


Conflict and Gender Study – South Sudan

Addressing Root Causes Programme

January 2018



Government of the Netherlands



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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACRONYMS	v
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	vi
Objective	vi
Methodology	vi
Constraints	vii
Findings	vii
Conclusions & Recommendations	x
1. BACKGROUND	12
2. OBJECTIVE.....	12
3. METHODOLOGY	12
4. CONSTRAINTS	14
5. FINDINGS	15
5.1 People’s General Concerns	15
5.2 Conflict & Security Concerns	16
5.3 Conflict Contributing Factors.....	20
5.3.1 Guns.....	20
5.3.2 Socially Constructed Masculine Aggression	21
5.3.3 Cattle Greed	22
5.3.4 Revenge	23
5.3.5 Accolades.....	24
5.3.6 Girls, Marriage, & Dowry	26
5.3.7 Gendered Power Dynamics	28
5.4 Conflict Management Strategies.....	29
5.4.1 Contrasting Male & Female Conflict Management Strategies:.....	29
5.4.2 Contrasting Agriculturalist & Cattle-keeper Conflict Management Strategies:	30
5.4.3 Contrasting Urban & Rural Conflict Management Strategies:.....	31
5.5 Individuals are Reconfigured by Violence.....	31
5.5.1 Social amplification of risk	32
5.6 Social Fragmentation	33
5.6.1 Failed Peace Negotiations	35
5.7 Altered Social Norms	36
5.7.1 Normalisation of Violence.....	36
5.8 The Future Looks Hopeless.....	38
5.8.1 Defining Peace	39
6. CONCLUSIONS & THE WAY FORWARD.....	40
6.1 A Programming Framework	40

Pillar 1. CHANGING ATTITUDES & BELIEFS	40
Pillar 2. MECHANISMS for ADDRESSING ON-GOING VIOLENCE	44
Pillar 3. CONSTRUCTING A PEACEFUL FUTURE	46
8. ANNEX:	49
FURTHER SUBSTANTIVE INFORMATION	49
8.1 Conflict Trends in Detail	49
8.1.1 National Level Conflict.....	49
8.1.2 Criminality.....	50
8.1.3 Cattle Raiding.....	50
8.1.4 Political Dimension in Bor.....	51
8.1.5 Meso-Level Cattle Raiding	51
8.1.6 Livelihood Clashes	52
8.1.7 Everyday Violence - Domestic Violence.....	52
8.1.8 Hunger Causes Domestic Violence.....	53
8.1.9 Youth Beating Parents	55
8.1.10 Elder Versus Youth Conflict	56
8.2 The State & Security Sector Actors	57
8.2.1 Human Security & Security Sector Actors.....	57
8.2.2 Government.....	59
8.2.3 Security Sector Actors.....	61
8.2.4 Community Defense Forces.....	62
8.3	63
Men Abandoning Women & Children.....	63
8.3.1 Currency Crisis.....	63
8.4 Gendered Perceptions of Leadership	64
8.4.1 Women’s Role in Peacemaking	67
8.4.2 Participation.....	68
REFERENCES	70

ACRONYMS

ACORD	Agency for Co-operation and Research in Development
ARC	Addressing Root Causes
CCR	Centre for Conflict Resolution
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DCA	DanChurchAid
F	Female
HSBA	Human Security Baseline Assessment
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
M	Male
Pple	People
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
UNMISS	United Nation's Mission to South Sudan

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This study of Conflict and Gender in South Sudan was undertaken in support of the ‘Addressing Root Causes Fund Programme’ (ARC). Being implemented over a five-year period between September 2016 – August 2021, the Programme is to be undertaken by a consortium of three organisations including: the Agency for Co-operation and Research in Development (ACORD), DanChurchAid (DCA), and the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) (here-after referred to as the Consortium). Funding is provided by the Addressing Root Causes (ARC) Fund of the Government of the Netherlands. This study, conducted between February 20 to March 27, 2017, was meant to contribute to the baseline upon which the Programme is being constructed.

Objective

This was an ‘action research’ study which aimed to contribute to building the foundation upon which the conflict and peace programming that will be undertaken in the ARC Programme will be constructed. Given that peace and conflict programming is largely concerned with addressing ideas, beliefs and attitudes that underpin violent behaviour, this study was broadly aimed at identifying the existing ideas, beliefs and attitudes that are in need of changing.

Methodology

The framing of this study was constructed through a literature & document review. The main themes explored through the empirical process included:

- priority concerns in general;
- security concerns more specifically;
- perceptions regarding the performance and capacity of Security Sector Actors;
- social dynamics that unfold within violent contexts (eg: social amplification of risk; social fragmentation; the emergence of the ‘antagonistic other’; etc.); and
- shifting social norms (eg: normalization of violence; erosion of moral authority; increase in violent power through force; exaggerated social power dynamics especially along gender lines).

The approach adopted was qualitative. A feminist lens was adopted to particularly seek out power dynamics and hidden voices. The tools used included direct observation as well as a diversity of interview processes that were designed to capture the lived experiences of the respondents and explore how people make sense of these experiences. Taking respondents as the experts on their own experiences, this approach is explicitly ‘perception-based’ and intentionally seeks people’s subjective responses to the questions under exploration. The methodology is interpretive as opposed to scientifically positivists. The validity or certainty of the research stems from ‘investigative triangulation’ which is achieved through drawing on a diversity of sources. The data collected is ‘narrative’ in the form of words; phrases; anecdotes; stories, etc. A summary of the interview processes is presented in the following table.

Total Interviews per location for Conflict & Gender Analysis									
Dates	Days of Research	Locations	# of Interviews	# of ppl interviewed	# of Key informants	# of F Adult	# of M Adult	# of M youth	# of F Youth
03-05.03.17	½ + 1 + ¼	Terekeka	12	84	6	46	8	8	16
06-07.03.17	¾ + ¾	Bor/Pariak	11	60	0	18	7	28	7
10-13.03.17	3	Kapoeta	20	94	7	28	26	16	17

14-16.03.17	1	Chukudum	11	50	2	19	7	12	10
09&19-20.03.17	½ + ¾	Lobonok	9	55	2	12	15	19	5
13-18.03.17	5	Ikotos ¹	30	95	0	26	39	30	0
TOTALS:	13 ½		93	436	17	149	102	113	55
Percentages:					4%	34%	23%	26%	13%

A total of 93 interview processes were completed with some 436 individuals in seven locations. Some 47% of the total respondents were female; 4% of the total individuals were ‘key informants’ including Chiefs, religious leaders, etc. and 26% of the respondents were male youths.

Constraints

The study was undertaken within a difficult context that is notorious for its security and logistics challenges. However, the facilitation – which was shared among the three members of the consortium, as well as by local partners in each location visited – must be commended. No major security or logistical problems were experienced throughout the field research process, which was very tightly packed and involved extensive travel and numerous relocations.

The main constraint for the conflict & gender study was the inadequate time allotted for conducting the field level data collection process. With the responses of participants shaping the findings, a qualitative study relies upon the in-puts provided by the respondents. In this approach, a ‘representative’ sample is not determined statistically, but rather by what is called ‘*information saturation*’. This is the point at which respondents are simply repeating what others have said, and are no longer adding additional elements. Further, the validity, credibility and trustworthiness of the findings rely on *investigative triangulation*, which is achieved through an adequate number of interviews conducted with a diversity of respondents. In most locations visited, the time allocated for data collection was less than ideal. However, this was compensated to some degree by the fact that the findings in each location built on those from the earlier ones.

Findings

Empirical data was collected from Terekeka, Bor/Pariak; Kapoeta; Chukudum; Ikotos; and Lobonok. This section briefly sketches the findings of the study. In broad terms, the priority concerns that respondents consistently cited included: hunger, disease, economic difficulties, and lack of productive assets, as well as insecurity. Studying insecurity in more detail, the following table sketches a range of issues that people highlighted.

Type of Conflict	Level of Impact		
	Micro	Meso	Macro
Larger Juba-Based Crisis			
Criminality (all locations in different forms)			

¹ The data from Ikotos was collected by the Manna Development Agency (MADA) team, who are also scheduled to be implementing partners in the Programme as well.

Cattle-Raiding	Intra-Communal (eg:Terekeka)	Red	Red	White
	Inter-Communal (eg: Terekeka; Kapoeta; Chukudum; Bor)	Red	Red	White
	Inter-Communal with a political dimension (eg: Bor)	Red	Red	Yellow
Livelihood Clashes: agriculturalists vs livestock keepers	Local (eg: Terekeka)	Red	White	White
	Political (eg: Lobonok)	Red	White	Yellow
Revenge Attacks (all locations in different forms)		Red	Red	Red
Domestic Violence (all locations in different forms)		Red	Yellow	White
Elder vs Youth Tensions (especially in Chukudum)		Red	Yellow	White

With the formal security actors being largely ineffectual in terms of buffering the civilian population from direct exposure to the multiple sources of violence prevalent in their contexts, people are forced to adopt independent 'conflict management' strategies which include: acceptance/tolerance; avoidance; negotiation; or direct confrontation of the threat. The following table contrasts the likelihood of certain groups adopting each of these strategies, suggesting for example that women are more (albeit not exclusively) likely to try to tolerate and avoid sources of violence; while men (especially those from cattle-keeping contexts) rather tend towards confrontation as their first option of managing threats of violence.

	Acceptance/Tolerance	Avoidance	Negotiation	Confrontation
Female	Green	Green	Yellow	Red
Male	Red	Red	Yellow	Green
Agriculturalist	Green	Green	Yellow	Red
Cattle-Keeper	Red	Red	Yellow	Green

Whatever strategy individuals and/or communities employ in the face of on-going violent threat, the fact is that it is inadequate in the absence of functional security sector actors. As such, this study has taken the study further, exploring what happens to communities and individuals when they are repeatedly exposed to serious threats of violence over a long period of time. While it is well established in academic research that such communities and individuals are indeed altered, some of the most evident changes in the communities studied in this research is the profound level of *normalization of violence* and the *militarization of mindsets*. Indeed, the central argument of this report is that behaviour in itself is not the root cause of perpetual violence - but rather that the on-going violence is rooted in attitudes and beliefs that have been changed as a consequence of people's repeated direct exposure to violence. As such, any programme aiming to address the root causes of violence must tackle the ideas, beliefs and attitudes that allow for the continual use of violence as a normal social process.

The vast majority of respondents pointed to the fact that the use of (often extreme levels) of violence is indeed completely normal in the household; in management of disputes; and as a means of ensuring compliance. The

'normalcy' of this is repeatedly re-asserted through various assertions including: this has been there long; this is the way it is here; this is normal; it is our culture. These attitudes render the use of violence as deeply reflexive. Indeed, in many cases (eg: domestic violence) it is not even recognised as a problem, with countless respondents explaining that 'we just accept it like that'. This profound normalization of violence is taken to equate with an acceptance of it. However, this nevertheless does not change the fact that violence is deeply destructive and utterly unsustainable, so this so-called normalization of violence embodies a profound contradiction.

There are many factors in the South Sudan context that continue to perpetuate this normalization. For example, the high prevalence of small arms, especially in the hands of male youth, exacerbates these trends. While the Programme refers the problem of 'disengaged youth' the fact is that youth involved in cattle-keeping are extremely engaged – albeit in highly violent and socially disruptive behaviour. There is indeed another portion of the male youth who have had some education but can now find no productive alternatives. Respondents point out that both of these youth populations tend to proactively undermine traditional authority.

The erosion of moral authority, which is traditionally, the basis of both community governance structures, as well as household level systems, is all too apparent. Moral authority is being usurped by armed youth who lead by threat and the use of force. Masculine aggressivity has moved to the fore. It has eroded the capacity of individuals to empathise with others and squelched the space for softer sentiments such as compassion and cooperation. Once one is no longer able to imagine the feelings and experiences of another, they are far more able to perpetrate violence against that one. These factors contribute to the normalization of the use of violence.

The resultant context of perpetual violence fosters social fragmentation in which one's sense of community reduces. Those excluded from one's inner group are often perceived as a threat; and these perceptions are exacerbated by social practices. For example, the Taposa refer to the Buya as 'the enemy who is constantly among us'. Their daily language thus constantly reminds everyone that the Buya are their enemies, thus making the idea of peaceful co-existence ever-more difficult to imagine.

Even more fundamental is the lack of understanding/acceptance of the notion of human equity. In contrast to the core principle of universal human rights which states that human beings are equal due to the simple fact that we are all human, there is a clear hierarchy of value among individuals. This is most evident in terms of gender, with males, as the primary power brokers within the society, widely considering themselves as inherently superior to females. This attitude surely extends to the so-called 'enemy', which when seen as less than human, can more easily be seen as having no rights to live.

This combines toxically with the fact that the endless cycles of violence and the enmity held for the 'other' is often seen as normal. Normalization reflects a profound level of acceptance. The *expectation* for positive change is largely absent. If people are unable to recognise violence as a problem; they are utterly unable to change it.

There is also a problem with a sense of responsibility. As a result of having little power or control over their circumstances, people naturally take little responsibility. Indeed, the extent to which responsibility is transferred is quite impressive. For example, 'cows' are said to 'force us to clash'. With no sense of responsibility, there is no sense of the individual and/or of the agency of an individual. As such, it is hard for people to grasp the idea that choices are made; and the actions of individuals create consequences; that individual choices & actions

influence their lived experiences. The lack of this sense of self leaves individuals utterly unaccountable; as well as utterly powerless to create a positive change in their lives and their society.

Compounding this is a very passive engagement with the future. As a group of elder men in Pariak explained, 'changes come automatically; if they are not there, we do not worry, because then it was not going to be there' (6M Elders, Pariak). In the current context, most respondents have adopted an utterly passive stance, leaving their future 'in the hands of God'. As such, they have an especially difficult time in imagining a better future. They express little or no expectations for anything different. Little hope is expressed. There is no expectation for positive change in the future and they certainly have no sense of having the capacity to create a different future.

As such, the challenge at hand is shifting these attitudes and beliefs so as to reverse the negative individual and social erosion that happens in a violence-imbued context. For example, the importance of restoring social cohesion is widely recognised as key to reversing the trends of on-going violence and the consequent social fracturing that results. Indeed, while many respondents described peace in relatively basic terms of 'the absence of war', others highlighted the importance of living together and in harmony with those with whom you have been in conflict. As such, people understand intuitively where they need to go to establish a peaceful existence. However, they have a very difficult time imagining just how this could be made to come about. And they do not relate to the idea that each individual has at least some choice and individual agency to contribute to constructing a peaceful alternative future.

Conclusions & Recommendations

The core assertion of this report is that the altered social processes (ie: fracturing, exclusion, othering) and the attitudes and beliefs described above perpetuate the continuation of violence in the areas visited in this field study. Thus, to address the root causes, the intension must be to change these attitudes and beliefs and social processes as a means of changing reflexively violent behaviour that is widely adopted, but widely accepted as *normal* (ie: and thus acceptable).

Addressing the root causes of violence and conflict requires a hands-on engagement at the psycho-social level – because the exposure to violence that people have endured to date has generated deep changes at the level of the individual and social well-being and these factors need to be reversed in order to alter the practices around violence. As such, a clear set of objectives for change at the level of attitudes and beliefs is required. This should be accompanied with concrete activities aimed at creating change on the psycho-social level as a means of changing violent behaviour.

With changing attitudes and beliefs being at the heart of behaviour change, these objectives should be made central to all activities. The capacity to promote awareness of the principles of universal human rights (ie: that all human beings are equal on the basis of their humanness) should also be developed as the means for operationalizing ideas such as respect and dignity. The notion of social cohesion can be operationalised through many different approaches. However, at its core is the need to translate complex concepts such as meaningful participation; empowerment; and social responsibility into concrete action. Once a positive future can be envisioned, the peace-building needs then to be intimately integrated with the livelihoods programming as a joint effort to help these communities to create the future they have imagined.



1. BACKGROUND

This study of Conflict² & Gender in South Sudan was undertaken in support of the “Addressing Root Causes Fund Programme” (here-after referred to as the Programme). The Programme is being implemented over a five-year period (between September 2016 – August 2021) by a consortium of three organisations including: the Agency for Co-operation and Research in Development (ACORD), DanChurchAid (DCA), and the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) (here-after referred to as the Consortium), with funding from the Addressing Root Causes (ARC) Fund of the Government of the Netherlands.

Significant effort has already gone into studying how best to design such a programme - aimed at tackling the root causes of recurring cycles of conflict and fragile resilience - in order to maximise impact within what is an extremely difficult operating environment. As such, this Conflict & Gender Study aims to provide further nuancing to the understanding of the causes and consequences of conflict and violence and how these can be altered. The study draws on both a literature & document review and primary empirical data gathered through micro level analysis as means of exploring conflict and gender dynamics as they unfold in the lives of the Programme’s target population. The empirical data was collected through direct observation and various forms of interviews as a means of gaining insight into the lived experience of conflict and violence, particularly exploring how people make sense of their environment. A ‘feminist’ lens was adopted to gain insight into gender dynamics – and more specifically into power dynamics – as they unfold in the lives of the populations targeted by the Programme.

2. OBJECTIVE

The objective of the study was to provide nuanced and detailed insight, through a gendered lens, into the dynamics of conflict and violence as they unfold within targeted areas in South Sudan. Given that peace and conflict programming is largely concerned with addressing ideas, beliefs and attitudes that underpin violent behaviour, this study was broadly aimed at identifying the existing ideas, beliefs and attitudes that are in need of changing.

3. METHODOLOGY³

The approach adopted for this study was qualitative ‘phenomenologic’ approach. This approach is most applicable when the aim of the study is to discover, understand and/or describe a phenomenon or experience. As Creswell says, the research objective ‘is to make sense of (or interpret) the meanings others have about the world’ (Creswell 2013, p25). Being inductive or ‘bottom-up’ and ‘interpretive’, the approach facilitates the exploration of the perceptions, insights, attitudes, beliefs, preferences, experiences and interpretations of respondents. It is especially applicable when complex social processes; human behaviour; and/or social norms are being explored. Conflict and gender dynamics are very clear examples of such complex processes. Thus, the approach was adopted in order to capture the human experiences and the meaning and significance that people give to these experiences.

² The Programme applies the generic definition of ‘disputes’ or ‘contestation’ to the word conflict. It also refers to ‘Violent Conflict’ as: at least one party using violence to determine the outcome of their conflict or dispute, or more generally any kind of violent act. As this document is part of a ‘conflict analysis’ *per se*, it largely uses ‘conflict’ in the sense of armed conflict which is conceptually distinguished from the notion of violence.

³ More details regarding the methodology and analytic approach applied in this study are available in the annex.

In effort to capture the gender dimension of the study, a feminist lens was also applied. In taking ‘gender’ as a basic social organizing principle, which all too often shapes the conditions of people’s lives, a ‘feminist’ approach systematically looks for what has been ‘left out’ or which voices that ‘have been silenced’ (Creswell, 2013 p.29). Central to this, is the analysis of the power dynamics and the study of how social positions impact on individuals. Such intangibles can often not be counted in any meaningful manner. As such, phenomenology naturally relies upon qualitative ‘narrative approaches’ that seek to study the stories that individuals recount about their lives and their experiences as opposed to quantitative process.

This approach is precisely what was required in this conflict & gender study, given the above stated objectives. The root causes of conflict and dysfunctional gender dynamics are grounded in individual attitudes and beliefs and collectively held social norms. These must be understood in order to determine what can be changed to create substantive changes in behaviour.

The actual data collection process included direct observation and discursive tools. The data collected is descriptive and ‘narrative’ (ie: words, phrases, anecdotes, stories, etc) and provides insight into people’s experiences. The data collection tools included a series of semi-structured interviews (including individual, focus group discussions, key informants, etc). The following table provides a summary of these discussions, illustrating that a total of 93 interview processes were completed with some 436 individuals in seven locations. Some 47% of the total respondents were female; 4% of the total individuals were ‘key informants’ including Chiefs, religious leaders, etc. and 26% of the respondents were male youths.

Total Interviews per location for Conflict & Gender Analysis									
Dates	Days of Research	Locations	# of Interviews	# of ppl interviewed	# of Key informants	# of F Adult	# of M Adult	# of M youth	# of F Youth
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09&19-20.03.17	½ + ¾	Lobonok	9	55	2	12	15	19	5
13-18.03.17	5	Ikotos ⁴	30	95	0	26	39	30	0
TOTALS:	13 ½		93	436	17	149	102	113	55
Percentages:					4%	34%	23%	26%	13%

The analysis in such an approach is *iterative*, with the narrative data collected being progressively organised into patterns and themes that shape the observations and findings that emerge from the study.⁵ ‘*Investigative triangulation*’ increases confidence in the findings. This is achieved through diversifying the sources of data collected, both in terms of absolute numbers, and profile of respondents. Greater diversity allows for a more reliable analysis, and also deepens the nuance of understanding and enhances opportunities for innovation. The notion of ‘representation’ is achieved through so-called *information saturation*, or the point at which new respondents repeat information already gathered, and add nothing new to the understanding.

⁴ The data from Ikotos was collected by the Manna Development Agency (MADA) team.

⁵ This sits in contrast to a quantitative approach, by definition, relies on statistical data. Taking a top-down deductive approach, quantitative approaches generally aim to test/confirm hypotheses that are pre-determined before the research is undertaken. This qualitative approach allows the ground reality to shape the outcomes of the study.

The understanding of the issues that emerge from the data progressively evolves throughout the study. This requires that the research process is flexible (as opposed to fixed),⁶ evolving as the researcher's understanding evolves. The focus of inquiry adapts as nuances and new threads emerge. Often the most valuable insights emerge as a result of following new threads – which were unknown before the study began. In this light, the researcher herself is the primary tool of the research process, and it is for this reason that the research cannot be delegated to so-called 'enumerators'

Nevertheless, Manna Development Agency (MADA), based in Ikotos - also scheduled to be implementing partners in the Programme - conducted some 30 interviews with 95 individuals, providing additional empirical data for the overall analytic process. To a large extent, these findings correlated closely with those from Chukudum and Kapoeta. The detailed data collected will also provide a very valuable foundation when programming begins in the area.

