*	*MAWIEM AYOM*	*YOHANNA PHILIP*	*MACHOT AMUOM MALOU*	*TAB GATDIET*
YOUNG SMALL BUSINESS OWNERS (*BODA-BODAS*, OTHERS)	KII with CEO, Yaya Fashion Boutique and managing director, Floyd Video Date: 22–27/07/2020 #: 2 (male) FGDs with *boda-boda* drivers Date: 23/07/2020 #: 9 (male)	FGD with young local business owners (tailors and carpenters) Date: 24/07/2020 #: 6 (male)	FGD with *boda-boda* drivers and idle youth Date: Not done yet #: 5 (male) Date: 05/08/2020	FGD Aweil *boda-boda* youth union/ association Date: 21/07/2020 #: 6	FGD with *boda-boda* drivers/ owners and small businesses Date: 21/07/2020 #: 7 (male)	FGD with members of *boda-boda* association Date: 23/07/2020 #: 8 (male)	FGD Rubkotna Boda-Boda Operators Association Date: 23/07/ 2020 #: 10 (male)
BENEFICIARIES FROM DEVELOPMENT AND TRAINING PROGRAMMES	FGD with beneficiaries from Juba Technical Secondary School (vocational training) Date: 21/07/2020 #: 7	2 FGD in vocational centres with Rural Development for Action Aid, Star Trust Organization and Community Organization for Peer Educators Date: 24/07/ 2020 #: 12 (8 female and 4 male)	2 FGDs with trainees of the Vocational Training Centre (Red Cross youth volunteer, Whitaker youth volunteers Date: 20/07/2020 #: 16 (9 female, 7 male)	FGD with beneficiaries from Aweil Vocational Training Centre and idle youth Date: 22/07/2020 #: 8	FGD with trainees on education programme Date: 27/07/2020, 15.00 to 16.00 #: 5 (3 male, 2 female)	KII or FGD with trainees of vocational training Status: Not completed because beneficiaries requested support with transport support as result of the rains.	FGD with Bentiu Youth Club Date: 21/07/2020 #: 10 (8 male, 2 female)
MEMBERS OF GANGS/MILITIAS (CURRENT OR FORMER)	2 FGDs with groups of N***** (8) and Toronto Boys (5) Date: 20/7/2020, morning	FGD with former child soldiers Date: 24/07/ 2020 #: 6 (3 male and 3 female)	FGDs with Thug Life and N***** gang members Date: 31/07/2020 #: 5 (male)	FGD with Super Star gang members Date: 20/07/2020 #: 5 (male)	FGD with N***** group Date: 21/07/2020 #: 5 (male)	FGDs with former combatants/ Gelweng members (community police) Date: 20/07/2020 #: 5 (male) Location: City centre FGD with members of gangs not done for security reasons.	FGDs with former or current militia (Gojjam members) Date: 24/07/2020 #: 8 (male)
OTHERS	FGD with orphans/ unaccompanied minors and KII with Humanitarian Action for Peace and Development Agency managing director Date: 20/07/2020 #: 12 (FGDs), 1 KII						FGD with Peacebuilding Committee (Youth Peace Coexistence) – youth in POC camp Date: 24/07/2020 #: 8 (6 male and 2 female)
TOTAL	FGDS: 7, 56 (33 MALE, 23 FEMALE) KII: 5 (4 MALE, 1 FEMALE)	FGDS: 9, 55 (32 MALE, 23 FEMALE) KII: 5 (MALE)	FGDS: 5, 36 (19 MALE, 17 FEMALE) KII: 9 (MALE)	FGDS: 7, 56 (33 MALE, 23 FEMALE) KII: 5 (MALE)	FGDS: 7 FGDS, 53 PARTICIPANTS (36 MALE, 17 FEMALE) KII: 3 (MALE)	FGDS: 6 GROUPS, 45 RESPONDENTS (34 MALE, 11 FEMALE) KII: 6 (MALE)	FGDS: 7 GROUPS (67 RESPONDENTS, 43 MALES, 24 FEMALE) KII: 6 (MALE)

Annex D. Mapping of youth organizations and CSOs

This list might not be exhaustive given limited time for in-field research. Information regarding areas of expertise of each organization are based on surveys, open data and KIIs.