The sampling of respondents in the study was largely *purposeful*, with target respondents being identified according to specific characteristics. Respondents were *purposefully* selected according to their lived experiences, being expected to have insight into and opinions on the issues being explored. All respondents were invited to participate on the basis of free & informed consent.

4. CONSTRAINTS

The main constraint that this study faced was the inadequate time allotted both for conducting the field level data collection process as well as the analysis. The above described qualitative approach is bottom-up, and is thus fundamentally constructed upon in-puts from the respondents. While the narrative data collected is 'subjective', this is actually the strength of the approach, in that it ensures that the outcomes of the study are constructed upon what the respondents have said. As such, the validity, credibility and trustworthiness of the research is important. This is achieved through the above described *investigative triangulation*. Indeed, a 'representative' sample is not determined statistically, but rather through the experience of '*information saturation*' – or the point at which respondents are simply repeating information already gathered, and are no longer adding additional elements. Typically, this would take some 3 days of interviews. In most cases, the study was allotted less than that.

Due to tight scheduling, the data collection process was required to be conducted at all hours of the day and evening, thus allowing for very little time for data in-put and analysis. Narrative data takes significant time to analyse, with the analysis being progressive. Inadequate time allotted reduces the richness that could be gained. In this case, it also limited the extent to which different sources of information could be fully merged and blended.

In order to compensate for the tight schedule, the planners of the research process had counted on the feasibility of 'delegating' a portion of the data collection process. However, the coherence of this particular research approach requires that the researcher has a direct presence and experience with the populations interviewed. As such, there is simply no alternative to face-time with respondents. As such, the researcher narrowed the scope in those locations where the time was severely short.

⁶ In contrast, questionnaires and surveys, as 'fixed' tools are very difficult to adapt as the understanding evolves.

The running of three studies concurrently stretched the staff resources, creating limitations both in terms of learning/teaching opportunities. The demands exceeded the staff resources in all cases. This combined with the lack of time, limited opportunities to engage with the implementing teams (and other implementing actors in the area). There was also a missed opportunity in terms of training.

In each location, I was allocated a different translator, each having different levels of skill, interest and flexibility, all of which influences the efficacy and accuracy of the research process. A shortage of female translators also has implications on the frankness of especially female respondents in some cases.

In a context which is in some cases classified as phase 4 on the IPC, it was difficult in some cases to motivate people to reflect on social norms and practices when their attention was focused on their immediate struggle - hunger. In some cases, the process encroached on the bad practice of engaging with people who have critical needs, but prompting them to discuss only the issues we were interested in. Further, in some locations (esp. Bor & Lobonok), respondents systematically expressed exasperation with answering the same questions again and again while allegedly 'receiving no feedback'.⁷ They claim to have given a lot of information in the past, but have seen no results.

The final report is expected to speak to a very wide range of audiences, including Donor Representatives; Senior Organizational Representatives; technical architects of the Programme; external stakeholders; and multiple levels of operational personnel. This broad range poses challenges in terms of clarity of pitch.

5. FINDINGS

This section outlines the main findings of the study. These findings largely reflect what respondents said in interviews. The style of reporting seeks to preserve the way that the respondents themselves described their lived experiences, rationale, interpretation, and analysis to the degree possible. In terms of themes, this section briefly sketches people's general concerns and orients their security concerns more specifically. It sketches a wide range of conflict trends as experienced from the micro perspective. It then explores a range of factors that contribute to the various conflict dynamics. Finally, it then briefly considers the independent 'conflict management options' that people exposed to violence may adopt, comparing and contrasting the tendency of options adopted by different population groups. Acknowledging that whatever options adopted are inadequate to protect people from the violent threats they face, the second part of this chapter explores the reconfiguring of individuals and the fracturing of societies that occurs due to prolonged exposure to on-going violence.

5.1 People's General Concerns

As a means of getting oriented in each interview, a general question about people's priority concerns was asked. This allowed people to express their general views, as well as providing insight into how people ranked security threats in relation to other urgent issues they confront in their daily lives. The issues highlighted systematically included hunger, disease, the currency crisis and a lack of agricultural tools and in-puts and insecurity.

Moreover, respondents often spontaneously drew correlations between these various issues, especially highlighting how hunger contributes to violence. For example, claiming that 'a hungry man is an angry man', a

⁷ In this case, 'feedback' was equated with a material response to the needs they had listed in the discussions undertaken.

group of males from a cattle-camp stated that ‘if people are satisfied there are no fights; if they are hungry, there will be fights’ (10M cattle-camp, Terekeka).⁸ They added that ‘hunger causes people to become tense; hungry people will over-react; hunger makes people wild; you can just touch them and there will be a fight’, concluding philosophically that ‘hunger moves with conflict like satisfaction moves with laughter’.

Hunger was also regularly tied to theft. For example, stressing that ‘there can be no peace when there is hunger’, the above cattle-keepers explained that ‘hunger pushes someone to steal a cow; this will quickly grow into a fight between the villages’. A group of women associated with this cattle-camp agreed that ‘hunger leads people to steal to stay alive; this causes more fighting’. Stating that ‘we have no peace here because we are hungry’ another group of women in the Terekeka market added that ‘hunger causes children to steal; this causes chaos; there will be a fight’. In many cases hunger was also tied to escalating domestic violence, discussed further below. The following explores the specific security issues and some of these linkages in more detail.

5.2 Conflict & Security Concerns

Especially when adopting a micro-level perspective, which this Programme intends to do, many conflict analysts suggest ‘decoupling’ the study of violence from that of armed conflict or civil war (Gilligan 2009, p.131) because very distinct dynamics of violence typically emerge at the micro level. Indeed, pointing to what he refers to as a ‘Pandora’s box of violence’, Kalyvas as a leading conflict theorist emphasizes a ‘privatization of violence’ characterised by intimate and inter-personal hurt that often unfolds at both the individual and intra & inter-communal levels (2006, p.10-14). As such, he recommends adopting a macro-meso-micro analytic frame so as to disaggregate different forms of conflict & violence.

In such a frame, the macro perspective focuses on the traditional concept of armed conflict, spotlighting the broader causes of war, the political elite, and the formal structural and organizational issues and processes. From such a macro perspective, the lived experiences of the individuals affected by armed conflict are typically rendered invisible. As such, it is the micro perspective that specifically spotlights the individual and their lived experiences of this violence. It captures the above-mentioned Pandora’s box of privatized violence that unfolds within the households and in the lives of individuals occupying these micro spaces. The meso level is concerned with dynamics of violence that occur in between these two level – in this case cattle raiding being the most obvious example. The following table provides a summary of the main security threats that were highlighted throughout the study, reflecting the levels at which the particular forms of violence are rooted.

Type of Conflict		Level of Impact		
		Micro	Meso	Macro
Larger Juba-Based Crisis		Red	Yellow	Red
Criminality (all locations in different forms)		Red	Yellow	Yellow
Cattle-Raiding	Intra-Communal (eg:Terekeka)	Red	Red	White

⁸ Much of these findings presented in this report are expressed in the relative words of the respondent (within the fact that they have been translated). The referencing label indicates the gender & number of people participating in the interview, and the location it took place. When this information is provided in the text, the label is deleted.

	Inter-Communal (eg: Terekeka; Kapoeta; Chukudum; Bor)			
	Inter-Communal with a political dimension (eg: Bor)			
Livelihood Clashes: agriculturalists vs livestock keepers	Local (eg: Terekeka)			
	Political (eg: Lobonok)			
Revenge Attacks (all locations in different forms)				
Domestic Violence (all locations in different forms)				
Elder vs Youth Tensions (especially in Chukudum)				

Awareness of the multi-dimensional reality of violence is critical for any programming that aims to address the root causes. This section expounds on respondents' experiences of the above noted security threats.⁹

The most obvious macro rooted crisis is that which stems from Juba. Opinions varied from location to location on whether that crisis was directly affecting them locally. Respondents from Lobonok, Bor & Ikotos drew very direct connections, with one young man in Bor categorically stating that 'the 2013 crisis rages on today'. A group of women in Ikotos claimed that 'all of these problems are brought by the fighting between the government and the rebels'.

From the perspective of the agriculturalists in Lobonok, the crisis there is seen as having clear ties to the macro level, with the cattle-keepers in their area being perceived as 'supported by the government'. On the other hand, in Chukudum respondents were unsure if an intensive episode of violence occurring in late 2016 in which 'armed men from Juba came in a vehicle and started shooting and looting and terrorising the population' was related to the Juba crisis. While a local Chief was convinced of this, many respondents were unsure. Others more generally blamed the 'top leaders' for 'causing troubles so we cannot see peace' (6F, associated to cattle-camp, Terekeka), and worried that if the Juba troubles continue, 'it'll reach us; it has spoiled many things; we now have a bad economy', and 'people have been killed' (8F&4M, orient TaposaVillage, Kapoeta).

This highlights the secondary consequences of macro level armed conflict that play out at the micro level. This is compounded by other micro level dynamics. Conflict theorists argue that although embedded within the wider frame of the macro-level armed conflict, the violence that unfolds at the micro level is often 'privatized' and deeply personalised and is often unrelated to the macro political agenda (Kalyvas 2006, p.20). As institutions collapse and law & order is eroded, space is created for new forms of violence. In this sense, respondents from all localities agreed that the Juba-based crisis is exacerbating criminality in their areas. For example, everyone in Chukudum who was asked agreed that the incident mentioned above had escalated the prevalence of criminality and insecurity more broadly, due both to an increase in 'unknown armed men' in the area, as well as due to an influx of small arms into the area.¹⁰

⁹ More details of each element are available in the annex.

¹⁰ The police reportedly armed the youth to help them to fight those attacking the area.

However, pushing this to a deeper level, Kalyvas emphasizes that conflict environments create the space for personalised violence that is often 'motivated by opportunism, impunity, and revenge' (2006, p.24). In this line, local analysts in most localities visited noted that both 'unknown armed men' as well as local individuals are taking these opportunities for criminal activities. This generates fear and forces civilians to reduce their movements and reduces their livelihood options as they try to avoid such threats. In Kapoeta people mentioned a high prevalence of rape by unknown assailants occurring in the outskirts of the town. In both Bor & Pariak, respondents readily blamed the 'Murle' for such activities, with women claiming that 'they will beat you; they will rob you, they will rape you; they can even kill you'; adding that they have 'a constant fear of our children being kidnapped'.

Especially in cattle-keeping contexts, especially male respondents especially associate criminality to the stealing of cattle. This reflects observations of theorists that individuals caught up in war often 'take advantage of the prevailing situation to settle private and local conflicts' (Kalyvas 2006, p.365). This is all too evident in relation to the cattle raiding which ranges from small-scale 'stealing' which is generally described as the unorganized opportunistic stealing of small number of cattle, to large-scale community-based processes that aim at large numbers of cattle. This 'stealing' is a micro-level criminal act.

However, being relatively removed from the local environment, the organized raiding can be seen as generally playing out in the meso-level space. Exceptions include those cases in which 'big men' (ie: powerful people from Juba) are presumed to be inciting and/or arming the youth to either stir up political discontent, or to collect cattle on their behalf. Alternatively, attacks in Bor allegedly perpetrated by Nuer are now seen by Bor respondents as having a political dimension tied to the Juba crisis – thus rooting those activities in the macro level.

However, for the most part, meso-level cattle-raiding has its own dynamics. Most striking is the sense of *inevitability*. Respondents within cattle-keeping contexts systematically described cattle-keeper clashes as *an inevitable confrontation*. Many explained that contact between different groups will inevitably lead to a violent conflict. Even though they allegedly go another's land for grazing, it is widely understood that 'these boys go hoping to grab cattle' (6F,2elders& 4 youth, Kapoeta). Others explained that 'they know they will fight; those boys expect the "enemy" to raid their cattle so they try first' (5F, IDP Margaret, Chukudum). These conflicts are expected to be deadly, with people readily admitting that 'he must kill you or you must kill him; this is just routine; it must be like this' (9M Napetait Village, Kapoeta). This often provokes all-too-common revenge attacks, which tend to be directed at the communities of the cattle-keepers, thus drawing this violence back into the very local environment. These dynamics begins to provide the first glimpses into the extent to which deadly violence is normalised.

In other cases, the clashes occur between the cattle-keepers and framers. This type of clash has distinctly different dynamics when it is a micro-level issue versus a macro-level issue. The latter plays out in Lobonok, where a deadly clash between cattle-keepers who are said to have only recently come into the area and clashing with the agriculturalist indigenous population. With speculations that these cattle-keepers are supported by powerful people from Juba, the local population have no contact with the cattle-keepers, but feel utterly oppressed by them.¹¹ This conflict scenario poses critical challenges for peace-building activities that intend to be undertaken exclusively at the local level. Local initiatives will not reach the drivers of the violence, who are presumed to be those individuals located at the macro level.

¹¹ See more details on this in the annex.

In other contexts, this farmer/cattle-keeper clash is very much rooted in the micro space. For example, in Terekeka livelihood clashes pose an imminent security threat especially for women. Especially in the dry season, farming and grazing occur in close proximity on the banks of the Nile and unsurprisingly the animals regularly eat the crops. This pits women, who do most of the farming, against men who are the carers of cattle – although they are often related. Being frustrated with them eating their crops, women may beat the cattle and this puts these women at risk of themselves being beaten by the cattle-keepers. These dynamics can quickly escalate into intra-communal violence on a large scale.

While the above illustrates the so-called militarized mind-set that says that the use of violence is the best way of managing dispute, the deep normalization of violence is especially evident at the micro level within the household. Indeed, given the dramatic prevalence of domestic violence, its significance in relation to micro-level conflict & violence dynamics should not be under-estimated. In fact, domestic violence often goes unrecognized/unacknowledged because of the extent to which it is normalized. Countless respondents referred to this normalization. A group of women in Chukudum agreed that ‘a man can come home angry and the wife can talk and he can explode in anger; then fighting is there; this is normal’. Men in Kapoeta readily agreed that if a man asks for water or food and it is not there ‘he will beat his wife’. A group of male youth in Kapoeta further stated that ‘this one is a normal thing in the family; everyone is doing it’, adding that ‘a woman is like a child; she must be disciplined’. Other men in Kapoeta stressed that ‘she must respect the husband’, suggesting that the beatings facilitate this.

Others stressed the element of hunger, with one group of men stressing that ‘a hungry man is an angry man’. Many agreed that ‘bitterness comes from hunger; this causes problems in the household’ (12M, youth, Lawala), with women explaining that ‘when the household has no food, the husband is angry; if he tries to quarrel and pressure you, you will get bitter; it is like fuel catching fire; but if you don’t restrain yourself, then there will be problems; you’ll be slapped’ (15F under tree, Lawala). This illustrates the reflexive reliance on violence as the primary means of solving tensions and disputes.

Taking it further, it also highlights the cause & effect logic. For example, when asked why/how this escalates, a group of women in Terekeka explained that ‘if someone tries to slap you, what do you do? You also slap...’. When asked about the severity of this household violence, it was only in Lobonok/Lawala that women claimed that such violence was relatively limited. Alternatively, even women from Bor Town agreed that ‘sometimes this is very violent, even if not by every man; it can include beating with sticks, knives, and pangas’. There were many stories of individuals going to the hospital as a result of this violence. As an extreme example, a group of men in Lorema reported a case in which ‘a man is staying permanently in the health centre; he is lame because his wife beat him’.

In terms of justification for this on-going violence, both men and women point to dowry. A group of women in Terekeka explaining that ‘because they have bought their women with cattle; they can beat you as they want; even kill you’, adding that this is exacerbated by the fact that ‘there are no repercussions’. On the other hand, noting that they pay many cows for their women, a group of Taposá men explained that ‘we have married women so they can get us food & water; when it is not there, we get angry; so we beat them; we beat our women so that tomorrow she will be motivated to do her work; tomorrow she will go and fetch the water’. Another group of men similarly claimed that ‘we must beat them when they misbehave; the woman must obey otherwise she will be beaten; this is so that she can try to be disciplined; she must accept what the man says’ (8M, Taposá Kapoeta).

While these dynamics were generally consistent across all locations visited, it is generally agreed that women are less able to fight back because the 'do not have the masculinity to beat men' (4M,elders, Lawala). In fact, some male respondents even went so far as to claim that 'if the man comes home drunk, he can cause problems; but it is for the wife to control herself; she must keep quiet until the morning so she does not provoke the husband to beat her' (4M,youth, Kapoeta). Indeed, with a group of women from Lorema noting that no-one can beat the husband, a group of Taposa women pointed to an additional level of intimidation and oppression for women, stating that 'the woman does not dare to fight her husband because then his whole family will fight her; the women fear this'.

The extent to which these often brutal every-day violence is accepted is really quite astounding. Moreover, expectations for change are non-existent. For example, laughing ironically, a group of women in Terekeka said that 'if this was going to change it would have done so already'. Indeed, when asked what people would think of a man who does not beat his wife, women in Napetai asked 'is there such a man'?

A further evolution in domestic violence is that of male youth beating their parents. With many agreeing that this is very common in especially Chukudum, a boy of 24 years claimed that 'this is the culture that they do here; this is normal'. This is described as being provoked by disputes between the children and the parents, especially associated with children's demands on resources (eg: for dowry). It is said that the youth become angry when the father fails to deliver. Given that many of these youth are armed, the disputes can quickly unfold into deadly violence. As a Chief in Chukudum explained, 'now, even over a very small dispute in the family, when a youth has a gun, he can just kill his father or mother'. The Chief added that alcohol has made these problems much worse. Others emphasised the problem of disrespect, stressing that 'parents cannot control the children when they have guns' (2M Speaking English, Chukudum), pointing to the extent to which social rules and norms have collapsed as guidance for individual conduct within communities and indeed in households.

A group of Elder men in Chukudum suggested that some distortions are a result of 'male aggressivity, suggesting that 'as long as the fathers have the energy to fight, the youth see them as a threat; they think the father will try to steal their cows'. Chiefs more specifically underlined an age-based conflict over authority. Indeed, commentators have long been pointing to the progressive erosion of social norms in South Sudan, specifically emphasising the erosion of traditional authority structure (McEvoy & LeBrun 2010, p.20; Reeve 2012, p.46). In this line, one Chief described the tensions that are especially amplified between the youth as '*cattle grabbers*' and the Chiefs as the '*people responsible for resolving conflict*', pointing out that the 'armed youth cannot agree with the Chiefs when they decide that the stolen cattle must be returned to the owning community'. However, the lack of respect goes much deeper, with many respondents suggesting that 'these youth don't respect life itself; they can just kill anyone just like that'. The following section explores factors contributing to such dynamics.

5.3 Conflict Contributing Factors

5.3.1 Guns

Although respondents are often hesitant to admit to their presence, guns are prevalent in all locations (except Lobonok). As a group of youth in Bor stated, 'in this part of the world, everyone has guns now'. Many respondents added that this has problem has been exacerbated with the Juba-crisis.

People's perceptions regarding the use of guns varies according to the specific context. For example, pointing to an inadequate security sector, one respondent in Terekeka noted the 'necessity' of guns, explaining that

'guns are like people's private defense; the life plan is always about trying to buy one; you sell crops to buy a goat; once it is big you sell it to buy a cow; which you eventually sell to buy a gun; this is the objective for many people'. He added that 'guns are necessary because of the constant security threats; you can be attacked at any moment; that is why everyone thinks of having a gun'. Indeed, Respondents in Ikotos systematically pointed to 'the youth' when asked who protects them. However, most respondents equally emphasized the security problems that have escalated with the increased prevalence of guns.

Reflecting Arendt's observation that when power is understood in terms of a man dominating another, then 'there is no greater power than that which grows out of the barrel of the gun' (Arendt 1969, p.37), McEvoy & LeBrun had pointed some years ago to the intense belief of Southern Sudanese in the 'power of the gun' (McEvoy & LeBrun 2010, p.20). Countless respondents in this study reiterated this. For example, stressing that 'you can just kill someone like that if you have a gun' a group of Taposa women stated that beyond the cattle 'the problem is the gun; war is something you can only do with a gun; with guns these boys are motivated to fight' (4M&2F, Dadinga Youth, Kapoeta). Indeed, referring to guns as 'the enemy' an elderly villager Taposa woman added that these boys 'see the gun as something that can let them own everything; when someone has a gun, they can never leave the enemy be'. Two elder educated men in Chukudum similarly noted that 'guns are the main problem; with these guns the youth believe that they have all the power to get whatever they want; they believe they can just take things with force; now they have no respect'.

A Taposa Priest concluded that 'these arms have made people become very violent'. And this is exacerbated by the fact that the guns are largely in the hands of volatile youth. For example, a group of elder Taposa men explained that 'it is the youth who are in charge of the guns'. When asked if that is such a good idea given that youth are not the community's wisest members, these men simply said that 'this is the system here; the child is given the gun so he can defend the cattle' (8M, Taposa village @school). Another group of Taposa men added that 'the youth are there on their own; they do not listen to anyone; they are making their own decisions; we know they are only children who have not grown; we know they think differently; when they make a mistake, we go and talk to them'. However, reflecting the above discussed age-based power tensions, they further added that 'these youth cannot listen; if you try to tell them or even disarm them they cannot accept this; they will try every means possible to get another weapon' (9M Napetait Village, Kapoeta). As a senior respondent in Terekeka warned, 'with guns, those who engage in violence are more violent more quickly'. This combines toxically with the strategic construction of masculine aggression that is practiced in many cattle-keeper communities

5.3.2 Socially Constructed Masculine Aggression

Building on observations by Gilligan (a theoretical psychologist) that violence is often intimately related to 'the cultural construction of manhood' (2000, p.23), some analysts suggest that while violent cattle raiding is 'engrained for both cultural and economic reasons' in South Sudan, it plays a significant role in the development of the identity of the male youth (McEvoy & LeBrun 2010, p.20). Many respondents alluded to the fact that especially in cattle camps, aggressive masculinity is intentionally fostered through social practices. For example, in Terekeka, a group of male cattle-keepers explained that 'boys are being trained to be strong; they must be trained into masculinity'. Pointing to wrestling as one of the tools for such training, a group of Chiefs of the town proudly agreed that 'these young boys must wrestle; they get thrown done by big men; the winner is the strongest one; he will become the leader'. In the same line, a group of men in a rural Taposa village explained that 'here there is a system of pride of strength; you always want to be praised; that is through strength'.

Cattle raiding is an important venue through which male youth can demonstrate their strength and courage. Explaining that 'you become famous when you have killed many people; when you have raided many cattle', the above Taposa men added that 'when you talk to your child you tell him of your successes; you want him to be strong like you' (9M Napetait Village, Kapoeta). Agreeing that 'the boy must prove that he is a man by raiding', the Taposa Priest also tied this to the issue of guns, stating that 'for the youth the gun shows that you are a man; it is important for them to show their strength in this way'.

Similar social norms around male aggressivity also prevent those in combat from backing down. Respondents likened this to two boys fighting, explaining that 'if no one separates them, they must continue to fight for the whole day; neither one can stop; if he does, he will be seen as a coward by his community' (1M&1F, nonsense, Kapoeta town). Applying this to cattle-raiding, the above men from Napetait explained that 'if no one comes between us and the enemy; if no one has separated us; we must continue fighting'. However, the significance of cattle in these communities also places them 'at the centre of confrontation between communities' (ICG 2011b, p.26) as illustrated by so-called 'cattle greed'.

5.3.3 Cattle Greed¹²

Especially Taposa respondents highlighted the notion of 'cattle greed', underlining the extent to which cattle are integrated into their way of life & personal identity. While a group of Taposa women explained that 'the men see cattle as the source of food, wealth, dowry, power; the cattle are everything to them', the above mentioned Taposa Priest explained that 'if you do not have cows, you are not a Taposa; without cattle a Taposa cannot be a man; girls make songs shaming you'. He added that 'the most famous Taposa person is the one with the most cattle; everyone will know him as a rich man; he is very powerful'. Indeed, with identity being intimately woven into their herds, a number of respondents referenced the idea that 'Taposa men believe that they are the rightful owner of all the cattle on the earth'.¹³

In this sense, they pointed to what they called 'cattle envy' as a factor that undermines the potential for lasting peace between them and other cattle-keepers, although they generally blame the others of this envy. As one group of Taposa respondents explained, 'we have dialogued with the Dadinga & Buya; this has allowed for our cattle to graze together; but then they start envying our cattle; they think all the cattle that exist should be theirs'. If they do acknowledge that Taposa equally believe all the cattle should be theirs, they then pass the responsibility for the violence to the cattle themselves, claiming that 'it is the cattle force us to collide; if they see our cattle, they feel like they have to take them; it is the same for us; when we see theirs, you feel like you are supposed to grab them' (4M,youth with SPLA guy, Kapoeta). This framing nicely deresponsibilizes them as the attackers of any wrong doing.

From this perspective of being a victim of desire, one group claimed that 'this explains why the grabbing of cattle back & forth continues'. They explained that as much as they say they want the violence to stop, they equally claim that 'the greed for cattle cannot be stopped' (8F&4M, orient TaposaVillage, Kapoeta). As the Taposa Priest explained, 'what brought all these problems is the animals; but the Taposa cannot live without their animals'. When asked if a Taposa can ever have enough cattle, a group of Taposa men said that cattle are like money; you still have to take someone's money even when you have much of your own; this is what God has delegated' (9M Napetait Village, Kapoeta).

¹² This of course, is particularly relevant to societies that are concerned with cattle-keeping.

¹³ The above-mentioned Taposa Priest explained that 'if you take a Taposa to Europe, every cow he sees, he will be thinking they are his; he believes every cow that exists is naturally his'.

Adding to this idea of theft somehow being God's will, when asked if it is acceptable to steal, these men readily stated that 'things can be stolen if the other one allows you to steal'. This reflects a further dimension to the idea that the perpetrator is not responsible for his action, but that the responsibility sits rather with the other one who failed to prevent the theft. These elements of deresponsibilization and inevitability are important elements that support the social norm of revenge. For example, the same group from above stressed that 'when the enemy steals my cows, I must steal them back'.

5.3.4 Revenge

Revenge is a social norm that is widely endorsed throughout much of South Sudan. A group of women in Chukudum described revenge as a situation where 'someone did something wrong to you, so you must do it back to them'. A group of women in Ikotos said 'it is confronting & hurting another person for the wrong they have done to you, your relative, or your community'. A group of male youth in Ikotos equally stated that 'revenge is when the aggrieved goes to pay-back those who caused the grief'.

Kalyvas points out that revenge is one of the most commonly recurring features in conflict contexts (2006, p.58). In this line, the women from Chukudum observed that 'this revenge exists within many people' (6F, under MangoTree, Chukudum). To some degree this is a compensation for the lack of a functioning security sector. For example, the youth from Ikotos agreed that 'revenge is not good, but when the same people continuously repeats the same thing, you will be forced to revenge'. This alludes to the social dimension, with revenge also concerning issues of honor and respect. From this perspective, Gilligan observes that when 'an intolerable degree of humiliation or "loss of face" would result from a failure to fight for that honor' people may respond with violence (Gilligan 2000, p.97). This highlights that revenge is far more than simply a means of settling the material score and as such takes on a particular energy, quickly altering the dynamics of violence.

Agreeing, that motives driving violence at the micro level often shift quite dramatically, Besteman says that revenge often become an end in itself (2002, p.6). Kalyvas stresses that 'revenge is associated with escalation' (2006, p.59), often quickly creating a far worse situation.¹⁴ Given their intimate experience with such cycles of violence, respondents readily identified 'revenge' as the factor that typically causes the escalation of fights, especially when cattle are involved, with a group of cattle-keepers stating adamantly that 'we must pay them back; especially if someone is killed; the group remains bitter; any small problem is an opportunity to pay back' (10M cattle-camp, Terekeka).

Agreeing that 'revenge is a burning issue', a Taposá Chief explained that 'if people are killed in an attack, people feel very bitter; they have that idea to revenge; we know it worsens wars'. Indeed, despite acknowledging that 'revenge will not bring us peace' a group of Taposá men readily admitted that they engage in revenge attacks claiming that 'it is difficult to bring about peace ourselves because we always have that feeling (ie: urge) to revenge; if they kill someone in your family; you must return to kill someone of that one's family or of his tribe (8M, Taposá village @school).¹⁵

This again has a very clear tone of reflexive inevitability to it, with both reflexive use of violence and a lack of individual responsibility being evident. This is especially evident in description of how the revenge sentiment lingers. For example, one group explained that 'sometimes we can even trade with the enemy; but then that

¹⁴ As a case in point, the ICG described the December 2013 eruption of violence in this sense (ICG 2014, p.11).

¹⁵ When asked why they attack the whole community as opposed to the specific individuals who stole their cattle, they explain that 'they can take your cattle; then you are angry so you can just attack all of them; you cannot know which individual attacked you' (8M, Taposá village @school).

enmity comes between us; people remember things and they must revenge; so they start killing even in peace times when people are moving freely with no weapons' (8F&4M, orient Taposavillage, Kapoeta). These people clearly feel they are driven by the revenge sentiments.

Despite the extensive evidence of the consequences of revenge attacks and the likelihood of escalating violence, the same patterns of reflexive violence continue to be repeated. Especially the youth seem either to fail in making the cause & effect linkages – or they simply don't care about the consequences that they generate. An NGO staff in Chukudum speculated that 'these boys think very small; they do not consider something beyond their immediate environment; they don't care if they see it; they just act'.

Highlighting the factor of '*brotherhood solidarity*', two educated young men in Terekeka also highlighted the very strong bond that exists between male age-mates. They explained that when a fight breaks out, no matter how violent, men will unquestioningly support their 'brother'. They stated that 'this is the cultural way; if you hear that your own people are being attacked, you must run & support them; soon without thinking you might find that you have killed someone in the process; often you have to enter into the situation before you know the details; even if that one was in the wrong, you will still support him'. In this line, a Taposavillage Chief agreed that 'they don't even think; they push each other; no one can stop the one who has decided to revenge the killing in his family; he'll never accept; he just runs with his gun to kill that one; he just kills so his heart can cool'.¹⁶

This begins to shed light on the collective experience of violence. Arguing that it is not just about the direct victims and victimizers, Gilligan emphasizes that violence is 'unavoidably familial, societal, and institutional' (2000, p.7). Bar-Tal et al. add that even if not directly harmed themselves, the broader community often see themselves as victims 'because their fellow group members were hurt' (2009, p.235). Building on Fierke's observation that the traumatic experience of a community 'is more than the sum of traumatized individuals' (2007, p.132), Scheper-Hughes emphasizes that 'feelings of vulnerability and woundedness are dangerous' with many wars having been fueled by narratives and memories 'of perceived trauma and woundedness' (2008, p.37). In this light, the Taposavillage Priest reported that revenge is indeed proactively promoted from within the aggrieved community, explaining that 'there are many songs that promote war; peer pressure is there; the youth push each other; the wives push their husbands to collect more cattle'. Thus, as much as people say they want peace, there also very strong social factors that perpetuate violence. The following section looks at the role of public accolades.

5.3.5 Accolades

In some communities, raiding cattle is a social initiation. It plays an important role in determining an individual's social ranking with a cattle-keeping community, with a group of educated youth in Kapoeta explaining that 'if you have not yet raided, they will say "who are you, have you been on a raid, have you even killed the enemy; you just keep quiet". In this sense, it plays an important role in the development of one's identity. Further because of the critical role that cattle play in the socio-economic dynamics of a cattle-based community, the value of a male in the society is directly proportional to the number of cattle he has. As such, although some respondents indicate a desire for peace, and look for an end to the perpetual cattle-raiding, many equally point out that 'people are very proud of their youth; they are happy when they bring cows home; they are seen as an important man if they kill the enemy; they get names of praise; people sing songs about them' (1M&1F, educated youth, Kapoeta). The two priorities sit in fundamental contradiction with each other.

¹⁶ Providing a slightly deeper emotional insight, a group of men explained that 'you must quickly go and kill that one as well; while I am crying, they must feel the same pain' (9M, Napetai, Kapoeta).

Acknowledging the public accolades gained, a group of Taposa men in Napetai agreed that 'when these boys deliver the stolen cows to their father, he is very happy; even if the boy has killed an enemy, he is very happy; women also are happy; even if this means a woman loses her son, this is just normal'. A group of elder women in the same village agreed that when the son arrives with cows, she is pleased that 'he succeeded to not be dead; he brought more cattle; God has helped him; we will be happy'. Others added that even if they are killed, 'the stories of that one will be remembered'.


In this light, Schroder & Schmidt note that linking the use of force to incentives such as honor and prestige, or equally a loss of face, gives additional meaning to violence and further legitimizes or indeed perpetuates such violence (2001, p.05). This lends further importance to the fact that women regularly push their men to go raid because they see the neighbours with more cows to milk and feed the children so she complains that her children are now hungry. In this sense, while cattle raiding is completely normalized as a natural part of the cattle-keeper life (which naturally includes the dimension of revenge), these social accolades and pressures serve to perpetuate the continuation of the cycle of violence.

Indeed, a group of armed youth in Chukudum were very confident that 'our community is very proud when we bring the cattle; they celebrate; they are happy; they dance'. A group of women in the same location agreed that 'of course the community receiving the cattle will be very proud; they will celebrate; they will be chanting and dancing; they will sing songs of praise; people will rush to share water and food with these boys; you feel proud of them'. Others added that people will be happy; they will sing songs of praise' explaining that 'now the family that was poor can slaughter a cow and sell the meat and make some money' (6F, under MangoTree,Chukudum).

However, with some nuancing, it was specifically underlined that it is especially the young women who are looking to be married who publicly praise these boys, and push them to do more raiding, because this is tied closely to their marriage interests.

However, competing interests abound, as indicated by the reflections of a group of youth from Kapoeta who noted that 'when someone is killed some people think revenge; others think that now we must finish this fighting because too many people are being killed; these ones think about peace'. Indeed, married women who have children are described as being far less enthusiastic about encouraging their men to continue raiding, pointing out that stealing cattle will automatically bring revenge to them and thus puts the lives of their children at risk. Indeed, a group of elder women in Napetai readily stated that 'when the boys return with cattle we are not happy because it is something that will return us to war'. Indeed, stating that 'people are divided about this raiding; not everyone is happy with it', a group of elder women in Chukudum equally highlighted that 'the other side will obviously come and revenge; we know they will not choose who they will kill when they come'.

More generally, the above women from Napetai further added that 'you cannot always be happy or proud of things when they are stolen; stealing and killing is not a good thing; only God should take life'. Indeed, while they concluded from a pragmatic survival perspective that 'at the same time, you can milk the cow because it is there, even if you know it is stolen', they nevertheless equally acknowledged that 'the Dadinga will follow their cattle; they will come and kill us'. But finally, they concluded that 'we don't have another way' (5F Elders Napetai, Kapoeta).



BOX 1: CONTRADICTIONS & COMPETING PRIORITIES

This illustrates the extent to which competing interests, whether on the level of social identity, security, material wealth or food security, create profound contradictions for people, making prioritization difficult. Countless respondents stated that they want violence and conflict to end. As one group of women in Kapoeta city said ‘war destroys everything; we are tired of it; people are dying; we are hoping that this violence will stop; everybody is now crying; all of them are hoping for it to stop’. However, as the Taposa Priest explains for cattle-keeping communities, ‘as much as people depend on their cattle for their lives; these same animals can also cause their death’. The contradictions leave people uncertain on how to move forward. For example, even though most people are aware of the problems cattle-raiding generates, the Priest underlines that ‘none will speak out; when the youth bring cattle back few will complain; only a few will have the courage to say “now you have brought something bad to our village”; they will keep quiet; especially the ones who received the cattle will be happy; they will praise their son; it is the others who will fear the revenge’. In this he concluded that ‘their life is a cycle of “today is peace; tomorrow is war” arguing that ‘this is normal for them’ (1M,Priest,Kapoeta).

5.3.6 Girls, Marriage, & Dowry

Throughout much of South Sudan, it is the case that ‘without a wife a man is abused in the community; when you are married you are respected’ (4M&2F, Dadinga Youth, Kapoeta). This combines toxically with the fact that ‘no girl in South Sudan is brought to for marriage for free’, with countless respondents indicating that ‘the worst thing for violence is the case of marriage’. As a group of Taposa respondents from Kapoeta stressed, if someone does not have cattle ‘this one can provoke a lot of problems; because of dowry boys must raid cattle; they can even be killed in this’. Agreeing, the Taposa Priest added that ‘if you have no cows, you must run to raid cattle so you can marry; many people have died because of this’.

Being very clear about the above described contradictions, a group of male elders in Loryok stated that especially men in the villages want raiding to continue as it brings cattle for marriage. As an example, they cited one case in which an old man asked a young man who wanted to marry his daughter if he knows the road to where cattle are, explaining that ‘the old man told the young man “if you want my daughter, put on your shoes & go there; if you come back bringing cattle, you can take my daughter; if you remain there (ie: get killed), another one will take my daughter’. As such, pointing out that elder men regularly incite the youth to raid because ‘they need cattle for the sons to marry’, they added that there is not negotiations (or flexibility) on this matter. In this case, the respondents were thus very clear that ‘cattle are very important for these people; the loss of people is acceptable’.

This ties cattle-raiding to economic stability. Indeed, at the centre of the quagmire is the conceptualization of the daughter as an economic commodity, with dowry being the central strategy upon which the household economic plan is constructed. Bride wealth is the foundation upon which the economic and social well-being of the male members of the girl’s family relies.

BOX 2: EARLY & FORCED MARRIAGES

Many women highlighted the problems of early & forced marriage, with one group from Terekeka explaining that 'usually the young girl is not interested; but if the man can pay 50-100 cattle, the father & brothers will force her to accept even a grey-haired man who is losing his force'. When asked if the girl has any choice, women explained that 'a girl with a good brain can accept the decision of her father; she will marry the one with the cows; the one who doesn't have a good brain resists the father'. When asked if the girl is happy with this arrangement, they noted that 'even if the girl is not happy, she cannot refuse'. When asked if girls talk to their mothers about these things, a group of Taposá women explained that if the girl refuses, the mother is also badly beaten because she is assumed to have encouraged the girl to disobey the orders of her father. As such, although forced and especially early marriage is an utter betrayal of the rights of any girl, the process is perpetuated by the far more powerful interests of the male members of the girls' own family.

With dowry being revealed as a deeply systemic issue, it has a powerful influence on many social norms, attitudes and practices. For example, because dowry is expensive, it is widely noted that 'the boy has to struggle hard to pay', thus justifying cattle-raiding. As a further knock-on effect, it is widely suggested that 'men believe that "I have paid too much; now the woman must make a good return"; therefore, justifying expectations that 'the women must do all the work' as discussed above. Clearly identifying the girl as an 'object' as opposed to a 'subject' with agency and rights, a group of youth explained that 'dowry is essential because the family gave birth to the girl; they grew her in their household; so you pay for her to say thank you to them; you must appreciate their efforts' (4M&2F, Dadinga Youth, Kapoeta).¹⁷

Because it is tied into the male interests of each family, dowry is an extremely powerful trigger for revenge. For example, a group of Chiefs in Terekeka were very sympathetic to the logic of revenge, explaining that 'you expect to gain money from your females; if this fails, people become angry', adding that 'if your years of efforts are destroyed (ie: a daughter is impregnated), of course you will be very angry'. More operationally, a group of men within a cattle-camp in Terekeka explained that 'because we marry with cows; if you don't have cattle and you get a girl pregnant, the men of that family will come to beat you; this will lead to a bigger community fight because it is painful; you must pay them back'.¹⁸ Similar patterns unfold if a young girl fleeing a forced marriage, runs to her boyfriend. Being at risk of losing the cattle they have received as payment for the girl, 'the brothers will badly beat the 'boyfriend'; they want to ensure the girl stays with the old man so he doesn't demand his cattle back' (6F, associated to cattle-camp, Terekeka). Indeed, demonstrating the extent to which these practices are seen as completely normal, acceptable, and proportional the above-mentioned Chiefs readily agreed that 'especially if that one has no cows; they kill to pay him back'. Not only do these Chiefs fail to prevent such action, they clearly condone it. As such, in addition to being complex and loaded with violence, the dynamics of dowry and early/forced marriages begin to give us a glimpse into the gender dynamics of this patriarchal society.

¹⁷ When asked if this is slavery, they stressed that they had paid for her – but they missed the irony in the fact that they had paid to her father and not to the girl herself.

¹⁸ This group claimed that these dynamics take place throughout Terekeka on a daily basis.

5.3.7 Gendered Power Dynamics¹⁹

Unsurprisingly, both male and female respondents systematically delineate the role of the female to the sphere of the household, repeatedly stating that 'women look after the affairs of the household; this is collecting water; cooking; washing clothes; rearing the children; looking after goats; they care for the people in the household' (1M, Vet, Bor town). Male respondents in Lorema were also very clear that 'men are the head of the household; women take care of the homes', with a group of women from the same place adding that 'women take orders from the men'. Explaining that the roles are different 'because men must go and find the girl' a group of Dadinga youth in Kapoeta town claimed that 'the man is the head of the woman; the woman must wait in the household for the man to return; the woman must cook and clean the household'. A group of women in Chukudum stated that 'men are the head of the family; they have all the power in the household; he is supposed to look after all the problems in the household; he can decide everything' concluding that as such, 'women must be below the man'.

Others suggested that the different roles stem from the fact that 'God created us differently', with a group of Taposa men arguing that 'men are superior because God designed it like that; women must do all the work because God decided it like that' Indeed, these perceptions establish a very distinct power dynamic, with even a relatively unassuming male respondent in Bor claiming very matter-of-factly that 'men are like the Second God for women' (1M, Vet, Bor town). Further is the assumption that women are naturally infantile, disobedient and in need of being disciplined.

For example, the above group of Taposa men stated 'women are brought into the house of the man; she must be treated like a child because she has no responsibilities, she is like a child'. When asked if women are the same as children, a group of male youth from Kapoeta town suggested that 'they are not exactly the same thing; but women are naturally bad; you must beat them to discipline them'. Concluded that 'this beating is normal here', this quickly recalls the earlier discussions on domestic violence.

However, a group of Dinka women living in the heart of Kapoeta city readily countered this, exclaiming that 'women and children are not the same; I gave birth to the child; the child knows nothing when she is born; I must teach her everything; but men cannot accept that women are different than children; that is because he assumes he knows much; the man says the women reason like children; they cannot accept that women know things'. They went on to lamented the fact that 'men & women are not equal; women are obliged to respect the man because he has paid for them; a woman must consider herself as smaller; the man demands that the woman remain inferior; you must respect him like you respect your mother and father' adding that 'this is thinking from a long-time ago, but it is normal here' (4F,Dinka, Kapoeta).

A group of Taposa women equally stated that 'the man is superior because he brought the girl into his family; you are to give birth to his children; but he must be superior to both of you'. However, while stressed that 'the man thinks he is superior simply because he married us; because he has paid cows', another group of Taposa women stated quite matter-of-factly that 'we women are superior to men because we are giving birth to those men' (13F; 11elders&2yough, Napetai).

When asked why it is like this, the Dinka women explained that 'men continue to undermine women like this because they believe they take all the responsibility in the household; they say women have no power' (4F,Dinka, Kapoeta). Speculating that this 'could change once our children are educated; these ones could be together in the household', they nevertheless stressed that 'for now men cannot accept that women's roles will

¹⁹ Further insight into the gendered dimensions are available in the annex: Gendered Perceptions on Leadership

change; the man is the head of the household; this is how the system works here’ (4F,Dinka, Kapoeta). However, the Taposa women from Napetai stated very clearly that ‘we know that we are all created as human beings; even though men have made themselves superior, we know we can think in the same way; we can decide like them’.