AREA	ORGANIZATION	YOUTH GROUPS	TYPE OF PROGRAMMES
JUBA	Humanitarian Action for Peace and Development Agency	Gangs Idle youth	• Peace dialogue between gangs, and between gangs and local authorities • Training on peacebuilding, conflict resolution, mediation and reconciliation
JUBA	Maridi Service Agency	*Boda-boda* drivers Idle youth	• Vocational skills training, scholarships • Women's economic empowerment: supporting business and small income generation activities • Peacebuilding programmes through forming youth action groups
JUBA AND UNITY, EXPANDING NATIONALLY	Ana Taban Arts Initiative	*Boda-boda* drivers Idle youth Gangs	• Ana Taban Jua Hilla (Ana Taban in the Neighbourhoods) inspiring and developing youth into active responsible citizens through arts and dialogue • Community mapping and research
JUBA AND YAMBIO	Civil Society Human Rights Organization	Women/girls SGBV survivors Idle youth Gangs and armed youth group members Orphans	• Entrepreneurship projects supporting youth to venture into business through providing them with cash transfers • Legal representation of SGBV survivors • Provision of defence representation to juvenile criminals • Lobbying and enabling environment to include youth in national and state-level development policies and action plans • Sports tournaments and entertainment • Psychosocial support and trauma healing • Education programmes: leadership training, entrepreneurship, farming, access to justice and rule of law
JUBA	Humans Must Access Essential Services	Youth at risk of drug addiction, members of gangs and armed groups Women/girls SGBV survivors	• HIV/AIDS prevention • Peace and community cohesion • Strengthening GBV prevention, mitigation and response, awareness-raising, case management, income-generating activities, linkage and referral to GBV services • Providing primary education to children who come from families affected with HIV/AIDS, disabilities
JUBA	Shabab le Shabab Youth Alliance Network	Youth in general	• Sexual and reproductive health information • Youth empowerment through training
JUBA	Research and Development Organization	Youth in general	Radio programmes on: • Civic (health) education programmes • Fighting rumours, misinformation and hate speech • Strong collaboration with Community Power for Progress Organization
JUBA	Take Tea Together	Youth in general, emphasis on gangs and armed youth groups	• Youth dialogue across ethnic divides • Use of music to promote peace and reconciliation • Training by practice on peacebuilding • Planning to expand to Warrap State, Western Bahr el Ghazal, Jonglei State and various parts of Central Equatoria State
TORIT	Value Interest Non-Violent Alliance	Victims Gangs Former/current members of armed youth groups	• Vocational training and behavioural change programmes • Advocating daily engagement with SGBV and survivors of violent crimes on non-violence • Community policing • Mapping the areas where the groups exist and meeting their leaders to determine peaceful alternatives to conflict • Engage youth in competitive activities such as sporting activities and drama
TORIT	South Sudan Red Cross	Idle/unemployed and at-risk youth	• Training on programme management, financial management, health and safeguarding practices • Volunteering programmes