The male perspective unsurprisingly differed. For example, when asked what they thought the added value of women is in their society, they were often somewhat baffled. For example, the group of Chiefs from Terekeka – despite their leadership role in the community – could only reiterate that this included ‘giving birth and sharing the household chores’. This is particularly relevant in relation to conflict management strategies.

5.4 Conflict Management Strategies²⁰

While the above describes a diversity of perceptions regarding the perpetuation of violence, this section looks at those on the receiving end of the violence. In an ideal situation, the security sector actors position themselves between the sources of threat and the populations at risk. However, although the attitudes and judgements varied slightly from one location to the next, the formal security sector actors are either: absent; seen as inadequate; seen as playing a very narrow role; or threaten to escalate the violence.²¹ As such, this section briefly sketches *Conflict Management Strategies* that individuals at risk adopt when they are directly exposed to violent threats. The strategic options include: acceptance & tolerance (ie: exercising restraint); avoidance (eg: forced displacement); negotiation; and confrontation (ie: either defensive or offensive). The following compares and contrasts the options taken according to gender and livelihood groups.

5.4.1 Contrasting Male & Female Conflict Management Strategies:

The following table contrasts the conflict management options that men & women tend to adopt when faced with a threat of violence.

	Acceptance/Tolerance	Avoidance	Negotiation	Confrontation
Female	XXX	XX	X	
Male		X	XX	XXX

Building on the above discussed socially constructed notion of manhood in cattle camps, which is designed to foster aggressive masculinity and a tendency towards reflexive violence, male relationships are understood as being fundamentally competitive. As a group of women from Pariak stated, ‘men are born like that; they will always defend themselves violently’. This highlights the widely-held assumptions that men are inherently aggressive and combative. Especially male youth are seen as acting reflexively as opposed to rationally, with one observer explaining that ‘they don’t approach matters with their brain; they just want to use violence’ (1M, Pres, Terekeka). On this basis, they are assumed to aggress first, and reflect and negotiate as a second option. As two educated youth in Terekeka observed, ‘they go immediately to get their guns; they want first to intimidate the other; they want to make them run away; then maybe they don’t have to fight’.

While it is believed that ‘men don’t want to talk; they just want to fight; men are always ready to provoke, to disturb, to confront; they are too easy to anger’, women’s strategic options for conflict management are

²⁰ More details are available in the Annex

²¹ Further details on both the formal and the informal security actors are available in the annex.

distinctly different. Whether due to physical disadvantage or preference, the gender contrast has observers claiming that ‘women want to discuss; they want to negotiate to find solutions’ (2M&2F, Partners, Terekeka). The group of Chiefs in Terekeka agreed that ‘women prefer to avoid violence; men prefer confrontation, maybe with some negotiations afterwards’. Especially in relation to domestic violence, countless women cited strategies of tolerance and avoidance, stressing that that ‘we just try to ignore our husbands; even if he tries to provoke, we just keep quiet; if you reply, he’ll beat you’ - indeed highlighting the consequences, they added that ‘then you are injured and you don’t have the energy to farm’ (11F, 2nd Farmer group, Terekeka). Others stressed that ‘the only thing is self-restraint’. Two elder women in Terekeka agreed that ‘today women have to tolerate in order to survive; they must just forget about the husband’.

5.4.2 Contrasting Agriculturalist & Cattle-keeper Conflict Management Strategies:

The following table alternative contrasts the conflict management options that agriculturalists versus cattle-keepers opt for.

	Acceptance/Tolerance	Avoidance	Negotiation	Confrontation
Agriculturalist				
Cattle-Keeper				

Livelihood clashes reflect a very similar power differential as that described above. In Terekeka, this framing pits largely women farmers against male cattle-keepers. Looking for avoidance strategies, women explained that ‘we have tried fences but the cattle ruin them’. Those who had tried reporting the problems, explained that the Chiefs are largely unsympathetic. Others underlined that efforts to negotiate with the cattle-keepers fail ‘because we are related, they just say “you just chase them away” (7F, 1st Farmer Group, Terekeka). Indeed, reflecting the male propensity for the use of intimidation and force, a group of women associated with the cattle-keepers emphasized that ‘if these women insist, the leaders will turn against them; they’ll be beaten’. Being all too aware of this, women farmers repeatedly referred to avoidance strategies, with one group observing that ‘you don’t get beaten if you give up early; you just have to abandon your field and leave the vegetables for the cattle’. However, even if the security threat is thus avoided, this strategy obviously generates serious food security concerns.

A very different version of this Livelihoods clash is unfolding in Lobonok, due to the macro level political dimension mentioned above. This situation pits non-violent indigenous agriculturalists against armed and apparently hostile cattle-keepers. Locals suggest that ‘the cattle-keepers have come here because our communities are weaker; we have no guns; people here are peaceful; they are not hostile; we are weaker’, implying that they are thus an easy target for the more aggressive community to over-power.

On a daily basis, the agriculturalists of Lobonok have adopted an avoidance strategy by reducing their movement and activities. More fundamentally, they are asking for the cattle-keepers (and their cattle) to be removed from the area by any means possible, by anyone who has the will and capacity to do so. Others suggest that ‘we are trying to get UNMISS to establish a camp here’. However, they are finally resigned to defensive confrontation if & when need be. As a group of Lobonok youth stated, ‘we have decided not to run; we will stay here; if it gets worse we will try to defend the community’. A local Chief added that ‘we will face them’ explaining that ‘this is like facing your danger; we know it is possible that we will be killed’. Indeed, noting that ‘those ones are very well armed’ the youth agreed that they will ‘stand in there for the community’, anticipating that ‘all of the youth will go; we can just make an attempt’. Agreeing that ‘we are weaker in arms’, another Chief added that ‘we are a community; we can respond together’.

5.4.3 Contrasting Urban & Rural Conflict Management Strategies:

Taking this further, a distinctly different attitude and mentality is also adopted by urban versus rural populations, with rural spaces generally being seen as more closed and exclusive, with urban spaces seen as mixed and more inclusive. For example, as much as especially rural cattle-keepers were adamant that they could not co-exist with their 'enemies' while in their village context, they stated that it would be possible to do so if they were to meet in a town, 'because towns are for everyone'. Similarly, while cattle-keeping villages tend to be caught up in repetitive cycles of attacks and counter-attacks, it is largely agreed that these dynamics do not play out in the towns – even though neighbourhoods are typically very ethnically diverse. For example, in Kaopeta city it is widely claimed that 'in the town we are together; we are like one family here'. Both urban and rural respondents in Kapoeta area claimed that 'whatever happens in the villages does not come into town'. Even a group of Taposa women in their village of Napetai spontaneously explained that 'if we meet Dadinga women in town, we don't think anything bad; this is town; they have no cattle here; town is for everyone; so we just meet'. Most agree that this is due to the absence of cattle in the urban space. Reiterating the idea that 'towns are for everyone' the Taposa Priest pointed out that 'people in town only have money; they have no cows'.

Although these urban/rural differentiations require further nuancing, they begin to demonstrate the elasticity in people's ideas & beliefs around what constitutes an enemy for example. This highlights the potential for changing attitudes and beliefs as a means of fundamentally altering violent behaviours. However the bigger point of this section is that while people exposed to violent threats are not simply passive recipients, and do adopt various independent Conflict Management Strategies; these strategies for the most part are either profoundly inadequate or they generate as many problems as they avoid. As such, individuals at risk are repeatedly exposed to threats of and in some cases direct violence on an on-going basis. The following examines the implications of this exposure.

5.5 Individuals are Reconfigured by Violence

It should come as no surprise that people exposed to the violence and threats described above are affected by their experiences. As an anthropologist who has long studied experiences of violence in Africa, Nordstrom emphasizes that individuals inevitably meet such violence 'in a profoundly personal way' (2002, p.276-7). Bourgois adds that people confronting such violence 'do not escape unscathed' (2004, p.433). Indeed, Nordstrom asserts that prolonged exposure to violence 'reconfigures its victims' (2004, p.59). This was all too evident in this study.

Indeed, many respondents themselves recognised that people have been deeply affected by the violence they have been exposed to. For example, in Lobonok observers reported that 'people are no longer settled; people are not feeling normal; they are traumatised', adding that 'they have that thing in them; they cannot think clearly; they cannot concentrate'. A group of women in Bor similarly noted that 'trauma is there in the mind; you will not sleep; you are always thinking; we worry about death; child abduction; looting'. In Terekeka, many of the female farmers also talked of incessant thinking about their worries, underlining repeatedly that 'we are helpless'. One group of farmer women explained that 'it makes us think a lot; we are not happy; this can make us sick; in the night, you are always awake; your brain is thinking every day that you cannot be happy'. In Chukudum, a staff member of a local NGO observed that 'people are not at peace in their minds; they are traumatised; the youth are disturbed in their minds; they are not at peace with themselves'.

BOX 3: ALCOHOL

In Chukudum, many respondents noted that ‘alcoholism is a growing problem; many people think alcohol can take their problem away’. One old woman readily admitted that ‘I drink alcohol when I am thinking too much; when I am having too much stress; the alcohol takes this away’. Alcohol is also a critical factor contributing to the dynamics of violence with the Taposa Priest suggesting that ‘if you give alcohol to the youth who are carrying guns; then you have a big problem; they feel very strong; in this way people can kill even their sisters and brothers; that is what we are seeing today’. Indeed, although a group of armed youth in Chukudum claimed that ‘we cannot drink; we are looking after the cattle; we must remain alert’, by 11:00 AM at least half of a group of 12 boys were visibly drunk. Observers noted that ‘these youth can easily fall into disputes and begin fighting; they quickly resort to using these guns; stray bullets are injuring & killing innocent by-standers’. As such, at this point, it is unclear if alcoholism is a symptom or a consequence of prolonged exposure to on-going violent threats.

5.5.1 Social amplification of risk

The brief sketch above demonstrates that perpetual exposure to imminent threat typically disturbs one’s psychological well-being. Nevertheless, it remains that perceptions are central to people’s lived experiences of violence. In this sense, how people make sense of their experiences is critical to the way they manage them. Building on this, Strathern & Stewart argue that in intense circumstances ‘frameworks that are built out of people’s thoughts become as important as, or even more important than their everyday empirical observations’ (2006, p.7). Many theorists identify that the experiences of threat and risk are perception-based and are indeed socially constructed (Kasperson 1992, p.158),²² with Strathern & Stewart pointing out that ‘people create their own fears out of the imagination of possible horrors’ (2006, pp.8–9).

This is compounded by the fact that direct experience of violence increases its ‘memorability and imaginability’, thus feeding into people’s perceptions of risk, and creating what is referred to as ‘the social amplification of risk’ (Kasperson 1992, pp.157–158). This is all too evident in how respondents talked about their experiences. For example, being described as ‘arriving without warning’ the October 2016 crisis in Chukudum has left the population with an escalated sense of risk, with many stating that ‘we are nervous; you cannot predict; we can be expecting this problem to recur at any time; war can just break out like that’ (4M,elders@market,Chukudum). A group of women equally noted that ‘we knew nothing of this; suddenly we heard gunfire; we saw people killed we could only just run’. Other women concluded that ‘now we cannot predict that thing happening again; we didn’t expect it; it came; it can come again’.

Similarly, after experiencing a series of punctual violent attacks in Lobonok, a local official emphasized that ‘people are fearing that this will happen again; the trauma has affected them; they are now very worried’. Reflecting the escalated sense of risk, a group of women similarly stated that ‘now we are afraid of going to the field; if we meet them, they’ll shoot us; we are now fearing that we will be killed’.

Similar sentiments were clearly expressed in Bor, with one man explaining that ‘the situation is calm but it could erupt at any time; it is fragile; we worry that we can be sleeping peacefully and something big comes in the night’, concluding that ‘it is only God who knows’. However, reflecting more specifically on the destruction

²² What actually constitutes threat or ‘harm’ is ‘socially mediated and culturally determined’ (Kasperson 1992, p.161)

of his veterinary pharmacy, explaining that 'after 10 years of building it up; they have destroyed it all; I used to be a very big man; now I have lost it all' he concluded that 'now I have the heart of enmity; even today I hate those people that did this'. Stressing that 'now I am affected in the brain' he added that 'this is what makes war permanent' (1M, Vet, Bor town). Thus, as much as such experiences escalate one's sense of risk, they also escalate one's sense of animosity towards the other.

More broadly, a national staff of an NGO underlined that in those acute situations where one crisis has been piled on top of other crises, 'people are hopeless; they see life as useless; you can die either from bullets or from hunger; but your life is useless; this erodes people's minds; they can just think of themselves and of self defense; they cannot think of other people'. This reflects observation by Bar-Tel et al. that in their 'focus on themselves and their suffering', people exposed to on-going violence develop a sense of collective victimhood which can cause 'a reduced capacity for empathy' (2009, p.251). Bhavnani & Backer tie this to eroding social cohesion, arguing that as this weakens, 'the risk of social fragmentation, exclusion and opposition' are increased – all of which are associated with increased risks of violence (2007, p.4). This is explored in the next section.

5.6 Social Fragmentation

One of the very visible social trends in times of acute violence is that of social fractioning. Coletta & Cullen define social cohesion as 'the absence of latent social conflict along economic, ethnic or political lines and the presence of strong social bonds as measured by high levels of interpersonal trust, norms of reciprocity, membership in cross-cutting associations, and effective and responsive institutions' (2000 cited in Bhavnani & Backer 2007, p.3). Bhavnani & Backer similarly talk of 'the internal coherence of a community of people' highlighting elements such as cooperation, civic engagement, political equity, trust, tolerance, as key to such processes. (2007, p.2). It is precisely the erosion of these elements that lead to social fragmentation that characterises conflict setting. This section explores just how this erosion takes place.

Sen suggests that social fragmentation is a result of altered perceptions of the 'other'. Observing that in normal times people have multi-polar identities and diverse associations with many different groups, high-risk environments lead to a process of narrowing of identities, reducing social organization to 'us' & 'them', with these so-called 'singular identities' being 'uniquely divisive' often leading to dramatic fragmentation of societies (2006, p.xii-xvi). Schroder & Schmidt similarly observe that in threatening contexts, peoples' sense of community narrows (2001, p.02). In this the bonds that draw people together shift. For example, the commonality of the shared experience of exposure to violence often bonds individuals together. Bar-Tal et al. suggest that hatred of the 'other' quickly becomes a further 'cohesive factor' that bonds self-perceived 'victims' together and consolidates the 'others' as a threat (2009, p.236).

Building on this, Steenkamp suggests that the experience of trauma by large sections of a society can lead 'to demoralization and a breakdown of normal social norms and values' creating a situation in which 'social values that support the use of violence can take hold' (2005, p.264). Agreeing that being exposed to things like 'constant hatred, violence, weapons, expecting to be shot in the back', Kalyvas suggests that this 'destroys "civilized" principles and dispositions', often making it difficult to differentiate between 'the banal and the extraordinary' with people sometimes killing over small and big issues equally (2006, p.56). In this, old frameworks that normally suppress the use of violence 'become overshadowed by new norms and values that sustain the use of violence' (2005, p.264). While these elements contribute to the diversity and complexity of micro-level violence described above, they also foster social fragmentation and the emergence of the 'antagonistic other'.

With those falling outside of these common experiences being powerfully excluded (Sen 2006, p.15), Sen argues that the resultant 'singular identities nurture violence' (2006, p.4). Indeed, pointing out that an antagonistic sense of the 'other' typically emerges in such a process, Schroder & Schmidt stress that violence is often seen as *the* means of overcoming the risks the others are imagined to pose (2001, p.2).

While this social fragmentation is evident throughout much of South Sudan, it is especially so within the Programme areas. Especially in the cases of cattle-keeping tensions, the social construction of the 'other' as the 'enemy' is very deliberate. For example, in the Taposa language, the word 'Buya' translates as something like 'the enemy who is always among us'. As such, the enmity is deeply embedded in people's psyche, and is repeatedly re-enforced through the daily language. More generally, those perceived as 'the enemy' are reflexively associated with animosity, with a group of Taposa women from Napetait stating for example that 'the Dadinga will never be good people'. Another group of Taposa women similarly explained 'with the Buya & Didinga, we can only think about war'.

When asked why these groups fight rather than negotiate, the women from Napetait explained that 'they cannot discuss (ie: negotiate); they are enemies they cannot speak together; when they see the enemy, they must attack; they just start killing and grabbing cattle'. A group of Taposa youth in Kapoeta city agreed that 'in the village these different tribes cannot sit together; when you have cattle you will always clash; so they are enemies there in the village'. In this sense, there is an utter fracture between the two groups; the 'other' is understood as something fundamentally different than themselves. This has been perpetuated by repeated violations of trust.

Repeated back & forth attacks among continue to erode any trust between them. Being all too aware of this progressive erosion, some respondents claim that these attacks are perpetrated by certain individuals seeking to undermine peace processes. For example, a group of Taposa men speculated that 'if the trust is there; it is always ruined by those ones in the bush who start the fighting again; some are not happy with peace'.

Alternatively, pointing to a recent attack by Dadinga in which Taposa were killed,²³ a group of Taposa women asked: 'why do you ask us if we trust them; why should we trust them; they are the enemy; it is only the government forcing us together for peace; but they want to kill our people; we don't intend to stay with them in peace'. Another group of these women explained that 'trust is two-ways; if they cannot trust us; we do not trust them; there is no trust; we don't trust them; they don't trust us; trust is not possible when they are trying to 'pay-back' (ie: revenge)'.

Similarly, when a group of women in Pariak were asked if they could sit together to discuss with the Murle women, they quickly became very animated, showing the universal symbol of 'slitting throats', stating that 'those ones have no mercy; this is not even possible' (5F, at kiosk, Pariak). They clearly cannot imagine trust existing between these two communities.

When asked if they trust the Logir, a group of Dadinga women in Chukudum agreed in principle that they could discuss, although they equally noted that 'this does not happen because there is fighting now; as long as the men continue to raid we cannot sit together'.²⁴ While others agreed that 'trust could be there', they suggested that 'this can only be temporary; it breaks with raids' again concluding that 'it is the cows that are the

²³ Estimates given range between 20 to 54 people in total killed.

²⁴ These women argued that 'women want the fighting to stop, but it is difficult to advise the men to stop' (see section on Women's Role in Peace Making).

problem'.²⁵ While this recalls the issue of deresponsibilization mentioned above, it also recalls the problem of repetitively failed peace negotiations.

5.6.1 Failed Peace Negotiations

As a peace & conflict theorist, Jeong agrees that prolonged exposure to conflict leads to 'chronic feelings of uncertainty, stress, and grief' accompanied by 'a sense of hardship, lack of control, and helplessness' (2008, p.13). As has been demonstrated throughout this document, these sentiments combine toxically with the progressive spiral of social fragmentation and antagonistic perceptions of the 'other' as described above. One of the most typical conflict management tools that has been applied in South Sudan is inter-communal dialogue.

Ironically, for many respondents, one of the key indicators for peace is 'when we are having peace meetings' (5F, IDP Margaret, Chukudum). Pointing to the many different dialogue processes that have been undertaken, a group of Dadinga youth in Kapoeta stated that 'we know peace is there when there are meetings; when it is announced'. In this light, a group of elderly women from Napetai explained that 'you know that peace is there when you have been called; when people are making a dialogue then you will realise that they have established peace'. Obviously, this is a very low bar in terms of what constitutes peace. But even more concerning is the legitimacy of these processes. Countless respondents pointed to the fact that peace talks have been undertaken, agreements made, treaties signed, and shortly afterwards all such agreements collapse, and fighting resumed. This raises questions regarding the extent to which inter-communal dialogue as a means of building social cohesion is being undermined.

For example, respondents in Bor referenced, talks between the Dinka and the Murle that took place in October 2016. The Bor respondents reported thinking that 'this was somehow good; this might be a new beginning'. However, they claim that literally the day after an agreement was signed, an attack was launched against them. Reflecting on this one young man emphasized that 'these mechanisms have had more failures than successes', pointing out that 'this makes people very angry; they have hopes of solutions and then they are disappointed'. Others added that 'many peace conferences are not working out; immediately after we hear about them, the places are being attacked'. While a group of armed youth in Chukudum stated that 'we cannot talk to the enemy unless there is an avenue for dialogue', they equally concluded that 'there have been many treaties; they last for some time and then they break'. Indeed, this pattern is also normalized, leading people to expect and indeed accept such cycles.

However, even more worrying is the fact that these mechanisms are reportedly being incorporated into cattle-raiding strategies. While such processes have achieved some form of periodic respite from the on-going violence associated to raiding, the processes are increasingly delegitimised as the boys progressively integrate these brief respites into their strategizing. As one-armed youth from Chukudum explained, 'we cannot keep continuously fighting; we must stop shortly; we must rest; but it starts again'. Further, despite claiming that 'the enemy always starts it; we expect that they will try to come to steal their cows' he nevertheless added that 'you have peace only to take advantage to steal the other's cattle; while they are resting and feeling safe you can steal them'. The implication is that, as people slowly rebuild their confidence in the absence of violence, it is at that point that the cattle-raiders attack, because people have put down their arms and they are most vulnerable; they are easiest to attack at that point. However, recalling the above discussion on 'social

²⁵ Demonstrating the extent to which these sentiments are socially constructed, while agreeing that 'they are the enemy', these women admitted that 'we have never been to Ikotos; we don't know any Logir'.

amplificator of risk', the negative consequences in terms of hope for ever restoring peace and trust between these communities are amplified exponentially.

As such, many doubt that these mechanisms can actually create a change. As one young man in Bor said, 'we know the Murle; we know that kidnapping children is a way of life for them (ie: an economic strategy); so when we talk about solutions or resolution, no one will believe it'.

Jeong points out that in the absence of effective conflict management mechanisms, the antagonistic feelings and frustrations, as described above, deepen the negative perceptions of the 'other' as the 'adversarial enemy', making negotiated solutions ever-more difficult (2000, p.31). In this, people develop a strong sense of 'a loss of control or powerlessness' (Fierke 2007, p.136). This is particularly important – and dangerous – in relation to the collective experience of violence. Arguing that 'if power corrupts, so does powerlessness' Keen suggests that 'a sense of powerlessness can feed into the assertion of power through violence' (2008, p.68). This provides the foundation for shifting social norms that allow for the normalization of the use of violence, which is widely visible throughout the Programme area.

5.7 Altered Social Norms

Many theorists argue that social and cultural norms are often dramatically altered during conflict situations – often leading to a further perpetuation of violence. This section examines this process.

5.7.1 Normalisation²⁶ of Violence

Kalyvas, as a conflict theorist argues that civil war perpetuates violence through the brutalization that happens as a result of the unremitting exposure of people to on-going violence. Observing that such exposure leads to the collapse of social controls and a reduction in the social costs for violent activities, he suggests that this leads to an increasing number of individuals adopting newly learned violent instead of peaceful social skills, which results in an overall increase in use of violence by individuals and contributes to the proliferation of micro level violence (Kalyvas 2006, pp.55–56).

From an anthropological perspective, Besteman suggests that over time, the violence becomes culturally embedded, eventually transforming local reality, morality and truth (2002, p.6). She explains that this 'embedding' sets the foundation for what is widely referred to as the normalization of violence in which contexts 'become thoroughly pervaded by violence' with violence becoming 'normalized as part of the fabric of everyday life, even among the nonviolent members of the society' (2002, p.2). Others describe this as a 'culture of violence', which in effect can 'define, stimulate, and condone violent behaviour' (Abbink 2001, p.140).

South Sudan experts have pointed to the progressive socialization or normalization of violence over the past decades (Jok & Hutchinson 1999; HSBA 2007; ICG 2011). It has further been long noted that this propensity for micro-level violence is 'exacerbated by an abundance of small arms' (HSBA 2012, p.1), as discussed above. Today the extent to which extreme levels of violence are accepted as normal within the communities visited during this study is striking. Countless respondents noted that this violence has long been there and that they fully expect that it will continue long into the future.

²⁶ 'Socialization' is understood as the process of acquiring and internalizing attitudes, beliefs, values, interests, and behaviour consistent with those of the community into which the individual is being socialized (Greenberg 1970, p.3). Macionis & Gerber add that socialization is 'the means by which social and cultural continuity is attained' (2010, p.104). 'Socialization' is used relatively synonymously with the idea of 'normalisation' in this document.

The sense of inevitability regarding extreme levels of every-day violence has a long trajectory in people's minds. This serves as a perpetuating factor in itself, with a group of armed youth in Chukudum claiming that 'this is our culture; my father did it like this so I should do the same'. Similarly, a young man in the cattle-camp in Terekeka stated that 'before we were born that kind of life was there; there is no end; all these years this has been happening; it is the way of life here'. In this case, although the local Chiefs say 'we have told the youth that they must not engage in this fighting', they were clearly proud of the fact that 'these are our traditions; the young ones understand this'. Such attitudes in themselves, especially among community leaders, also go far to consolidate a sense of normalcy regarding every-day violence.

The level of acceptance is also striking. For example, when asked if they have hope for a better future for their children, a group of Taposá men from Napetaít explained that 'we cannot just stop this like that; we got these cows from our father; when the little ones are grown, they will also receive these cows and they will continue to fight; there is no other way'. A group of women from the same place were lamenting the fact that the war continues, but they nevertheless agreed that 'if a boy grows up and finds fighting, he will join it; it is only peace that can stop this'. In this light, the men concluded that 'there is no end; this is an inherited war; we have received it from our fathers; our children will receive it from us; there can be no end' (9M Napetaít Village, Kapoeta). The extent to which violence is normalized in individual's lives is particularly worrying in relation to domestic violence, which is more specifically studied in the following section.

1. Normalization of Domestic Violence

Earlier sections of this report have demonstrated that domestic violence often comprises of extreme violence. Nevertheless, not all respondents were convinced that this is actually a problem. For example, a group of particularly reflective women in Chukudum suggested that 'this fighting itself is part of the resolution of problems between people; this is part of the experience; you can learn; you can see who is the stronger and who is weaker'. More importantly, others in Chukudum suggested it was acceptable simply because 'this is what we have found; this is God's creation; it is like that here'.

A group of Taposá women explained that 'this beating is just there; we don't consider it bad; this fighting is a normal thing; it is a must that there is always fighting; when the man sees that there is no water or food, then he becomes angry and he must beat his wife; this is normal'. This group of women added that 'this has been existing long like this; so now when you see it you don't consider it as a bad thing; it is just something there; you know everyone is doing it like that; so we think it is a good thing because it is like a discipline'. This illustrates just how a strong prevalence creates a sense of normalcy which eventually begins to equate with acceptance.

In fact, this acceptance often prompts excuses or justifications,²⁷ with a group of women from Napetaít suggesting that 'the man must beat the woman so she does not forget important things'. When asked if this works' they stated that 'yes, you automatically pick the point; when I am not beaten, I will not learn the point'. However, when asked if this is what they believe or what men say, they said that 'you just have to take this; there is no alternative; all men beat their wives; no man can stay with a woman without beating her' (5F Elders Napetaít, Kapoeta).

²⁷ This recalls the earlier claims of the men that women need to be beaten as a means of discipline, with a group of male youth from Lorema explaining that 'we can stop beating our women when they change their behaviour.'

Clearly, violence is profoundly normalized at all levels and in many domains.²⁸ And for many, this normalization equates with a profound resignation. With people accepting the endless cycles of violence and the enmity held for the 'other' as 'normal', there is a profound level of acceptance of deeply dysfunction processes. The *expectation* for positive change is largely absent. If people are unable to recognise violence as a problem; they are then utterly unable to change it.

Compounding this is a very passive engagement with the future. As a group of elder men in Pariak explained, 'changes come automatically; if they are not there, we do not worry, because then it was not going to be there'. This manifests in the fact that people are largely unable to imagine a different future.

5.8 The Future Looks Hopeless

Prolonged exposure to threats and violence creates a situation in which 'nobody is sure of anything anymore' (Kalyvas 2006, p.28). This is precisely the situation within which all too many respondents find themselves today. For example, a group of elder men in Lobonok emphasized that 'you just can't know what the future is all about; it is not certain anymore'. As such, when asked to speculate on the future, most respondents had a bleak outlook. As one old man in Chukudum said, 'I cannot waste my time predicting something that doesn't make sense'. A group of women in the same location said equally bleakly that 'we are just in the darkness; we don't know the future'.

Pointing to the hope that has been crushed since independence, a national staff observed, 'people have lost respect for the system; the future feels hopeless for them; people have lost hope'. Indeed, with hope continuing to be eroded on a daily basis as people are forced to perpetually confront their on-going crises, the same staff member noted that 'you might plan your future very well; but it might not be like you planned; you can invest in something like a building; and then someone can just come and destroy it; people are suspended; it becomes very difficult to plan for your future'. In this line, a group of youth in Lobonok similarly lamented that 'as we are trying to think of development, we are being forced to consider displacement; this leaves us wondering what will be there; we know the agenda of those ones [ie: the cattle-keepers] for the future is not a healthy one in the months to come'.

The lack of hope is all too prevalent, with a group of beaten-down women in Kapoeta stating that 'we don't have any hope; if we think of this it does not happen; if we try for that, it fails; nothing is possible now'. A group of Dadinga youth in Kapoeta similarly stated that 'we cannot even imagine a good future; now we can just pray hard'. When asked if they thought the future would reveal positive or negative trends, one group in Terekeka stated that 'we don't see anything good in the future; but if we are so bitter, we might not see that better future; so we have faith in god we will have a better future'. Others stated that 'we just want to see what arrives before we can say', reflecting a clear lack of any sense of control.

Speculating that 'the future is not good; the future is uncertain' many underlined that 'we can just leave it to God'. Indeed, there is a distinctly fatalist perspective, with people systematically claiming that 'the future is in the hands of God; we can only wait to see what God has in mind for us'. Women in Terekeka agreed that 'we live in the hands of God; it depends on God; the future lies with God; it depends on what God decides'. Respondents in Kapoeta stressed that 'we put God first; you must pray' while others literally passed the responsibility to God, saying that 'for security, it is in the hands of God; it is his responsibility to stabilize; God

²⁸ These youth from Lorema equally noted that 'people also beat their children when they make mistakes; this is how they can be taught'

decides if you eat, or if you grow old; it is God who is responsible for all of this', thus abdicating any responsibility on their own part. In an equally passive manner, respondents from Chukudum agreed that 'we can just pray to God that things will be ok'. Indeed, the most positive tone with some vague tone of hope saw respondents saying things like: 'we can just hope the country can be stable; we can just keep praying that there will be peace'; or 'we are hoping to have peace'. Indeed, on the positive side, people were able to define peace.

5.8.1 Defining Peace

Johan Galtung, the father of Peace Studies draws the distinction between what he refers to as *positive* & *negative* peace. 'Negative peace' refers to the absence of violence & war; while 'positive peace' refers to the state of an integrated society (1964, p.02). The definitions that respondents gave for peace reflect both the notion of *negative peace*, talking of the lack of violence, shooting and 'when there are no fights; no trouble'; as well as *positive peace* and the positive opportunities created.

Highlighting that 'we are tired of war; we want to rest; we want no war', a group of women in Lobonok stated that 'peace is when the war stops'. A Chief added that 'peace is when you have no war; it is when there is safety; when people can move freely and we don't have any of this running up & down'. A group of elder men looked slightly more to the positive potential adding that 'it is when I can sleep without fear of being attacked; when we can go to the river without fears'. Some in Kapoeta stressed that peace is the absence of violence stating that 'it is freedom; it is when there is no killing of women and children; no killing of innocent people'. Others also pointed to the opportunities, adding that 'it is a good thing; we can become free; we can move freely; we can access food; the animals can graze freely'.

While stating that peace 'is the absence of war; when no shots can be heard' a group of women in Chukudum added that 'it is unity; it is togetherness; it is when people can move freely to their fields'. Indeed, many respondents naturally referred to a state of restored social cohesion. For example, a group of women in Lorema described peace as 'bringing friendship between those who were fighting'. Others in Chukudum said 'it is when the neighbours can come here with their cows and we can live together like brothers and sisters; it is when former enemies can come together'. A group of women in Terekeka highlighted reconciliation, describing peace as a process of 'forgiving each other; if we are angry we need to forgive the other one; the offending party should seek forgiveness'.

Stressing that 'peace is a good thing', a group of Taposa men explained that 'it is when people can become brothers; there will be no more hunger; it is when people are together; we can even be together with the enemy'. Taposa women equally emphasized the aspect of social cohesion, stating that 'peace makes people to come together; it is when you stay together as brothers & sisters; when there is freedom of movement; you can move freely; when you can get food'.

However, people had great difficulties in imagining how these ideas of peace could be translated into concrete action. As one group of rural Taposa women stated, 'we don't even know where the people who will bring peace will come from'. A group of women in Ikotos added that 'now we are afraid; we are worried that now we will only have fighting'. The absence of a vision of a better future is all too evident – as is the apprehension for investing the development of such a vision. Due to a near utter loss of confidence in the future, people express little or no expectation for anything different. Little hope is expressed for something better. There is no expectation for positive change in the future. As a group of women from Bira (Ikotos) stated, although they want things to change, they don't think they will.

6. CONCLUSIONS & THE WAY FORWARD

The above section has illustrated the extent to which everyday violence is normalized at the micro level. It also shows the extent to which the normalization of social fragmentation and the every-day violence are met with widespread resignation. They are widely accepted. However, these realities are far from 'ideal'. Profound levels of everyday violence do not reflect patterns that are healthy or sustainable. A vibrant and peaceful community cannot be constructed on such a foundation. As such, efforts to address the root causes of recurrent violence in South Sudan requires efforts to reverse the above described erosive trends. The erosion is evident at both the individual level as well as the collective or societal level, so the big question for the Programme is how to engage in a meaningful manner in order to interrupt and eventually reverse these trends of erosion of social norms and fragmentation of societies. How can these negative social norms begin to be reversed? How can the seeds of more healthy trends be planted? How can the foundation for healthier social norms that could help to create a more sustainable foundation for a health and vibrant society be established?

As an anthropologist, Fry stresses that 'attitudes, values, and beliefs can either promote peaceful, nonviolent behavior, or, to the contrary, facilitate aggression and warfare' (2006, p.256). Obviously, ideas and attitudes are held by individuals and thus, to change these requires an concentrated engagement with at the individual level. However, the changing of societal norms (ie: those that allow for the reflexive use of violence) is a collective process; as is social cohesion. As such, based on the findings described above, this section proposes a framework upon which gender & peacebuilding could be integrated with livelihoods in the overall effort of tackling the root causes of conflict & violence.

6.1 A Programming Framework

A conflict & gender response framework can be constructed upon three pillars:

1. Changing Attitudes & Beliefs
2. Mechanisms for Addressing On-going Violence
3. Constructing an Alternative Future – Integrating Peace & Livelihoods

The programming itself does not need to be very complex in its initial stages. One of the biggest objectives is to provide opportunities for communities to reflect on the issues discussed in this report, and to bring what is largely reflexive normalization of violence into the realm of consciousness, as people need to firstly become aware of the problem before they can change it. As such, each pillar is developed below.

Pillar 1. CHANGING ATTITUDES & BELIEFS

Based on the above findings, micro level programming should be constructed around efforts aimed at:

- reversing individual attitudes & beliefs that violence is 'normal' (which fosters its continuation)
- increasing individual awareness of the value (and equality) of every human life
- establishing the belief that each & every individual is responsible for contributing to creating peace (ie: promoting empathy & a social conscience)

At the heart of this set of activities is the objective of changing individual mind-sets so as to promote Social Cohesion. Both the theory and the data collected demonstrates how conflict and disputes lead to the fracturing of social relations (ie: between livelihood groups; within communities; and even between husband and wife). A

change of attitudes and beliefs is critical to addressing the root causes of this perpetual violence that perpetuates social fracturing. There is no single approach to creating such a shift.

As such, the shifting of attitudes & beliefs should be seen as a principle objective. This calls for: numerous trainings aimed at promoting the essential ideas of social cohesions as an alternative to existing beliefs sketched above. These core ideas need to be integrated into all discussions with the community. It also calls for working with a wide range of individuals of all kinds within the community including: little kids in school; youth leaders & youth groups; people within the market; agricultural groups; etc. The idea is to tap into the agency of each individual to contribute to creating a change as opposed to creating the impression that these key messages are the responsibility of only a few leaders. They should be widely & repeatedly disseminated to as wide of an audience as possible for people to understand that accepting, integrating and operationalising social cohesion and peaceful co-existence is the responsibility of every member of the community. The following proposes some concepts upon which activities can be developed. It starts with addressing/restoring the well-being of the individual; and then proceeds to preserving & rebuilding the well-being of the society.

1. Restoring Individual Well-being & Responsibilization

People are affected by their experiences of violence, as well as the pressure of coping with the difficult circumstances that result. As a national staff of an NGO observed, 'people are badly affected; people are tired; they are losing hope; you cannot just keep telling them something better is coming; you cannot just console them; now they are angry'. Respondents regularly referred to the psychological implications of their distress, explaining that they can stop reflecting, but yet are unable to develop a constructive plan of action. Such sentiments need to be acknowledged and support given to manage and reverse them. As such various activities with a psycho-social dimension need to be considered. This could include peer-support-groups in order to create space for people to share their difficulties in a non-threatening environment, with the group also being useful to help such individuals to jointly identify possible ways of managing their difficulties.

2. Fostering a sense of social responsibility & prompting people to make a positive contribution

People exposed to violence adopt a sense of victimhood and as such lack a sense of control and individual agency. Further, it is typical that responsibility is transferred elsewhere. Through transferring the responsibility for the violence to a multitude of other actors, individuals have no sense of responsibility for it; there is no sense that an individual is relevant, or that their action makes a difference. This leaves individuals utterly unaccountable; as well as again utterly powerless to create a positive change in their lives and their society. This point of view needs to be altered. People need to be reminded that they create their reality. Individuals are making either a positive or negative contribution. If the causes and consequences of their activities are made conscious, people can become more aware of how their behaviour is affecting their community. Once becoming more aware of this, they can make more conscious choices in terms of the role they want to play in their community.

3. Building Inter-Personal Solidarity

This approach is also designed to counter the tendencies of fragmentation, although at a more personal level, fostering a sense of compassionate concern for those that people already see as part of their community and with whom they regularly engage with. Activities such as revolving loans increase the inter-reliance and foster the notion of working together to help someone else. While these activities can emerge more naturally between those who are of a common group, the tool can be applied across fragmented groups as a means of drawing them together through inter-reliance. This should be accompanied with efforts to highlight the notions of compassion, empathy, and constructing social cohesion.

BOX 4: SOLIDARITY BETWEEN WOMEN

An important doorway is the solidarity between women. Even though households are being fractured in the micro spaces, women described a growing solidarity among themselves, explaining that ‘you try to find a good neighbour and talk to her; she can advise you; otherwise you talk to the Pastor, he can listen and calm your mind’ (15F in market, Terekeka). Other agreed that ‘we can listen to each other’s problems; we can console the other one; we tell them to forget’ (8F, doing leaves Chukudum). Indeed, one woman in the group added that ‘if you don’t go to your friends, you can even kill yourself’ (8F, doing leaves, Chukudum). This connection keeps empathy alive. It is only a small step from there to building a bridge between women of different communities on this basis. For example, women believe/understand that the other feels as much pain as they do when their sons are killed, with a group of Taposa women explaining that ‘the Dadinga mother feels the same thing because she is a woman’ (13F; 11 elders & 2 youth, Napetai). It is these sentiments that must be identified and built upon.

4. Promoting the notion of Human Equity

There is a lot of work to be done in terms of planting the seed of the idea of gender equality. This requires a multi-pronged approach working more aggressively with the coalition of the willing and more slowly with the resisters. Especially men will not only have a conceptual problem with this, they will also see it as a threat to their power base. As such, progress in this line needs to be tied to advantages that can be gained for the resisters (ie: their households will benefit from allowing women to play a role in society).

BOX 5: RAISING AWARENESS OF UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS

The frame of Universal Human Rights can be useful in this endeavour as it establishes a foundation upon which all human beings are said to be equal simply on the basis of their humanness. This could be introduced as a counter logic to the various local logics that have effectively dehumanized individuals – whether on the basis of gender or ethnicity – in order to support the sense of superiority of one portion of the population.

For example, a young lady speaking English in Pariak who had been educated in Kenya argued that much of what is existing in the local environment ‘is a result of how people are growing up; there is no respect for women in both women and men’, adding that ‘because women have not gone to school they learn nothing other than what they are taught in the household; it is traditions that they learn; this is how people learn what they are; with no education even women do not respect women’. She added that ‘even men have no education so they do not understand that all human beings have rights; so they have no respect for women’ (1F, speaking English, Pariak). Disseminating such ideas widely has proven to spark a new way of thinking and create space for greater respect to grow at an inter-personal level.

5. Restoring Empathy & Compassion – Maximising the female contribution

The capacity for empathy, or concern for the other is an important aspect in rebuilding social cohesion. However, the above has indicated that perpetual threat causes people to reduce their sense of community and turn in on themselves. Many respondents spoke about people losing the sense of the value of life, with those carrying guns readily ‘killing people like a bird’. This sense of threat reduces one’s sense of community and concern for those outside of that. As such, people need to be facilitated to see beyond themselves, being encouraged to empathise with others. In this study, the typical test of a respondent’s sense of empathy included questions regarding what they think another person might think about something. When asked to

imagine the thoughts or experiences of other person, respondents systematically indicated that ‘I can’t know what the other one is thinking’, reflecting either an inability or a lack of will to ‘step into the other person’s shoes in order to imagine their experience. This is a critical skill that must be developed in order to facilitate a reconnection between fragmented communities. The point here is to develop exercises that focus on developing empathy & compassion and promote the value of these sentiments & practices within a household & community. Activities need to bring these elements to the fore, and make them conscious and valuable.

Importantly, it was widely suggested that it is especially women who can remind people of compassion and empathy – as their presence is said to make youth recall their days as small children being cared for by their mothers; also making them aware of the small children they put at risk when they engage in attacks on communities. This emphasizes the importance of creating adequate space to enable women to play their unique role in rebuilding the society, especially in terms of leading this effort to renew a sense of empathy within the society.

BOX 6: HIGHLIGHTING COMPASSION IN MEN

Somewhat more challenging is the need to connect men with the notion of empathy and building both their intra & inter-communal connections. Indeed, a group of women from Kapoeta town warned that the cattle-keeper youth have a reduced capacity for empathy, stating that ‘their view depends only on the successes of the raid; the pain they feel if people are killed is lessened if they gained lots of cattle; they only really feel pain if a cow dies’ (3F,SPLA Captain, Kapoeta). More tangibly, it was only with some prompting that a group of Taposa men agreed that in peace times they would no longer call the Buya and the Dadinga ‘the enemy’, but shift to ‘brothers’, nevertheless stressing that ‘for now we know them to be the enemy’ (8M,Taposa village @school).