AREA	ORGANIZATION	YOUTH GROUPS	TYPE OF PROGRAMMES
TORIT	Whitaker	Idle/unemployed and at-risk youth Gangs	• Information and communication technology (ICT) training • Entrepreneurship skills/business skills with grants for start-up of individual businesses • Peacebuilding and conflict mitigation training • Arts and crafts training • Sports activities for peace
TORIT	Monyomiji Union	*Monyomiji* members	• Capacity-building on peace and reconciliation approaches • Good governance training for local leaders and *monyomiji* to improve their service to their communities • Gender and child protection activities • Entrepreneurial skills in agriculture (agro-farming)
TORIT	Centenary Legal Advocate	Idle youth Gangs and armed youth group members	• Trauma counselling and guidance for children with criminal records • Provision of defence representation to juvenile criminals
YAMBIO	Rural Development Action Aid	Idle youth, former child soldiers and vulnerable women	• Training in peacebuilding, small business and financial literacy skills and entrepreneurship • Provision of start-up kits to start their own businesses • Reintegration and trauma counselling
YAMBIO	Community Organization for Peer Educators	Uneducated/idle youth Youth peer educators for health awareness in HIV/AIDS, COVID-19 and sexual and reproductive health	• Awareness-raising to end child marriage • Youth sport for peacebuilding • Capacity-building for effective youth service delivery • Advocacy sensitization on GBV and drug abuse issues • Capacity-building and technical support for parent-teacher associations and school management committees
YAMBIO	Star Trust Organization	Rural youth – farmers	• Agribusiness training to boost food production, build livelihoods, improve incomes and increase access to safe and clean water
AWEIL	Initiative for Relief and Development Council	Idle youth/gang members Small business owners	• Capacity-building, employment opportunities • Support for small businesses
AWEIL	Democracy International	Young women	• SGBV representation and advocacy • Trauma and reconciliation • Livelihood activities • Peacebuilding, conflict resolution training and dialogue
AWEIL	Northern Bahr el Ghazal State Youth Union	Youth in general	• Advocacy for unity and peace (peacebuilding programme) • Radio programmes on self-reliance and creativity • Create awareness on COVID-19 • Capacity-building of youth
AWEIL	Aweil Boda-Boda Association	*Boda-boda* owners and drivers	• Credit, financing, livelihood support • Representation, lobbying and advocacy
AWEIL	Dove United of Young Women and Girls	SGBV survivors	• Trauma and psychosocial counselling • Advocacy and representation • Women empowerment: household management, leadership and conflict mitigation training
AWEIL	Aweil Vocational Training Centre	Idle youth, youth in general	• Vocational training on ICT, carpentry, business development • Expanding to others
AWEIL	Aweil Farmers and Pastoralist Union	Rural youth	• Training on animal health and provision of inputs, fish harvest and provision of inputs, food hygiene and processing • Farmers and pastoralist policy advocacy • Employ youth on microbusiness such as beekeeping, fishing, poultry and vegetable production • Organize farmers and pastoralist youths into groups from state to *boma* levels
AWEIL	Aweil Domino and Chess Club	Idle youth, youth in general	• Youth club looking to provide spaces for peaceful recreation
AWEIL	Aweil Women General Association	Young women and girls	• Microbusiness training • Trauma and psychosocial counselling to survivors of SGBV
AWEIL	Aweil Community-Based Organization Forum	Idle youth, youth in general	• Sport peacebuilding activities • HIV/AIDS awareness • Youth capacity-building through club activities

AREA	ORGANIZATION	YOUTH GROUPS	TYPE OF PROGRAMMES
AWEIL	Aweil Civic Engagement Centre	Youth in general	• Peacebuilding through civic engagement training and promotion of dialogue
AWEIL	Wun Anei Development Association	Religious groups, youth in general	• HIV/AIDS awareness
AWEIL	Christian Action for Development and Support	Young women and girls	• Advocacy on SGBV, including training, psychosocial counselling and representation
AWEIL	Recovery & Access to Commonly Best Optimism	Young women and girls	• Community consultation on local conflict issues, dialogue and supporting community dialogue resolutions • Supporting women's livelihoods for peaceful coexistence • Awareness and formation of SGBV
AWEIL AND WAU	Help Restore Youth	Young farmers	• Youth empowerment, including economic and social capacity-building • Agribusiness training – farmer field schools • Also operates in Western Bahr el Ghazal, Warrap, Jonglei and Upper Nile
WAU AND RUMBEK	Community Empowerment for Progress Organization	Youth in general	• Vocational training • Peacebuilding programme • Civic education • Livelihood projects
WAU	Kindness Community Development Organization	Young women and girls Youth in general	• Youth rights advocacy – awareness on GBV and human rights • Peacebuilding initiatives
WAU	Change Makers South Sudan	Young women and girls Youth members of gangs and armed groups	• Advocacy and awareness-raising against forced and child marriage • Training for parent-teacher associations • Peacebuilding through drama and intercommunal dialogue • Dialogue between gang members and local authorities • Radio talks on citizenship, national identity and role of youth • Water points and creation of peace and reconciliation dialogue between pastoralist communities
WAU	Inclusive Education & Development Initiative	Youth gang groups	• Advocacy and awareness-raising against forced and child marriage • Youth dialogue through drama, radio and music • Platforms for youth to be part of decision-making processes
RUMBEK	Youth Action for Sustainability	Young women and girls Youth in general	• Peace and reconciliation project: trauma and healing interventions, sports for peace, peace and reconciliation training and facilitation • Intercultural dialogue camp for peace building: intercultural dialogue and peacebuilding, theatre arts, creativity, music, dance, cultural performances, exhibitions, workshops
RUMBEK	Women Aid Vision	Young women and girls Youth in general	• Peace activities for communities to debate their differences and resolve them through traditional peace mechanisms • Supporting women to establish small businesses in Mvolo County • Building a multipurpose centre for textile manufacturing
RUMBEK	Disabled Association and Rehabilitation Development	Youth in general	• Education, child rights governance, livelihood opportunities, health and governance
RUMBEK	The Organisation for Children's Harmony	Youth in general	• Conduct systemic research on the historical and current manifestations of communal conflicts and the impact they have on children, youth and women • Conflict-resolution mechanisms for communities • Advocacy to local, national and international stakeholders about ongoing community conflicts and resolution strategies • Civic education and community sensitization on human rights, children and women rights, laws of South Sudan, democracy and good governance • Child protection in emergencies, GBV and child rights programming
RUMBEK	Widows and Orphan Development Agency	Orphans, young women and girls	• Livelihood and economic support • Provision of skill-based vocational education
RUMBEK	DIAR for Rehabilitation Development Agency	Young women and girls	• Livelihood and economic support • Provision of skill-based vocational education