6. Making ‘Cause & Effect’ Linkages

It is important to help people make the ‘cause & effect’ linkages between violent behaviour and the destruction it causes; and pointing to how positive alternatives can avoid the destruction and even create positive opportunities. With some respondents arguing that ‘just talking to people about being together will not work; people will not listen to this; they will not change’ (1M,Vet,Bor), it is important that the reflective process go deeper and engage more tenaciously. For example, a group of male respondents in Pariak called for ‘sensitization and creating awareness on living in peace; explanations that it is dangerous to live in conflict’. This is them asking for help in making the cause & effect linkages, thinking through the consequences of destructive actions, and developing alternatives. Indeed, speaking more directly to this, a group of male youth in Lorema stressed that ‘people do not understand this idea of consequences’. The reflexive use of violence indicates that such action is not a conscious decision. Such choices should be brought to the fore. People should be guided to make their choices around the use of violence more conscious.

This can again be tied systematically to concrete activities, weaving the logic together with livelihood activities. Violence reduces livelihoods opportunities. A wide range of dialogue processes and information dissemination & communication tools need to be developed (eg: radio spots, posters; pamphlets; T-Shirts, etc) as a means of helping people to make the links between the consequences of certain actions, at the same time suggesting alternatives. The positive results of positive behaviour need to be systematically spotlighted.

7. Preventing Social Fracturing & Building Social Cohesion

As demonstrated, social fragmentation is happening at all levels (eg: inter-ethnic; inter-communal; intra-ethnic; intra-communal; within families; and within households) and thus the Programme needs to consider multi-pronged actions designed to restore/enhance social cohesion and/or preventing fragmentation at all levels. Activities should be designed to bring people together along multiple lines aimed at creating positive opportunities, experiences and inter-reliance. Livelihood & market activities are great vehicles for doing so, but these activities must be combined proactively with social well-being activities. Restored interface should also be constructed around positive engagement opportunities as well. This might include quarterly 'Peace Celebrations' in which different communities are brought together to celebrate their differences together. This could include dancing, theatre, story-telling, etc. The tone should be very positive and avoid competitive activities, rather highlighting things that people work together to create something positive (eg: cooking together).

In preventive terms, emerging social fracturing should be anticipated and proactively interrupted before such situations erupt into the use of violence. Such efforts should be undertaken in a timely manner, anticipating as opposed to reacting. The groups among which tensions are starting to grow should be brought together in activities that enhance their inter-reliance and connect them in a positive sense, so they realise that combatting leads to the loss of these opportunities. In this sense, it is important to go beyond the typical approach of inter-tribal (Chief-based) negotiations, but drawing on far more diverse dialogue processes including women-women; women-youth; children-children; etc.

Pillar 2. MECHANISMS for ADDRESSING ON-GOING VIOLENCE

Although prevention should be the priority, operational efforts to address on-going violence must be developed in discussions with the people themselves, given that the ideas, interests, opportunities, and community resources to do so vary from one locality to the next. Moreover, it is the community themselves who must drive such initiatives – and not only the Chiefs and other obvious leaders, but the community as a whole. At the heart of this approach is the idea that every individual must play their part in stopping the violence and creating peace. In this, it is the responsibility of the NGO team to guide and facilitate the development of alternatives based on the recommendations and in-put of the communities themselves. Do not go into this with pre-conceived ideas.

Some elements include:

- establishing/restoring alternatives to violence
- restoring trust in negotiated reconciliation
- decentralizing communication & dialogue processes

1. Restoring Moral Authority & Leadership

Many respondents indicated that rely upon coercive mechanisms as the most likely resolution to on-going violence (ie: the security sector) – despite the fact that in most cases these mechanisms were identified as largely non-functional. With this aside, NGOs can play a role in relation to the soft power discussed above. In this sense, there is a need for a strengthening of the moral leadership from the church as well as from all leaders, including the traditional authorities as well as the Government. In this, NGOs could play an important role in terms of educating the population and raising awareness and setting an example. Many emphasise the importance of talking to the youth, even if this is difficult and slow going. There is a need to address the conflict between youth & the Chiefs in those locations where it exists.

2. Reconsidering Dialogue Processes

It is ironic that for many respondents, the indicator for peace is ‘when we are having peace meetings’, especially given that, as discussed throughout this report, many of the dialogue processes that respondents have experienced have largely been violated; often immediately following the conclusions of the dialogue processes. Indeed, many respondents highlight how especially cattle raiding youth have integrated peace settlements into their attack strategies (ie: communities begin to have confidence in peace and drop their guard and thus become easy targets). As such, these tools need to be adopted with caution. However, most people still believe they are essentially useful. They need to be studied carefully in order to extract the aspect that have proven to be constructive and changing the dimensions that are failing to create the intended change. There is particularly a need for shifting away from a reactive approach towards a preventive approach – dialogue and engagement should be promoted before the tensions are explosive. Further, there is a need to shift away from the very top-down officious approaches that concentrate the process in already too-powerful individuals, spreading the process across a wider range of groups, promoting youth-to-youth; women-to-women; and even children-to-children exchanges (within the limits of doing no harm).

3. Supporting Women’s Peace Initiatives

Inter-community women groups need to be facilitated to be talking to armed youth as a means of change the dynamics and begin to create new outcomes. These ideas are there within the communities, but they need support and facilitation. For example, the Dadinga women of Chukudum have joined the Logir women in efforts to organize themselves to encourage their youth to stop fighting. They said that ‘because the men had failed to control these boys, they need now to move back and allow the women a chance to try’.²⁹ A Chief in Chukudum agreed that ‘it was a very good initiative; this should be supported again; it could be revived; it was stopped because the Commissioner was supposed to be talking to these youth; if he can’t then no one can’.

An NGO staff aware of this process noted ‘they aim to try where men have failed; women have a different opportunity to talk to the youth; this is because women are seen as neutral in war’. However, he underlined that ‘the major issue is still that of getting men to accept to listen; culturally it is normal that women are considered inferior to men; they are seen as having nothing to say about war’. In any case, he was convinced that such efforts need to be supported because the efforts of men have produced few results; we need to try different ways of communicating to the youth. In this sense, the Chief was sure that these women bring something unique to the process, explaining that ‘they feel the pain of those ones killed; when they talk about this it makes the youth hear something different; they remember when they were young children under the care of their mothers; they think of the small children there now who might be killed in the violence they create’. He went on to say that ‘as a mother you have to think differently; they remind the boys of their emotions (ie: empathy)’. He emphasized that this is a very different process than that of the Chiefs noting that ‘when the Chiefs talk to the youth, the boys just want to fight; with the women the atmosphere is soft; it is calm; at the fighting front the boys see the elders as a threat; they want to compete with the Chiefs; they can even try to take their cattle by force; but the women are seen as neutral so the boys can listen to them more than the elders’.

4. Capitalizing on Education & Religion as Neutral Spaces

Countless respondents underlined the importance of education and religion as peacemaking tools. A group of male elders from Loryok stated that ‘education and religion will change the mindset of the people’. As a group of men in Pariak stated, ‘it is important to work through churches as a place of gathering’. In addition to being

²⁹ However, these women noted that ‘the Logir women are really strong in motivating their men to fight; they abuse those ones who have not gone for fighting’ (5F, IDP Margaret, Chukudum).

'ethnic-neutral' spaces through which people can be brought together around a common set of interests, both institutions also have the moral authority to disseminate key messages concerning peace and social cohesion. As a group of women from Bira stated, 'the church can shape people's behaviour'. Further, they create a neutral space within which people can discuss and develop alternative ideas and change destructive beliefs. As an NGO staff member in Terekeka suggested, 'exposure to new ideas can help people to think differently; they can think of a different kind of future'. In this sense, a good number of people look to both education and religion as the core opportunities through which solutions can be created.

5. Tackling specific elements of social decline

Alcoholism is extremely prevalent in some communities (eg: Chukudum; Nepatait) and needs to be addressed before these crises worsen. Firstly this concerns educating people about the consequences of alcoholism; it requires the creation of livelihood alternatives for women who do the brewing; and creating alternatives to alcohol – how people can more constructively engage themselves in the afternoon.

Disrespectful youth is a social dynamic that also needs to be tackled. But this requires further exploration with the boys to understand their concerns and interpretations, and their interests. Working with a few willing individuals from within this target demographic as 'change agents' could provide an entry point into this sub-community.

6. Management of Small Arms

Given the central role that guns play in the erosion of the society, many people agree that disarmament is an urgent matter. In fact, the Chief said that 'if the guns are still there, then our future will be very uncertain' (1M, Chief, Chukudum). As one group of men advised, even if NGOs are not able to do this themselves, they need to bring this issue to those who can (2M SpeakingEnglish, Chukudum). However, disarmament of course is only feasible with a functional security system in place (ie: the security sector must be functional). Alternatively, there may be opportunities for 'managing' small arms within communities – to be explored more intensively within given communities.

Pillar 3. CONSTRUCTING A PEACEFUL FUTURE

Populations at risk must be facilitated to envision an Alternative Future. And through the combined capacity of peacebuilding & livelihoods programming, this programme can also help communities to actually create an alternative future.

In this sense, the programme can facilitate people:

- to envision a positive future
- to develop concrete plans on how they can take proactive steps to building that future on a daily basis.
- create positive incentives for building cooperative inter-reliance (eg: trading opportunities; merging with the livelihoods dimension of the programme)

Successes achieved through the above two pillars creates the space for an alternative future. But the community themselves need to define what they want that to look like. At this point people are at best very passive about their future, and at worst have lost all faith in a worthwhile future. This in itself creates the sense of having 'nothing to lose', thus allowing for the continuation of violence. The process of facilitating the creation of a vision of an alternative future can restore hope and help people to redirect their energies and prioritise building peace over repeatedly resorting to violence. Integrating livelihoods opportunities into this then gives people something concrete to rely upon in this new future.

Programming should draw on both livelihoods and peace-building activities as means of fostering both negative peace (ie: the absence of violence; stopping the fighting; etc); and positive peace (which is concerned with restoring inter-relations, inter-reliance and eventually trust and collaboration).³⁰ As such, ‘creating peaceful communities’ must be a central goal of activities. While livelihoods & peace-building programming should be developed as strong and independent dimensions, they also need to be merged with staff of each specialization being trained in the other in order to ensure that they can work together in a strategic opportunistic approach – with each group looking for synergies between them. In this light, some activities could include:

1. *Envisioning & Constructing a Positive Future*

The capacity to imagine a better future is particularly relevant in conflict zones. This needs to be built off of people’s definition of peace. Indeed, as a promising aspect of this study, respondents were quite able to define peace. However, they were distinctly unable to see how that could be created in their lives. In hopelessness, people lose the sense of being constructive and creative individuals who have the power and influence to create a meaningful positive future. This sense of agency needs to be restored. It is closely related to the above noted idea of ‘responsibilizing’ the individual. In addition to raising the awareness of social responsibility, this aspect is the social or collective process of combining efforts to build something positive together. As such, community initiatives can be constructed firstly around envisioning a positive future together. And secondly, a map for constructing this can then be developed. This would require dialogue with all members of the society to determine what they think they can contribute. This is a great means of fostering a positive collective effort; and restoring faith that creative vision can produce results – ie: it is worth the effort to think about the future.

2. *Building Synergies Between Livelihoods & Peace-building Activities*

While livelihoods & peace-building programming should be developed in this programme as strong and independent pillars, they also need to be merged with staff of each specialization being trained in the other in order to ensure that they can work together in a strategic opportunistic approach – with each pillar looking for opportunities to proactively interweave the two pillars in order to create and capitalize upon synergies between them (as highlighted in the process of envisioning an *alternative peaceful future*).

Programming should draw on both livelihoods and peace-building activities as means of fostering both negative peace (ie: the absence of violence; stopping the fighting; etc); and positive peace (which is concerned with restoring inter-relations, inter-reliance and eventually trust and collaboration).³¹

BOX 7: CREATING LIVELIHOOD ALTERNATIVES WHEN CATTLE-KEEPING CAUSES TOO MANY PROBLEMS

In some cases, communities have reduced their reliance on cattle because they cause too many problems. To the extent possible and to the extent that people are receptive, alternatives to cattle could be promoted.

3. *Facilitating cooperation at borders*

³⁰ This means that while peacebuilding activities lay the foundation for enhanced livelihood activities, livelihood activities need not only be designed with economic goals, but also with goals that foster positive peace.

³¹ This means that while peacebuilding activities lay the foundation for enhanced livelihood activities, livelihood activities need not only be designed with economic goals, but also with goals that foster positive peace.

Peace experts make the distinction between ‘negative peace’ that reflects the absence of violence; and ‘positive peace’ that refers to the positive progression that can build upon the discontinuation of the violence, such as the restoration of inter-reliance, cooperation and eventual trust between the formerly warring communities. In this sense, a number of observers argued for the drawing together of cattle-keepers at the border areas of their lands, creating robust water sources, schools, markets, etc as a means of bringing combatting populations together in positive relations around inter-related activities, building inter-reliance and positive re-engagement with the ‘enemy’ on more constructive lines.

BOX 8: A FOCUS ON EDUCATION

Focusing on education, two well-educated elders stated that ‘the answer is to send the children to school; the schools must be improved; teachers must be properly trained and told not to be drunk in school; even the girls must go to school’ (2M Speaking English, Chukudum). Similarly, when asked about the future, another woman said that ‘I see that people with education are different; they do not want to fight; I think education can make a difference; I will work hard to send my children to education’ (5F, IDP Margaret, Chukudum). In this light, many respondents pointed to the idea of locating boarding schools between two communities in which kids from both communities can study and learn together and overcome the enmity that now exists. They add that ‘with this education, these kids will set an example; they will not want to be raiding’ (3M, Loryok).



8. ANNEX: FURTHER SUBSTANTIVE INFORMATION

8.1 Conflict Trends in Detail

8.1.1 National Level Conflict

Opinions varied from location to location on whether the Juba-based crisis directly affect them locally. Respondents in both Lobonok and Bor see very direct connections between their localised insecurity and the broader Juba-based crisis, with one young man in Bor categorically stating that ‘the 2013 crisis rages on today’ (7M, youth@restau, Bor Town).

From the perspective of the agriculturalists in Lobonok, the crisis there is seen as having clear ties to the macro level. They speculate that the cattle-keepers who are present in the area are ‘supported by the government’, with one well informed observer suggesting that ‘we think the cattle are owned by big men, like the Ministers and the Colonels; they send the lower soldiers here with the cows as though they are cattle-keepers; they give them guns; because this land is very good, they want to chase the farmers away so their cattle can just graze on this land’ (1M, local Rep, Lobonok).

Respondents in Chukudum reported an intensive episode of violence in October 2016 in which ‘armed men from Juba came in a vehicle and started shooting and looting and terrorising the population’. A prolonged violent face-off unfolded between these men; the police who also armed the local youth;³² and a local reorganisation of former SPLA soldiers. These three groups are described as shooting and killing and looting; houses were reportedly burned; and civilians, being both caught in the cross-fire and directly targeted, were killed and forced to flee. While a local Chief was certain that this attack was related to the larger juba-based crisis, many respondents were unclear about this. Indeed, the majority of respondents asked, said the larger conflict does not directly affect them in Chukudum, except through a more general increase in insecurity in the area.

Respondents in other localities took a similar view. While a group of women associated with the cattle camp in Terekeka blamed the ‘top leaders’ for ‘causing troubles so we cannot see peace’ (6F, associated to cattle-camp, Terekeka), most respondents claimed that ‘the larger crisis is not touching us here’. Similarly stressing that ‘we are not happy with it’, those in a village near Kapoeta worried that ‘if it continues, it’ll reach us; it has spoiled many things; we now have a bad economy; some of our boys are traders and they have been caught by the violence in Juba; they have been killed’ (8F&4M, orient Taposavillage, Kapoeta). Many respondents rather highlighted the secondary consequences.

This recalls Kalyvas’ claims that although embedded within the wider frame of the armed conflict, the violence that unfolds at the micro level is often ‘privatized’ and deeply personalised and is often largely unrelated to the macro political agenda (2006, p.20). This broader crises causes the collapse of institutions, and erodes any law & order that may have existed, thus creating the space for new forms of violence to emerge in the local spaces. Speaking precisely to this, a Chief in a village near Kapoeta agreed that the bigger conflict ‘is not really affecting us here’ but pointed out that ‘our problem is the criminals on the road; this stops people from moving freely’ (1M,Chief, Taposavillage near town). Indeed, respondents from all localities agreed that the Juba-based crisis is exacerbating criminality in their areas.

³² Rather than engaging in the larger battle, these local boys reportedly rather used their new-found fire-power to settle old scores they had with their age-mates over issues such as girls.

8.1.2 Criminality

This dynamic reflects Kalyvas' earlier point that the conflict environment creates the space for an escalation of personalised violence at the micro level that is often 'motivated by opportunism, impunity, and revenge' (Kalyvas 2006, p.24). For example, in Chukudum, respondents reported that there are now many armed men in the surrounding areas. Although they can feel relatively safe within the town centre, many said they are at risk of being robbed, knifed or shot in the outer areas. As one group of women noted, 'we can no longer move freely to the mountain (where they normally collect wild food); we worry that we will be attacked by men with guns and knives; these men are there in the bush; they are armed but we don't know who they are' (5F, IDP Margaret, Chukudum).

According to the Chief, the problem has two dimensions: one is that of 'unknown armed men looting [opportunistically] along the road', which he says 'is not organized in any way; these ones have no objective other than looting' (1M, Chief, Chukudum). The other involves armed youth from within their own community who are 'taking things by force', with the Chief citing the fact that 'these ones can force weaker people off of productive land if they want to confiscate it for themselves' (1M, Chief, Chukudum). They reportedly engage in the more

BOX 9: DIRECT OBSERVATIONS IN CHUKUDUM:

There are many young men moving in the centre of Chukudum with their guns, looking extremely petulant and intimidating, as well as visibly inebriated. These boys are described as having very little respect for anything but their own interests. Many observers noted that 'because they are carrying guns, they think they can take whatever they want by force'. They are an important menace in their own community.

Women in Bor specifically associate criminality with their daily activities, lamenting that 'when we go to collect firewood; when we go out like that; we might meet someone early in the morning; they will beat you; they will rob you, they will rape you; they can even kill you' (5F, Restaurant, BorTown). Readily allocating such actions to the Murle, they further emphasize 'the constant fear of our children being kidnapped' (5F, Restaurant, BorTown). In Pariak, women equally claimed that 'the Murle are killing people; we don't sleep; we worry about them attacking; if you go to collect firewood, they'll be there' (5F, at kiosk, Pariak). In both Kapoeta and Terekeka, especially male cattle-keepers rather associate criminality to the stealing of cattle.

8.1.3 Cattle Raiding

Kalyvas has observed that individuals caught up in war often 'take advantage of the prevailing situation to settle private and local conflicts' although these local issues typically have little or no relationship to the causes of the larger war (Kalyvas 2006, p.365). This is all too evident in relation to the cattle raiding trends, thus illustrating the meso-level dimension. Further, playing a significant role in the identity development of the male youth in many parts of South Sudan, some analysts suggest that violent cattle raiding is 'engrained for both cultural and economic reasons' (McEvoy & LeBrun 2010, p.20), with the ICG noting that '[c]attle raiding and associated conflicts have been a part of agro-pastoralist life for generations' (ICG 2011, p.126).

Cattle raiding has distinctly different dimensions according to where it unfolds and the interests driving it. For example, although this used to occur on large-scale organized inter-communal basis in Terekeka, a series of

discussions between Lakes, Jonglei, and Terekeka has led to a notable reduction in those trends. Cattle-keepers from Terekeka report grazing further away from the other groups so as to avoid interface and confrontation with them. What does continue on a fairly regular basis is small-scale intra-tribal (Mundari) 'stealing' of cattle which is identified as something quite different than large-scale organized raiding.³³

Respondents from Kaopeta talk of a similar criminal element associated with cattle raiding, as opposed to raids being organized at a community level (which was 'the historic way'). A local observer explained that 'this is the decision of a few people; they run to steal cattle; they go and then they hide them; this is just stealing' (1M,Priest,Kapoeta). A group of Taposo men equally said, 'those youth; they are always there in the bush; they are there like criminals; they are provoking to make war so they can steal more cattle' (8M,Taposo village @school). From another perspective, others suggested that important people proactively incite such endeavours for the purposes of accumulating cattle themselves and/or benefitting politically in the chaos that results, thus giving what is fundamentally a meso-level form of violence, a macro level dimension. However, the macro level dimension is most clearly described in Bor.

8.1.4 Political Dimension in Bor

Cattle raiding in Bor is often seen through a political lens that ties it directly to the larger crisis. While claiming that 'the Murle are stealing our children and killing' respondents in Bor & Pariak noted that 'they do not try to capture our territory'. They account this more specifically to the Nuer, who along with the Mundari are rather seen as attacking 'on the basis of politics'. As one group of women stated, 'the Nuer are there as well, but their attacks are related to the crisis' (5F, at kiosk, Pariak). Although these threats are seen as less constant, one group reported that the Nuer had recently attacked the area, claiming that 'they want to capture a part of Bor County' (12M,Gang-Leader,Pariak).

8.1.5 Meso-Level Cattle Raiding

Alternatively, the cattle-raiding described in Kapoeta & Chukudum is located more distinctly in the meso space. It is primarily the youth who engage in cattle-raiding.³⁴ Most respondents describe cattle-keeper clashes as an *inevitable confrontation*, with contact between different groups inevitably leading to a violent conflict. For many it is understood that, when one group takes their cattle to another's land for grazing, 'these boys go hoping to grab cattle' (6F,2elders& 4 youth, Kapoeta). Especially men highlighted the objective, stressing that 'you must return your own cattle safely home; then you try to collect the cattle of the others' (4M,elders@market,Chukudum).

As a group of women explained, 'those boys expect the 'enemy' to raid their cattle so they try first; they know they will fight; people will be killed' (5F,IDP Margaret,Chukudum). When asked if they intend also to kill someone when he grabs the cattle, a group of elder Taposo men said 'yes he must do that automatically when he sees the enemy; otherwise they will grab our cattle' (8M,Taposo village @school). This in itself adds to the death tole, with a group of men readily admitting that 'he must kill you or you must kill him; this is just routine; it must be like this' (9M Napetait Village, Kapoeta). In this line, a group of armed youth confirmed that 'when we meet them, we cannot talk; they are the enemy; we can just use this one', pointing at his gun (12M,armedYouth, Chukudum). Although cattle-raiding takes place in the so-called meso space, which is

³³ A recent large-scale incident took place in which many cattle were stolen and the attackers were extremely well armed, leaving some wondering if this might be the start of a new trend towards the return of larger-sale raiding.