AREA	ORGANIZATION	YOUTH GROUPS	TYPE OF PROGRAMMES
RUMBEK	Rumbek Youth Union	Youth in general	• Brings together diaspora and youth in South Sudan • Training for youth and advocacy • Promote gender leadership
RUMBEK	Action For Rural Prosperity	Women and uneducated/ idle youth	• Peace and reconciliation dialogue and dispelling of hate speech, bringing together youth and local authorities • Radio talk shows on peaceful coexistence, bringing together youth leaders and other influencers from conflicting communities for training • Trauma healing and psychosocial support training
BENTIU	Hope Restoration South Sudan	Gangs and members of armed youth groups Rural youth Victims and youth in criminal activities	• Peacebuilding and conflict mitigation activities (conferences, community dialogue) • Capacity-building in different developmental activities • Enhancing reconciliation forums • Training youths on small and illegal arms control • Rule of law projects: manage, respond, handle and control crimes • Advocating for human rights and access to justice
BENTIU	Action for Conflict Resolution	Idle and uneducated youth Youth in general	• Advocacy for basic human rights protection and civic education • Peacebuilding activities through sports, arts, music and talent-building, intercommunal dialogue and conflict resolution • Awareness campaigns and civic education on good governance • Campaigns against tribalism, clannism and sectionalism • Training in business and entrepreneurship skills • Cash and infrastructure donations for business
BENTIU	Justice and Peace Commission	Women and girls, survivors of SGBV Youth associated with gangs and criminal groups	• Access to justice, free legal service to youth whose rights are violated but do not have the means to acquire legal redress
BENTIU	Bentiu Youth Club	Idle youth, youth in general	Youth club looking to provide spaces for peaceful recreation
INTERNATIONAL	Danish Refugee Council	Do not tackle youth specifically, but most beneficiaries are youth	Armed violence reduction activities, including conflict management education, community safety projects and conflict analysis
INTERNATIONAL	Peacebuilding Opportunities Fund – OPM	Rural youth – particularly youth vulnerable to mobilization by armed militias	Investment in organizations and civic approaches in four subnational locations (Bor, Bentiu, Rumbek, Torit), targeting youth who are particularly vulnerable to mobilization by armed militias, and supporting opportunities at the national level
INTERNATIONAL	Saferworld	Rural and urban youth, particularly youth vulnerable to mobilization by armed militias and gangs Work in all 10 states	Community security and peacebuilding, and peace and resilience in South Sudan programmes: • Support community groups to analyse the causes of conflict, and jointly plan responses • Mentor CSOs in networking and peacebuilding • Advocacy, and support efforts to counter divisive narratives that may worsen tensions • Produce analysis and policy briefings for national and international audiences
INTERNATIONAL	Windle	Idle youth, youth in general	Basic and secondary education, and vocational training in all states in South Sudan. Focused particularly on Accelerated Secondary Education Programme for Teachers and supporting South Sudan curriculum change.
INTERNATIONAL	Nonviolent Peaceforce	Idle youth, youth in general	Protection and peacebuilding based on unarmed civilian protection with emphasis on: • Women, peace and security: connecting women across ethnic divisions, supporting women leaders in facilitating dialogue at community level, creation of women protection teams at the grassroots level, among others • Social cohesion: strengthening leadership capacities of women and youth, facilitating inter- or intracommunal dialogue and strengthening community resilience • Protection in humanitarian emergencies: direct protection for individuals and communities who are under imminent threats of direct physical violence • Protection of children: protective presence for children under threat due to association to armed groups, protective accompaniment for children in reintegration and reunification processes, protective accompaniment for children who are under threat of forced recruitment • Part of the task force of the Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism of United Nations Resolution 1612 in South Sudan