³⁴ 'Youth' is defined as 'those who are young enough to run after the cattle', being estimated at 15-35 or 45 years (depending on the group)

somewhat removed from the macro and the micro, consequent revenge attacks often bring the violence directly into the households of affected communities (discussed below).

8.1.6 Livelihood Clashes

In addition to the above mentioned clash observed in Lobonok between the cattle-keepers and the agriculturalist indigenous population, livelihood clashes are also identified (especially by women) as one of the most imminent security threats in Terekeka. This issue highlights the perpetual risk of cows eating farmer's crops. However, in this case, this clash also reflects a gender dimension.

Women claim that 'men no longer farm; farming is now the work of women; few men will help; they see this as hard and tedious; they prefer buying their food in the market' (6F, associated to cattle-camp, Terekeka). Another large group of women added that 'men don't want to farm; women just have to do it; women just have to struggle to provide for their children' (11F, 2nd Farmer group, Terekeka). On the other hand, cattle-keepers are exclusively male. Indeed, stating categorically that 'women have no responsibility for the cattle', a group of women associated with the Terekeka cattle-camp claimed that for men 'their cattle are like their children, their wives, their everything; they value cattle more than their households'. A group of women from Ikotos agreed that as women they believe that human life is most important, but that for their men, the lives of their cattle is the most important.

As such, the so-called livelihoods 'clash' depends on perspective. From the view of the male cattle-keeper, the inter-livelihood relations are based on mutually beneficial trading. As one group of male cattle-keepers said, 'we are here grazing; those ones who are farming are there; we exchange; their children take milk; we take crops' (10M cattle-camp, Terekeka). At the same time, the female farmers desperately claim that 'everyone has had their crops eaten; it happens every day' (7F, 1st Farmer Group, Terekeka). Indeed, stressing that 'you become fed-up; you become so angry; sometimes you hit the cow' a group of women farmers reported that 'the owner will come and you argue; he can beat you with a rope;³⁵ this can quickly grow into the level of a violent fight' (7F, 1st Farmer Group, Terekeka).

Underlining the very distinct power differentials, the male cattle-keepers were very clear that it is they, as the owner of the cattle, who determines the evolution of this problem by their response, explaining that 'those ones who only farm will be very angry; they might spear your cow; you will then become very angry; you must pay back; this will lead to someone's death; this happens very often' (10M cattle-camp, Terekeka). These power differentials also extremely prevalent in the micro spaces of the household.

8.1.7 Everyday Violence - Domestic Violence

Given the extent to which domestic violence is normalised, respondents in this study often failed to identify it as a form of violence that affects them. For example, women in a village near Lobonok said that 'quarrels are there; this is normal; there are incidents of you being beaten, but that doesn't stop the marriage' (15F under tree, Lawala). A group of women in Chukudum similarly explained that 'people have stress; a man can come home angry and the wife can talk and he can explode in anger; then fighting is there; this is normal' (6F, under MangoTree, Chukudum). Noting that 'it is there between men & women; between women & children' a mixed group of Taposá readily agreed that 'a man always comes home, whether drunk or not, asking for water or food; and when it is not there; he will beat his wife' (8F&4M, orient TaposáVillage, Kapoeta). Domestic violence is widely prevalent and is profoundly normalized.

³⁵ When asked if they knew of individuals who had been beaten in this manner, all respondents said no.

Unsurprisingly, perspectives varies dramatically according to gender. For example, while suggesting the problem of domestic violence is indeed quite rare, a group of reflective youth in Lobonok said that 'this is usually due either to alcohol & drunkenness; illiteracy on peaceful management; or they learned from their parents' (9M,youth, Lobonok). A group of men in Ckukudum added that 'when the woman neglects her household tasks; then some mistrust is there; there is no understanding between them' (4M,elders@market,Chukudum). When women are asked if they are beaten, they all too often laugh nervously and become very animated making beating gestures, readily stating 'yes!' For the majority of women in all areas visited, domestic violence is not a rare occurrence.

When asked why they continue to choose to beat their wives, a group of male youth from Kapoeta city said that the problem is that 'this one is a normal thing in the family; everyone is doing it'. However, taking this further, they explained that 'a woman is like a child; she must be disciplined' (4M,youth with SPLA guy, Kapoeta). A group of Taposa men from the village equally stated that 'we must do this because women are like children; they must be disciplined' (8F&4M, orient TaposaVillage, Kapoeta). Further infantilizing women, another group of youth stated that 'when a woman misbehaves, you must have her parents remind her that she must respect the husband' (4M&2F, Dadinga Youth, Kapoeta).

8.1.8 Hunger Causes Domestic Violence

When asked why men beat them, a group of women said 'because he is a man' (15F under tree, Lawala). Indeed, recalling the earlier assertion that 'a hungry man is an angry man', the majority of respondents emphasized the causal links between hunger and violence. A group of male youths in Lobonok agreed that 'bitterness comes from hunger; this causes problems in the household' (12M, youth, Lawala). A group of women equally observed that 'when the household has no food, the husband is angry; if he tries to quarrel and pressure you, you will get bitter; it is like fuel catching fire; but if you don't restrain yourself, then there will be problems; you'll be slapped' (15F under tree, Lawala).

In Terekeka, a group of women farmers equally emphasized hunger as a trigger of violence, explaining that 'if there is food we are happy; when there is no food, the woman tells the man to provide food; if he has a goat he can sell it; if he has nothing he gets angry; because of hunger, if there is no food people fight' (7F, 1st Farmer Group, Terekeka). Others added that 'with hunger, arguments catch like fire; if your husband hits you...the fighting is because of the hunger' (11F, 2nd Farmer group, Terekeka). In Pariak a group of male elderly & youth together agreed that when women ask men why they fail to provide food, 'there will be a quarrel; there will be slapping and beatings' (7M youth with 6M Elders, Pariak).³⁶ In Chuckudum, a group of women stated that 'with hunger, there is a lot of misunderstanding; if you ask the husband for money for food he will beat you; this is because he is the head of the family' (8F, Orientation, Chukudum).

What is important in this, is the ingrained presumed cause & effect, and the reflexive reliance on violence as the means of solving tensions and disputes. For example, when asked how this escalates, they explained that 'if someone tries to slap you, what do you do? You also slap...' (7F, 1st Farmer Group, Terekeka). When asked about the severity of this violence, it was only in Lobonok/Lawala that women claimed that such violence was relatively limited. Alternatively, even women from Bor Town agreed that 'sometimes this is very violent, even if not by every man; it can include beating with sticks, knives, and pangas' (5F,Restaurant, BorTown).

³⁶ This is always discussed with laughter because such issues are 'supposed to be a secret', especially to a foreigner (6M Elders, Pariak).

In Terekeka, they explaining that ‘they can use anything, they use sticks, ropes, or anything; you can see many women are in the hospital getting stiches because they have been beaten’ (6F,associated to cattle-camp, Terekeka). In Pariak, women agreed that when the husband fails to provide food for the family, they will usually ‘disagree with violence’, describing ‘exchanges with sticks’, with both beating the other. They added that ‘this is why women go to the clinic; they are often injured in these beatings’ (5F, at kiosk, Pariak). In Chukudum, women described the fighting as regularly including wrestling, kicking, boxing, biting and the use of sticks (8F, doing leaves,Chukudum), with another group explaining that ‘if you persist with questions, the husband can become wild; he can beat you until you are admitted into the hospital’ (5F,IDP Margaret,Chukudum).

When asked what purpose such a beating is supposed to serve, they responded that ‘men do not care about these things; they don’t care if they injure their women; he just goes away and drinks something with his friends; when he comes back he can just continue to beat you; you just struggle for your children’ (5F,IDP Margaret,Chukudum). When asked why men think it is acceptable to beat them, women in a Taposo village stressed that ‘this beating is not a good solution; we are not happy; but the man always says he must do it because he has paid’ (8F&4M, orient TaposoVillage, Kapoeta). A group of women associated with a cattle camp in Terekeka equally said it was ‘because they have bought their women with cattle; here when you are bought, they can beat you as they want; even kill you; it is because there are no repercussions; they know her father cannot pay these cattle back’ (6F,associated to cattle-camp, Terekeka).

When told what women say, men don’t deny this. However, in their defense, a group of elder men explained that ‘there are disagreements when men give orders and women violate them; when they are late, that is when there are fights; when you have told her and she is not listening; you can slap her; then tomorrow she is in line, doing what you want her to do’ (4M,elders, Lawala). Indeed, after first denying it, a group of Taposo men eventually claimed that ‘we must beat them when they misbehave; the woman must obey otherwise she will be beaten; this is so that she can try to be disciplined; she must accept what the man says’ (8M,Taposo village @school). Another group of men stated that ‘we have married women so they can get us food & water; when it is not there, we get angry; so we beat them; we beat our women so that tomorrow she will be motivated to do her work; tomorrow she will go and fetch the water’ (8F&4M, orient TaposoVillage, Kapoeta). Indeed, this is so deeply normalised, some women agreed that ‘men must beat their wives when they do something bad’, with ‘something bad’ equating with ‘not having water or food in the house’ (8F, Orientation, Chukudum).

Women respondents further noted that ‘if a woman refuses sex, he will say “but I have paid for this thing that you are refusing me”’ (8F&4M, orient TaposoVillage, Kapoeta). Men readily agreed that ‘when they refuse us sex we are angry; we want to have children; we want to reproduce; we want to develop; women are always causing us to beat them; it is always the women’ (8F&4M, orient TaposoVillage, Kapoeta). Even the city youth agreed that ‘if a woman refuses her husband sex, this will cause him to beat her; it is because the wife does not understand; she must be made to understand that I have paid cows for this’ (4M,youth with SPLA guy, Kapoeta). These same respondents further explained that ‘if the man comes home drunk, he can cause problems, but it is for the wife to control herself; she must keep quiet until the morning so she does not provoke the husband to beat her’ (4M,youth with SPLA guy, Kapoeta).

When asked if they think this will change, a group of women laughed ironically, saying that ‘if this was going to change it would have done so already’ (6F,associated to cattle-camp, Terekeka). Indeed, when asked what people would think of a man who does not beat his wife, a group of village women in Kapoeta asked ‘is there such a man?’ (5F Elders Napetai, Kapoeta)

When they were asked if men need equally to be beaten, a group of elderly men explained that women do not have the masculinity to beat men; they report to the brother; he will discuss with the husband; sometimes you feel guilty; you might even reflect' (4M,elders, Lawala). Others point out that 'the woman does not dare to fight her husband because then his whole family will fight her; the women fear this' (5F,Taposa village @school). Others highlight that the mother beats the children, and even that the elder children beat their parents.

8.1.9 Youth Beating Parents

Indeed, a trend that was somewhat evident in Napetai (greater Kapoeta) and very widely mentioned in Chukudum is that of youth beating their parents, especially those in their early 20s. As one boy of 24 years said, 'this is the culture that they do here; this is normal'. This violence takes on a variety of forms. A larger group of women equally agreed that 'this is very common here' (8F, Orientation, Chukudum). Indeed, respondents estimated the prevalence is somewhere between 10-25% of households in the area. It is explained that this is especially related to alcohol consumption. Most mature adults state that this is something new, suggesting that it is a result of the changing society; the changing environment; or the fact that people have been to other places (eg: Kakuma), 'making them resistant to the rules of the elders'.

Respondents in Chukudum readily acknowledged this trend. From a relatively positive perspective, one group of women explained that 'if the boy loves his mother, he can defend her against the husband; he can fight his father' (8F, doing leaves,Chukudum). However, in Napetai (Kapoeta) where similar trends were observed, a group of Taposa women specifically noted that from the age of about 14 years, 'the youth cannot respect the mother; they will not listen to her; they will beat her; they move with their age-mates; they listen only to them; they are now drinking alcohol' (13F; 11elders&2yough, Napetai).

More broadly, others in Chukudum noted that 'when the children ask for their rights and they don't get this, they must beat the parents' (8F, Orientation, Chukudum), with another adding that 'even those who want to go to school can threaten and beat the parents when they fail to provide the fees; these young ones have become the boss; but they are too lazy to help themselves' (5F,IDP Margaret, Chukudum).

Dowry was regularly associated with this problem, with one group stating that 'if a boy impregnates a girl and asks his father for dowry and the father fails to give it, he thinks he must beat him' (8F, Orientation, Chukudum). The Chief added that youth systematically battle their fathers for the control of their cattle resources, stating that 'as long as the fathers have the energy to fight, the youth see them as a threat; they think the father will try to steal their cows' (1M, staff, Chukudum). A group of women agreed that 'these things are there; when boys want to marry and the father cannot pay the dowry, they can even kill the father' (5F,IDP Margaret,Chukudum). Making this all too real, just prior to our meeting, the Chief of the area had been to a nearby village to deal with a case in which an armed youth had indeed killed his father over precisely this issue. The Chief explained that 'now, even over a very small dispute in the family, when a youth has a gun, he can just kill his father or mother' (1M, Chief, Chukudum). He added that alcohol has made these problems much worse.

Many respondents alluded to the fact that social control mechanisms are collapsing, including those in the household. While respondents stressed that 'children are supposed to listen to their parents', it was widely agreed that when this is not the case, 'parents cannot control their children' (8F, doing leaves,Chukudum). Many respondents emphasized that 'today the young men are undisciplined; they don't listen to their fathers; advice passes from one ear through to the other' (6F,associated to cattle-camp, Terekeka). Pointing to the collapse of traditional institutions, elder respondents noted that 'such behaviour was not there in the past;

misbehaving youth were disciplined within the community; there was a structure for doing so, but this is no longer there'. They especially stressed that 'parents cannot control the children when they have guns' (2M SpeakingEnglish,Chukudum).

8.1.10 Elder Versus Youth Conflict

If the household fails to control these boys, it is widely expected that 'the Chiefs are responsible to control these youth'. However, many agreed that 'armed youth cannot listen to the Elders', acknowledging that 'the Chiefs cannot manage these boys because they carry guns' (2M SpeakingEnglish,Chukudum). A group of women agreed that 'the Elders cannot advise these youth; the youth just say "these ones are very old; they don't know anything"; so the Elders are now powerless; these boys have their own leadership; they can only follow their age-mates' adding that 'with their guns, these boys think they are everything' (5F,IDP Margaret,Chukudum).

Two elder educated men identify two distinct categories of youth: 'those who have some education and can listen to the authorities; and those who have never gone to school and don't listen to the Commissioner, the Elders or their parents; these ones have guns and no authorities can manage them' (2M SpeakingEnglish, Chukudum). However, a local Chief saw this slightly differently, explaining that 'those youth who were away in the refugee camps received some small education; now they think they are superior to the Chiefs; they cannot listen; they undermine the Chiefs; but they are not violent'. He similarly laments 'those with guns; they have not had education but they think they are superior because they carry guns; these ones undermine the Chiefs even more intensively' (1M,Chief, Chukudum).

Many commentators have reported on the progressive erosion of social norms in South Sudan, specifically emphasising the erosion of traditional authority structure (McEvoy & LeBrun 2010, p.20; Reeve 2012, p.46). In this study, some Chiefs underlined an age-based conflict between the Elders and the Youth. More specifically, tensions are escalating between the youth as '*cattle grabbers*' and the Chiefs as the '*people responsible for resolving conflict*', with the Chief pointing out that the 'armed youth cannot agree with the Chiefs when they decide that the stolen cattle must be returned' to the rightfully owning communities. While this tension is escalating with the youths increasing disrespectful for the Chiefs, the lack of respect goes much deeper, with many observers agreeing that 'these youth don't respect life itself; they can just kill anyone just like that' (1M,Chief, Chukudum). A group of youth in Ikotos agree that cattle-raiders do not value their lives (3M, youth Ikotos).

BOX 10: LOBONOK: A CLEAR EXCEPTION:

Both the Chiefs and the youth report far more cooperative relations in Lobonok. The youth claim to think of the Chiefs 'as our fathers', saying that 'we create a fence of the Chiefs; we are the children of these ones; there must be respect', adding that 'if there are individual youths who disrespect the Chief, we penalise him (ie: cane him) (9M,youth, Lobonok). Another group of youth said that 'we are like the poles of the house; we have the energy to build the community' (12M, youth, Lawala). The Chiefs themselves refer to the youth as their force.

8.2 The State & Security Sector Actors

A state is generally understood to consist of the following elements: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.³⁷ With state-society relations being the foundation of any state, there is a widely held assumption that a 'social contract' exists, and that there is thus a binding agreement between state and citizen (OECD 2012, p.15). As such, the primary function of state, and indeed, its government is to protect the basic rights of its citizens (Brown 1999, p.104). However, this has been problematic in the case of South Sudan.

With the 2005 signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), and alleged end of the civil war, 'many influential commanders who fought one another during the civil war, and have long and brutal war records' constituted the GoSS and SPLA elites (McEvoy & LeBrun 2010, p.17). However, as much as rebel movements might rest on 'the laurels of revolutionary legitimacy' when transitioning into political actors and the national government, they often prove very incapable (Reeve 2012, p.54), as has been the case in South Sudan. Many agree that 'a profound lack of capacity' has hampered the Government of South Sudan's (GoSS's) struggle to develop accountable, democratic state institutions and to provide basic services (McEvoy & LeBrun 2010, p.18). Widespread anger over 'an exploitative, corrupt, unrepresentative, and ill-performing Juba government' (Almquist Knopf 2013, p.1), combined toxically and its inability to maintain law and order and provide meaningful governance and security (ICG 2011, pp.26–27), setting the explosive foundation for the December 2013 crisis.

8.2.1 Human Security & Security Sector Actors

The Programme defines Human Security as: *the absence of all kinds of violent acts against citizens, such as sexual violence, and other physical security threats, such as landmines*. In this sense, Fierke says that, at its essence, security is about the pursuit of freedom from threat (Fierke 2007, p.13). In most security frameworks, the state plays the primary role in ensuring this. Concretely, physical security is expected to be achieved through the 'core' security actors such as the armed forces, including the military and the police, as well as non-state security forces, and justice & law enforcement institutions (OECD 2007, p.5).

BOX 11: RANGE OF SECURITY ACTORS

- Security management & oversight bodies (MoD & internal Affairs, financial management bodies, public complaints commission, etc);
- Justice and law enforcement institutions (said to include judiciary, prisons, prosecution services, etc.)
- Non-state security forces (eg: private security companies, guerilla forces, private militia, etc.)

Many analysts have reported that, even before the current crisis, that the GoSS had been largely **unable to establish or maintain** law and order and provide meaningful security since the end of the previous civil war (McEvoy & LeBrun 2010, p.12; UNMISS 2014, p.14; UNSG 2013, p.17). With both the police and the military (SPLA) being seen as weak (especially in rural areas), under resourced, and **predatory** (Giffen et al. 2014, pp.15–16), it is also widely reported that the SPLA were one of the primary sources of security threats for the civilian population (Lokuji et al. 2009, p.5; see also: Almquist Knopf 2013, p.25). Reeve had further observed

³⁷ See the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the rights and duties of states, available at: <http://www.jus.uio.no/english/services/library/treaties/01/1-02/rights-duties-states.xml>

that as the movement that had been responsible for liberating South Sudan, ‘the SPLM and the SPLA see themselves as the rightful holders of power’ (Reeve 2012, p.30; see also: Almquist Knopf 2013, p.25). Indeed, this sense of entitlement was very observable prior to the re-eruption of war, leading to widespread disrespect, abuse and harassment of civilians by these actors. Indeed, emphasizing that the SPLA has long relied upon its coercive force,³⁸ a ‘well-entrenched mentality among many of the political and military elites that objectives are best achieved by using, or at least threatening the use of, force’ has been widely reported (McEvoy & LeBrun 2010, p.20; Almquist Knopf 2013, p.23). This reflects a process referred to as ‘militarization.

BOX 11: MILITARIZATION

Militarism is constructed around the basic idea ‘that armed force is the best to resolve conflict’ (Fierke 2007, p.196). Enloe describes militarization as a process in which militarism shapes more and more areas of more and more people’s lives with militaristic presumptions increasingly being seen both as valuable and normal (Enloe 2000, p.3). With people progressively accepting the idea that ‘might is right’, Burke explains that the process of militarization creates ‘an ideology of power’; this becomes a societal mind-set which is founded on the premise that the use of violence is an acceptable means of solving problems (Burke 2012).

Describing the formal legal system as ‘sparse’ with ‘extremely limited capacity’, Reeve argues that it has never ‘been within the capacity of the state to deliver justice comprehensively or uniformly’ (Reeve 2012, p.45; see also: Almquist Knopf 2013, p.23). Indeed, as a contributing element to the current conflict, UNMISS noted that ‘efforts to establish effective rule of law throughout the country have yielded limited results’ (UNMISS 2014, p.14). Further the culture of impunity is described as endemic, with observers arguing ‘that a culture of impunity and lack of accountability permeates the current climate’ in the country (FIDH 2014, p.23). Underlining that impunity ‘destroys trust across communities and in the government itself’ (Almquist Knopf 2013, p.6). With Call underlining that policing is considered critical because it is located ‘at the intersection human rights, justice and security’ (Call 2007, p.387),³⁹ Ignatieff stresses that ‘[w]ithout the basic institutions of a state, no human rights protection is possible’ (2003, p.65).