AREA	ORGANIZATION	SPECIALIZED YOUTH GROUPS WORKED WITH	INTERCOMMUNAL/INTERTRIBAL DIALOGUE	CIVIC EDUCATION/ PEACEBUILDING TRAINING	PRIMARY AND/OR SECONDARY EDUCATION	PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICES	VOCATIONAL TRAINING	BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT/ ENTREPRENEURSHIP	PROMOTING SPORTS, MUSIC AND ARTS	RESEARCH, EVIDENCE BASE, CONFLICT-SENSITIVITY	ACCESS TO JUSTICE/SGBV INVESTIGATION	ACCESS TO JUSTICE/SGBV LEGAL SERVICES	PROTECTION, LOBBYING AND POLICY-MAKING	PSYCHOSOCIAL SERVICES
JUBA	Humanitarian Action for Peace and Development Agency	Gangs, idle youth	◊	◊										
JUBA	Maridi Service Agency	*Boda-boda* drivers, idle youth, young women and girls		◊			◊	◊						
JUBA AND UNITY, EXPANDING NATIONALLY	Ana Taban Arts Initiative	*Boda-boda* drivers, idle youth, gangs, young women and girls	◊					◊	◊					
JUBA AND YAMBIO	Civil Society Human Rights Organization	Young women and girls, SGBV survivors, idle youth, gang and youth army members, unaccompanied children and youth	◊		◊			◊	◊		◊	◊	◊	◊
JUBA	Humans Must Access Essential Services	Youth at risk of drug addiction, members of gangs and armed groups, young women and girls			◊	◊		◊					◊	
JUBA	Shabab le Shabab Youth Alliance Network	Youth in general				◊	◊							
JUBA	Research and Development Organization	Youth in general	◊	◊					◊					
JUBA	Take Tea Together	Youth in general, emphasis on gangs and armed youth groups	◊		◊				◊					
TORIT	Value Interest Non-Violent Alliance	Youth at risk of drug addiction, members of gangs and armed groups, young women and girls	◊	◊			◊	◊	◊				◊	
TORIT	South Sudan Red Cross	Idle/unemployed and at-risk youth				◊	◊	◊						
TORIT	Whitaker	Idle/unemployed and at-risk youth, gangs, members of armed youth groups		◊			◊	◊	◊					
TORIT	*Monyomiji* Union	*Monyomiji* members	◊	◊		◊		◊					◊	

AREA	ORGANIZATION	SPECIALIZED YOUTH GROUPS WORKED WITH	INTERCOMMUNAL/INTERTRIBAL DIALOGUE	CIVIC EDUCATION/ PEACEBUILDING TRAINING	PRIMARY AND/OR SECONDARY EDUCATION	PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICES	VOCATIONAL TRAINING	BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT/ ENTREPRENEURSHIP	PROMOTING SPORTS, MUSIC AND ARTS	RESEARCH, EVIDENCE BASE, CONFLICT-SENSITIVITY	ACCESS TO JUSTICE/SGBV INVESTIGATION	ACCESS TO JUSTICE/SGBV LEGAL SERVICES	PROTECTION, LOBBYING AND POLICY-MAKING	PSYCHOSOCIAL SERVICES
TORIT	Centenary Legal Advocate	Idle youth, gangs and armed youth group members									◊	◊		◊
YAMBIO	Rural Development Action Aid	Idle youth, former child soldiers and vulnerable women						◊					◊	◊
YAMBIO	Community Organization for Peer Educators	Uneducated/idle youth, youth peer educators	◊				◊	◊	◊				◊	
YAMBIO	Star Trust Organization	Rural youth – farmers					◊	◊						
AWEIL	Initiative for Relief and Development Council	Idle youth/gang members, small business owners					◊	◊						
AWEIL	Democracy International	Young women		◊			◊	◊			◊	◊	◊	◊
AWEIL	Northern Bahr el Ghazal State Youth Union	Youth in general	◊	◊		◊	◊	◊	◊					
AWEIL	Aweil Boda-Boda Association	*Boda-boda* owners and drivers					◊	◊						
AWEIL	Dove United of Young Women and Girls	SGBV survivors	◊	◊							◊	◊	◊	◊
AWEIL	Aweil Vocational Training Centre	Idle youth, youth in general					◊	◊						
AWEIL	Aweil Farmers and Pastoralist Union	Rural youth					◊	◊						
AWEIL	Aweil Domino and Chess Club	Idle youth, youth in general	◊						◊					
AWEIL	Aweil Women General Association	Young women and girls					◊	◊				◊	◊	◊
AWEIL	Aweil Community-Based Organization Forum	Idle youth, youth in general	◊			◊			◊					
AWEIL	Aweil Civic Engagement Centre	Youth in general	◊				◊	◊						

AREA	ORGANIZATION	SPECIALIZED YOUTH GROUPS WORKED WITH	INTERCOMMUNAL/INTERTRIBAL DIALOGUE	CIVIC EDUCATION/PEACEBUILDING TRAINING	PRIMARY AND/OR SECONDARY EDUCATION	PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICES	VOCATIONAL TRAINING	BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT/ENTREPRENEURSHIP	PROMOTING SPORTS, MUSIC AND ARTS	RESEARCH, EVIDENCE BASE, CONFLICT-SENSITIVITY	ACCESS TO JUSTICE/SGBV INVESTIGATION	ACCESS TO JUSTICE/SGBV LEGAL SERVICES	PROTECTION, LOBBYING AND POLICY-MAKING	PSYCHOSOCIAL SERVICES
AWEIL	Wun Anei Development Association	Religious groups, youth in general				◊								
AWEIL	Christian Action for Development and Support	Young women and girls									◊	◊	◊	◊
AWEIL	Recovery & Access to Commonly Best Optimism	Young women and girls	◊				◊	◊		◊			◊	
AWEIL AND WAU	Help Restore Youth	Young farmers					◊	◊						
WAU AND RUMBEK	Community Empowerment for Progress Organization	Youth in general	◊	◊			◊	◊	◊					
WAU	Kindness Community Development Organization	Young women and girls	◊	◊							◊		◊	
WAU	Change Makers South Sudan	Young women and girls, members of gangs and armed groups	◊	◊							◊	◊	◊	◊
WAU	Inclusive Education & Development Initiative	Youth gang groups	◊						◊				◊	
RUMBEK	Youth Action for Sustainability	Young women and girls	◊	◊					◊					
RUMBEK	Women Aid Vision	Young women and girls		◊			◊	◊					◊	
RUMBEK	Disabled Association and Rehabilitation Development	Youth in general			◊	◊	◊	◊						
RUMBEK	The Organisation for Children's Harmony	Youth in general	◊	◊						◊			◊	◊
RUMBEK	Widows and Orphan Development Agency	Orphans, young women and girls			◊		◊	◊						

AREA	ORGANIZATION	SPECIALIZED YOUTH GROUPS WORKED WITH	INTERCOMMUNAL/INTERTRIBAL DIALOGUE	CIVIC EDUCATION/PEACEBUILDING TRAINING	PRIMARY AND/OR SECONDARY EDUCATION	PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICES	VOCATIONAL TRAINING	BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT/ENTREPRENEURSHIP	PROMOTING SPORTS, MUSIC AND ARTS	RESEARCH, EVIDENCE BASE, CONFLICT-SENSITIVITY	ACCESS TO JUSTICE/SGBV INVESTIGATION	ACCESS TO JUSTICE/SGBV LEGAL SERVICES	PROTECTION, LOBBYING AND POLICY-MAKING	PSYCHOSOCIAL SERVICES
RUMBEK	DIAR for Rehabilitation Development Agency	Young women and girls			◊		◊	◊						
RUMBEK	Rumbek Youth Union	Youth in general	◊				◊						◊	
RUMBEK	Action For Rural Prosperity	Women and uneducated/idle youth	◊	◊										◊
BENTIU	Hope Restoration South Sudan	Youth at risk of drug addiction, members of gangs and armed groups, young women and girls	◊	◊			◊	◊			◊	◊	◊	◊
BENTIU	Action for Conflict Resolution	Youth at risk of drug addiction, members of gangs and armed groups, young women and girls	◊	◊			◊	◊						◊
BENTIU	Justice and Peace Commission	Women and girls, survivors of SGBV and youth associated with gangs and criminal groups									◊	◊	◊	◊
BENTIU	Bentiu Youth Club	Idle youth, youth in general	◊						◊					
INGO	Danish Refugee Council	Do not specifically tackle youth, but mostly they are the beneficiaries	◊	◊										
INGO	Peacebuilding Opportunities Fund	Rural youth – particularly youth vulnerable to mobilization by armed militias	◊	◊						◊			◊	
INGO	Saferworld	Rural and urban youth, particularly youth vulnerable to mobilization by armed militias and gangs	◊	◊						◊			◊	
INGO	Windle	Idle youth, youth in general			◊		◊							
INGO	Nonviolent Peaceforce	Youth at risk: members of gangs and armed groups, young women and girls	◊	◊									◊	

Annex E. Recommendations by state

STATE	MAIN YOUTH SUBCULTURES, GAPS AND SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS	SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS – AREAS OF FOCUS	AREAS OF WORK WITH LOCAL AUTHORITIES
CENTRAL EQUATORIA (JUBA)	• Gangs • Idle and unemployed youth • Youth from the diaspora • Unaccompanied youth • Small business owners • Emerging youth movements and organizations.	• Promote leadership and networks for urban and rural youth. • Avoid creating programmes that separate groups; instead promote a joint approach. • Basic and secondary education focused on skills, and accelerated training for youth behind in schooling. • Vocational training with focus on goods and services for urban areas or promoting idle youth to participate in agricultural activities. • Financial services and business management training. • Support for small businesses. • Peacebuilding, dialogue and reconciliation activities to avoid confrontation between the groups. Use of the arts, music and drama in peacebuilding activities. • Trauma and psychosocial counselling, access to justice for survivors of SGBV and human rights violations. • Cultural activities to promote better understanding.	• Reconciliation and peacebuilding between local authorities and gangs. • Rule of law programmes – ensure participation of youth and transparency/neutrality, and justice for SGBV survivors and survivors of other human rights crimes. • Support for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes.

EASTERN EQUATORIA (TORIT)	• Pastoralist and semi-pastoralist groups:
	  ✓ *Moyomiji* and *honyomiji*
	  ✓ Young farmers
	  ✓ Informal pastoralist armies
	• Gangs (N*****)/idle youth
	• Youth from the diaspora
	• Members or former members of armed youth groups
	• Youth engaged in youth organization and movements, with emphasis on women's organizations.
		• Basic and secondary education focused on rural skills, and accelerated training for youth behind in schooling.
		• Vocational training with focus on skills related to farming and pastoralism.
		• Peacebuilding, dialogue and reconciliation activities between farming and pastoralist communities, and members of armed youth groups, including engagement with *monyomiji* and *honyomiji*. Use of the arts, music and drama in peacebuilding activities.
		• Financial services and business management training.
		• Support for small businesses.
		• Trauma and psychosocial counselling, access to justice for survivors of SGBV and human rights violations.
		• Increasing the evidence base and understanding of armed youth groups and pastoralist communities.
			• Rule of law programmes – ensure participation of youth and transparency/neutrality, and justice for SGBV survivors and survivors of other human rights crimes.
			• Support for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes.
			• Reconciliation and peacebuilding between local authorities, armed youth groups, Gelweng groups and local gangs.

WESTERN EQUATORIA (YAMBIO)	• Young farmers • Youth from the diaspora • Idle youth in all semi-urban areas • Small business owners (particularly local traders) • Rural/semi-urban armed youth groups/gangs (White Arrows) • Youth engaged in youth organization and movements linked with the arts, religious affiliation, economic and political activities. Emphasis on women's organizations.	• Basic and secondary education focused on rural skills, and accelerated training for youth behind in schooling. • Vocational training with focus on skills related to farming and fishing. • Financial services and business management training. • Support for small businesses. • Peacebuilding, dialogue and reconciliation activities to avoid confrontation between the groups. Use of the arts, music and drama in peacebuilding activities. • Trauma and psychosocial counselling, access to justice for survivors of SGBV and human rights violations.	• Rule of law programmes – ensure participation of youth and transparency/neutrality, and justice for SGBV survivors and survivors of other human rights crimes.

STATE	MAIN YOUTH SUBCULTURES, GAPS AND SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS	SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS – AREAS OF FOCUS	AREAS OF WORK WITH LOCAL AUTHORITIES

NORTHERN BAHR EL GHAZAL (AWEIL)	• Criminal subcultures:
	  ✓ Current or former members of gang groups (N*****, Rud Boys, Young BK, YCMB, Future Boyz and Friends Forever)
	  ✓ Youth involved in cattle raiding and theft
	• Small business owners and beneficiaries of vocational training
	• Youth from the diaspora. Many of them may belong to gang groups but as in other states feel different and alienated.
	• Rural youth:
	  ✓ Young farmers
	  ✓ Young pastoralists, with some included in criminal subcultures
	• Youth engaged in youth organizations and movements linked with the arts, religious affiliation, and economic and political activities.
		• Basic and secondary education focused on rural skills, and accelerated training for youth behind in schooling.
		• Vocational training with focus on skills related to farming and pastoralism.
		• Peacebuilding, dialogue and reconciliation activities between farming and pastoralist communities, and members of armed youth groups. Use of the arts, music and drama in peacebuilding activities.
		• Financial services and business management training.
		• Support for small businesses.
		• Trauma and psychosocial counselling, access to justice for survivors of SGBV and human rights violations.
			• Rule of Law Programmes – ensure participation of youth and transparency/neutrality, and justice for SGBV survivors and survivors of other human rights crimes.
			• Support for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.
			• Reconciliation and peacebuilding between local authorities, armed youth groups, Gelweng groups and local gangs.

WESTERN BAHR EL GHAZAL (WAU)	• Rural subcultures: Armed youth groups (Arrow Boys, Döt ku Beny), Farming communities (Raga), pastoralist communities, including *monyomiji* and those in line, gang groups • Rural communities (issue to explore is whether Fertir–Luo–Dinka fighting created other youth subcultures besides armed youth groups, including more positive ones) • Youth from the diaspora. Many of them belong to other groups (positive and negative ones) but have particular cultures and sometimes face discrimination within their own groups • Small business owners • Youth engaged in youth organizations and movements linked with the arts, religious affiliation, and economic and political activities (see list in Annex E). Emphasis on women's organizations.	Similar approach to Northern Bahr el Ghazal. • Engagement with *monyomiji* and *honyomiji* on peacebuilding, dialogue and reconciliation activities between farming and pastoralist communities, and members of armed youth groups. • Increasing the evidence base and understanding of armed youth groups and pastoralist communities.	As in Northern Bahr el Ghazal

LAKES (RUMBEK)	• Youth in pastoralist camps, including:
	  ✓ Males responsible for the defence of their communities
	  ✓ Young girls with increasing say on intercommunal fighting
	• Current or former members of armed youth groups (Gelweng groups) and 'rural gangs'
	• Members or former members of armed youth groups: South Sudan Defence Forces
	• Youth engaged in youth organizations and movements linked with the arts (including rappers of 'insult songs'), religious affiliation, and economic and political activities (see list in Annex E). Emphasis on women's organizations.
		Similar approach to Western Bahr el Ghazal, focus on:
		• Increasing the evidence base and understanding of armed youth groups and pastoralist communities.
		• Creating peace and reconciliation activities between different youth subcultures, and between government and violent youth subcultures.
			As in Northern Bahr el Ghazal

UNITY (BENTIU)	• Current and former members of armed youth groups, including Gojjam, Jeish in Bor and minority Dinka armed youth groups • Pastoralist youth: in many cases part of the above • Urban/semi-urban gangs • Young small business owners (traders, *boda-boda* owners) • Youth engaged in youth organizations and movements linked with the arts, religious affiliation, and economic and political activities (see list in Annex E). Emphasis on women's organizations.	Similar approach to Western Bahr el Ghazal, focus on: • Increasing the evidence base and understanding of armed youth groups and pastoralist communities. • Creating peace and reconciliation activities between different youth subcultures, and between government and violent youth subcultures.	As in Northern Bahr el Ghazal

Abbreviations

CEO	chief executive officer
CSO	civil society organization
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
FGD	focal group discussion
INGO	international non-governmental organization
KII	key informant interviews
NGO	non-governmental organization
OPM	Oxford Policy Management
PaCC	Peace and Community Cohesion project
POC	protection of civilians
R-ARCSS	Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan
SGBV	sexual and gender-based violence
SPLA-IO	Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

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