The profoundly weak institutional capacity translates into ‘the failure of the state to provide the goods, or to provide protection for its population’, leading to the fact that ‘the social contract is not working and individuals are often left to fend for themselves’ (Fierke 2007, p.43). This painful truth has long been visible in South Sudan. The absence and dysfunction of formal protective institutions has long required that people take ‘matters into their own hands’ (McEvoy & LeBrun 2010, p.18; Almquist Knopf 2013, p.24). This in itself fosters an anarchic environment, in which new forms of insecurity, fear, and threat are perpetuated (Malešević 2010, pp.315–16). However, in South Sudan, this builds on an extremely toxic history of violence.

Looking back to the transition from the previous civil war, analysts had speculated that the history of the previous that war would continue to profoundly impact South Sudan’s future (McEvoy & LeBrun 2010, p.9; ICG 2011, p.9). Civil war with the Khartoum regime immersed the people of southern Sudan in violence from 1956 to 1973 and again from 1982 to 2005. While the civilian population was pulled directly into the dynamics of violence along many lines, it was arguably the extreme south-on-south violence, particularly associated with

³⁸ Many refer to ‘Garang’s notoriously heavy-handed rule’ during the war (Jok & Hutchinson 1999, p.128).

³⁹ Obviously in South Sudan, those who actually protect human rights extends far beyond the police, with the Programme defining ‘Justice Providers’ as: all justice institutions (formal or informal) that can protect fundamental rights and/or have offenders tried or disputes settled.

the 1991 split within the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) that has left the most profound mark. During this 'intra-ethnic violence' warring factions are said to have 'turned their guns against each other's entire populations' triggering a downward spiral in which multiple warlords emerged, each preying upon one the other's populations, with Khartoum strategically fuelling this internal fragmentation (Almquist Knopf 2013, p.10; McEvoy & LeBrun 2010, p.13).⁴⁰ In this process, the various southern Sudanese factions armed their own ethnic groups in order to help them to protect themselves (Jok & Hutchinson 1999, p.134).

This in itself triggered yet another dynamic of violence, as the now armed youth recognized their 'newly acquired fire power' which they reportedly quickly began using to conduct cattle raids against neighbouring tribes, and to settle personal disputes within their own communities (Jok & Hutchinson 1999, p.134). The consequential micro-level violence that emerged as a result of the strategy of arming the civilian population, which fostered progressively escalating tit-for-tat cycles of violence, is said to have led to some of the worst atrocities of the civil war, establishing long-lasting inter-communal bitterness (McEvoy & LeBrun 2010, pp.13–14). It is this foundation that played an important role in perpetuating micro-level violence during the years after the CPA was signed.

Indeed, reportedly since 2009 the frequency and intensity of ethnic violence in South Sudan had been on the rise (Almquist Knopf 2013, p.4). In 2012 Reeve noted that such violence in 2011 had risen again sharply from 2010, exceeding 2009 which he described as 'the most violent year of the CPA period' (Reeve 2012, p.5). With ominous premonition, he underlined at that time that peace in South Sudan was 'neither comprehensive nor guaranteed' (Reeve 2012, p.12). And in late 2013, he was proven correct.

The ICG reports that when violence erupted allegedly over power struggles between President Kiir, and former Vice-President Machar in December 2013 'the SPLM and its army (SPLA) quickly split along divisions largely unaddressed from the independence war' (ICG 2014, p.i). Indeed emphasizing the fact that 'South Sudanese committed atrocities against one another' during the previous civil war, Jok as a South Sudanese himself, argued that the lack of accountability for these atrocities has left 'gaping wounds in the hearts and minds of so many citizens' (Jok 2014, p.1). The ICG described 'ethnic targeting, communal mobilisation and spiralling violence [that] quickly led to appalling levels of brutality against civilians, including deliberate killings inside churches and hospitals' (ICG 2014, p.i).

Indeed, numerous human rights reports underlined the extent to which the violence is characterized by the targeting of civilians. Underlining that 'from the very outset of the violence, gross violations of human rights and serious violations of humanitarian law have occurred on a massive scale' UNMISS emphasized that 'civilians were not only caught up in the violence, they were directly targeted, often along ethnic lines' (UNMISS 2014, p.2). Unsurprisingly, given that both the military and the police imploded and turned their guns on each other, the conflict was characterised by the failure that Government as well as of the opposition forces utterly failed to protect civilians from violence (UNMISS 2014, p.9). It is against this backdrop that respondents offer their perceptions of their government and security sector actors.

8.2.2 Government

In Bor, the Governor is present in people's imagination, with one group explaining that 'he calls leaders together to return cows and arrest criminals'. However, while underlining that 'there will be no peace until there is rule of law', a group of young men acknowledged that 'the police and the military are not really able to

⁴⁰ Jok & Hutchinson refer to these a "fratricidal conflicts" (Jok & Hutchinson 1999, p.129)

function; the government needs to be able to practice the rule of law'. Others added that 'the government used to be effective when people had fewer guns'.

The Commissioner has largely been absent from Chukudum since the October 2016 incident, having fled to Kapoeta when an acute episode of violence erupted at that time. He is nevertheless periodically referenced as having led various initiatives. As such, respondents complain that the government simply 'advises us to remain calm; they prevent us from following our cattle; but they return nothing to us; they can just advise us not to go raid' (4M,elders@market, Chukudum). Taking this further, observers also emphasize weak efforts on the part of the government to enforce decisions taken in local peace processes. As one respondent underlined, 'the government is not pushing to make these agreements hold; there are no consequences for the culprits who violate them' concluding that 'the government is not concerned with these issues; they see them as simple local concerns' (1M staff, Chukudum).

In Kapoeta, respondents agreed that 'the Government plays a big role here', explaining that 'when there are problems, they run to contact the NGOs to bring services' (8F&4M, orient TaposaVillage, Kapoeta). One group of Taposa village women said 'they are close to us; when we have a problem we rush to them; they try to help us' (5F,Taposa village @school). Nevertheless, although they expressed these reflexively positive attitudes, when pushed, they could seldom identify something the government had done concretely. Further, when asked about the difference between NGOs and the government, they added that 'its hard to see what the government does; the government delivers no services; the NGOs do that' (5F,Taposa village @school). Nevertheless, while some argued that the government should be the primary body promoting peace, others emphasized that 'first they must be in peace themselves; then they can concentrate on their civilians; now they cannot even call for peace' (8M,Taposa village @school). This same group equally underlined the hypocrisy of politicians disturbing citizens arguing that 'much of the on-going violence is incited by politicians' (8M,Taposa village @school). Others added that 'today many politicians incite people to destroy peace; or to work against peace' (3F,SPLA Captain, Kapoeta).

In Terekeka, two young urban youth claimed that their authorities are corrupt, stating this problem is especially escalating at the local level because no one is paying attention. When asked what they think the citizens think about this behaviour, they said that 'people will be angry; they will talk & talk; but they are helpless; who can they complain to when the leaders themselves are corrupt?' (2M, educated Youth, Terekeka). Others noted that 'it used to be that one chief was in charge of a large area; now there are many in charge of small areas; there are too many now; and each one has his own interests' (1M cattle-camp, Terekeka). As a senior observer pointed out, 'it is only the head-chief who receives a salary; the other chiefs must take their money where they can get it; they must charge fees for the services they offer' (1M, Pres, Terekeka).

In Lobonok, respondents are exasperated with the government and its lack of response, with a group of elder men stating that 'the government is doing nothing; now we think the government does not even exist' (4M,elders, Lawala). Indeed, most respondents claimed that 'these cattle keepers are not the owners of these cattle; they have political support; army generals have armed them'. On this basis, it was widely speculated that 'their objective is to chase the indigenous people away; they want to let their cattle graze on the farms; they want to settle here with their cattle' (1M,Senior Respondent,Lobonok).

Nevertheless, stating that 'it is for the President to find a solution to this problem' a local Chief explained that the Chiefs of the area had visited the former Chief of Staff (in 2011 he thought), but that individual was then removed from the office and that was the end of their case. They have since been unable to register a further official complaint. However, he noted that 'the President issued a decree stating that all cattle-keepers who

were grazing cattle in agricultural areas were to withdraw them and take them back to their places of origin. However, few or no cattle-keepers complied.

As a result, the Chief talks in a somewhat hopeless or resigned manner, stating that the Generals don't want the cattle to leave; we are being intimidated by armed militias; where now can we go to complain; if they are not even willing to receive your complaints; where can we go? (2M, Chief, Lobonok). A group of elder men reiterated that 'the people who came to kill us were from the government; they are defending the cattle keepers; they have killed us as civilians; do they not know about rights? (4M, elders, Lawala). A group of youth added that 'these ones were killed by the government' (12M, youth, Lawala). A local representative observed that 'now people think there is no difference between the cattle-keepers and the government; when they see the trucks of the government, they start to run'.

As a group of youth stated, their animals are grazing on our crops; we are being oppressed; but no one is caring for us; if you go there, they ask for a letter from the Chief authorizing you to move in that area' (12M, youth, Lawala). However, reiterating that 'we have no arms' the Chief from Lawala stated that 'despite the behaviour of the government, we still believe we are citizens of the nation; we still hope the government will respond' (1M, Chief, Lawala).

8.2.3 Security Sector Actors

In Lobonok, respondents report that there are no SPLA in the area (except those protecting the Vice-President who has his private home there). There is a police post, albeit some 10 KM away, and it is staffed with some 5 police. Reportedly, they deal with small cases of theft and rape, although people's perception is that they actually do very little. SPLA was formerly located in the zone, although respondents claimed that 'they always sided with the cattle-keepers'. In 2010-12, the SPLA moved out of the area, thus pitting the farmers in direct confrontation with the cattle keepers. Some local authorities claim that they are at this time trying to convince UNMISS to establish a base in the area. More specifically, a local Chief reported that UNMISS had recently agreed to escort the Dinka cattle keepers out of the area and back to their area of origin, but the cattle-keepers reportedly simply moved their cattle to another area in the zone, causing chaos as they relocated.

In Bor and Pariak people reported that 'the police are there; they are few outside of the town; in town they function; they intervene; they make arrests; they bring the perpetrator to book; they put culprits in prison'. In Pariak, people agreed that 'the police are few; we normally report incidents to them; they can help to patrol the area; but they do not go into the rural areas; they are limited' (5F, at kiosk, Pariak).

In Kapoeta, when asked if the police come when there are cattle raiding incidents, the answer is usually 'no', with one group underlining that 'they are only there in the town' (8F&4M, orient Taposavillage, Kapoeta). They nevertheless added that 'the police receive the report of every attack; it is there with them'. However, when commenting on what they actually do, the respondents stressed that 'they only stop us from going to get our cattle back; but they bring only some of our cattle back' (8F&4M, orient Taposavillage, Kapoeta). When asked why the police are not in the posts established for them, a Taposavillage Priest just laughed, explaining that 'they are located there, but there is no follow-up; they are not supported; they do not receive a salary or food; so they just return to the city' (1M, Priest, Kapoeta).

In Terekeka, respondents reserved judgement on whether the police are good or bad, rather seeing them as simply playing a role of 'stopping fights'. As one group of women said, 'if we see the police, we believe there

has been a fight; police only do something to the people who are fighting' (7F, 1st Farmer Group, Terekeka). However, while agreeing that 'the police are supposed to stop people from fighting' others added that 'they always demand money (500 SSP); the courts also ask at least 100 SSP' (12F, @milk market, Terekeka), thus emphasizing that such services are indeed only available to those who are able to pay.

With respondents suggesting that 'the police's approach is more moderate than the military; therefore the relations are more cordial', the local Chiefs claimed that 'the police are preferred for restoring law & order' (5M, Leaders, Terekeka). Indeed, some respondents associate the SPLA behaviour with the historic SPLA, explaining that as an extension of the liberation struggle, they were not professionalised and thus are associated with 'lawlessness, and poor discipline'. Nevertheless, the SPLA is widely described as being responsible for positioning themselves between ethnic groups that decide to fight each other. They reportedly only engage in the more 'personalized violence' (eg: that related to pregnancies; extra-marital sex; etc) if this fighting escalates to the level of deaths. Seen as avoiding any kinds of negotiations, the Chiefs said 'the SPLA is just for war; they are used to prevent unnecessary wars between cattle-keepers' (5M, Leaders, Terekeka). Others added that when the SPLA is involved, 'the intervention is inevitably more aggressive; they enter with bullets; there will be dead bodies' (1M, Pres, Terekeka). In this line, a group of women stated that 'we are afraid of these ones because they have guns; they are sent only when there is war' (7F, 1st Farmer Group, Terekeka). Others claimed that 'if the army gets involved, they make matters worse; things escalate quickly' (10M, cattle-camp, Terekeka).

8.2.4 Community Defense Forces

At the same time, it is widely recognised that 'the police cannot be quick responders, especially in the rural areas because they are in the centre; everyone must look for himself; you cannot count on the government; every household must defend themselves'. This is the basis for the community defense system which is described as being 'coordinated at village level; individuals are constantly watching for indication of stranger's movements; everyone listens for gunshots, when they hear this they grab their gun and go running to see what the issue is; there are some people who don't have guns so this system needs to protect them as well' (1M, Pres, Terekeka).

In Chukudum, people referred to a 'community policing' system devised by the Commissioner which comprises the armed local youth working with the Chiefs to patrol the local area. It is widely referred to as 'an alternative to the police' (8F, doing leaves, Chukudum). However, given that the Chiefs report being powerless in relation to armed youth and armed criminals, this system allegedly gives them more power – although there is an inherent contradiction in this claim. This is especially so given that many more youths were armed in relation to the above October 2016 incident. Although this 'force is likely to be pretty ad hoc and unruly, people nevertheless are fairly positive about it, saying that 'it is the community that is protecting us; the Chief has his youth with their guns; we are happy with these ones' (5F, IDP Margaret, Chukudum).

A similar auto-defense system is reported in Lobonok, which is said to comprise of poorly armed youth 'taking a stand for the community against out-side attacks' (9M, youth, Lobonok). The youth themselves claim to have no real arms, rather relying upon bows & arrows, while noting that 'those ones [ie: the cattle-keepers] are very well armed; we can just stand in there for the community; all of the youth will go; we can just make an attempt' (9M, youth, Lobonok). It is notable that the dynamics between the Chiefs and the youth in this case are dramatically more cooperative than reported in Chukudum. In Lobonok, the system is managed by the Chiefs and the leaders of the youth, with the Chief underlining that 'the youth are the force of the community; if they are told that there is something; they can act on instructions' (1M, Chief, Lobonok). The youth agreed that they

check with the Chief before acting (9M,youth, Lobonok). The Chief in neighbouring Lawala added that 'we are a community; we can respond together', although he added that 'we are weaker in terms of arms' (1M, Chief, Lawala).

8.3 Men Abandoning Women & Children

A significant number of women respondents reported that they are singularly raising their children, stating that 'the men are not contributing' (15F in market, Terekeka). However, while tradition says they should still be responsible for the former family, the vast majority of the women interviewed stated that 'men do not have the energy; women do; women are responsible for the children; men are irresponsible' (15F in market, Terekeka). Another group of women associated with a cattle-camp added that 'men are concerned with cattle; they do not concern themselves with the household; the household is the single responsibility of the women; the women are responsible for the children; you must struggle for your children; it is you the woman who feels the pain of the children; the men do not; they are just with their cows; because they have milk and meat they do not suffer with hunger' (6F,associated to cattle-camp, Terekeka). In this sense, many explained that as a result of polygamy, men tend to take a new wife after their current one has had 2-3 children.

8.3.1 Currency Crisis

This abandoning of families is seen as an escalating trend. Many people in Bor mentioned the impact of the currency crisis, with a group of youth explaining that 'life was better before the 2013 problems; now there is little in the market; the currency has collapsed; people can't afford things; now life is at a stand-still' (7M, youth@restau, Bor Town). They tie the currency collapse directly to the Juba crisis. City youth in Kapoeta readily admitted that the current economic dynamics have left the man with few resources, making them frustrated' (4M,youth with SPLA guy, Kapoeta).

Many women have also noted the currency &/or economic crisis, stating that 'if you ask the husband for food, he says he has no money; if you insist to ask the question, then they will beat you' (6F,associated to cattle-camp, Terekeka). Indeed, in Terekeka, they take the analysis further, pointing out that the currency collapse has especially affected those who rely on the cash-economy (ie: men). One group of women contrasted this with their largely subsistence approach to food security, stating that 'men don't want to find their own food; they are always looking for cash;⁴¹ they rather want to buy their food in the market'. They suggested that this trend is worsening, stating that 'now the money is worthless, men are hopeless; they cannot get a job; now women shoulder it all' (15F in market, Terekeka). A group of farmer women complained of very similar trends, stressing that 'men are looking for money, but none of it comes back to the household' (11F, 2nd Farmer group, Terekeka). Indeed, many women suggested that 'they keep this money for themselves; they do nothing for their families'. A senior local male observer agreed that 'currently men run away and try to collect what little money they can; but they keep this for themselves' (1M, Pres, Terekeka).

Today, the men get so little money for their efforts, they are understandably frustrated. However, this is leading to a dramatic fracturing of the family at the micro level. Women are now reporting that 'men used to be able to provide but now with the money problems (ie: currency crisis) they are unable; if you ask, he just goes away; if you persist, he will beat you' (11F, 2nd Farmer group, Terekeka). Others report that 'they are abandoning their wives and children; they are going elsewhere (esp. Juba) to search for more money; even if it is not there' (6F,associated to cattle-camp, Terekeka).

⁴¹ Some respondents speculated that it is the NGOs that have created this change because they are seen as being responsible for introducing the cash economy.

Women are extremely critical of these men, with a group of women at a milk market stating that 'today husbands are not responsible; they are lazy; they make the woman pregnant and they run away from their families; they leave the women with all the responsibilities; the men are only good for making the baby; the women have to bear it all; we must pay school fees; women go to the forest to find food; we sell firewood in the market' (12F, @milk market, Terekeka). A group of elder women also indicated disappointment, stating that 'we see today, our sons are not providing even for us elderly ones' (2F elderly within 6F, associated to cattle-camp, Terekeka).

Largely concurring with this, a senior male respondent agreed that 'this problem is now there; this never used to happen'. He tied these erosive trends to the fact that 'there were fewer cattle; marriage was 5-10 cattle before, not the 50-100 of today', adding that all of this is exacerbated by the fact that 'the previous war has fostered a lack of discipline among the youth of today; the young men were not trained well in social values; they have no respect for fellow human beings' (1M, Pres, Terekeka).

Importantly, the Chiefs of Terekeka were not sympathetic to these claims. When asked about women being abandoned, the Chiefs laughed, stating that 'this is the way of our life; if you have resources to do so, you get yourself another wife'. As such, they claimed that while men take on new wives, they do not abandon their former wives & children. They also stated that since they had not received reports of any such cases (except widows who had been abandoned), they doubted that they exist. They said that 'if these cases were reported, we would not ignore them; if these women complain to us, we will do something; we can call the family'. (5M, Leaders, Terekeka).

However, women readily explained why they don't bother to report their plight to the Chiefs. Firstly it costs money to make such a complaint. The women have made clear choices, stating that 'if I have that money, I am going to use it to pay for my children, I am not going to give it to the Chiefs; secondly if I make such a complaint I will be beaten badly at home; and thirdly, we believe the Chiefs are protective of these men, they will agree with them; they are biased; we just keep these problems to ourselves as women'.

8.4 Gendered Perceptions of Leadership

Gender relations are often expressed most fundamentally in terms of power dynamics. As such, gendered perceptions and biases are readily exposed when discussing issues of leadership. To get at this, we first discussed the notion of leadership in generic terms in order to understand what characteristics people think are generally important in their leaders.

A Chief near Lobonok explained that 'a good leader is responsible; social; with problem solving skills; a confrontational one isn't good' (1M, Chief, Lawala). A group of elder men added that 'he cannot be hateful; he must be someone you look up to; someone who is convincing; has good ideas; is well informed and is not afraid to speak' (4M, elders, Lawala). Many respondents highlighted the importance of 'commitment' in their leaders (5F, evening, Bor). For example, the young woman above suggested that 'people want to be leaders for different reasons; only some fight for the good of their people and their country; some are just greedy; some just want to be important; some are just there; they are not caring about they people; they do not think about things like safety; or education; they are not committed' (1F, speaking English, Pariak). Others highlighted the aspect of respect, with one man explaining that 'a man can be the leader of the country when he looks after his household well; he will be respected based on the management of his household; if I manage the household well, people will respect me' (1M, Vet, Bor town).

When asked if they would prioritize strength or intelligence in their leaders, the Chiefs said that ‘today, people respect wisdom more and more; reflection and wisdom is important in leaders because it helps prevent problems; if there is no wisdom, people will just continue to fight’ (5M, Leaders, Terekeka). However, observers were split. For example, as one senior male observer stated, ‘people don’t approach matters with their brain; they just want to use violence’ (1M, Pres, Terekeka), others argued that while ‘many people value someone who is very strong and arrogant as someone who can defend you’; it is increasingly the case that ‘today people also look for someone who can speak well; leadership is more & more about intelligence’ (2M&2F, Partner, Terekeka). Others agreed that intelligence is more important than physical strength, with one group stating that ‘someone can be small but still a good leader; intelligence is the most important’ (8F&4M, orient TaposaVillage, Kapoeta).

Women highlighted characteristics such as speaking clearly; not fearing; being educated abit; being convincing when they speak. Various respondents described the respected characteristics as being: committed; God fearing; a good communicator; convincing; reasonably literate; and having an ability and interest to reconcile disputes. Others added the characteristics of: being articulate; having good words; communicating well; being active and participating in social issues; having the following of others, with women explaining that ‘if she demonstrates success, people will observe this and have confidence in her and she will have more opportunities’.

They added that the process of selecting women leaders includes observing her conduct in her household, with women explaining that such women are selected according to their household circumstances (ie: does she have a responsible daughter to pick-up her duties if she must be away) and how she behaves/conducts herself in that context. A group of women in Pariak agreed with this, explaining that ‘women leaders are there; this one knows how to speak; she is up-right; she is a good role model; she takes good care of her family (5F, at kiosk, Pariak).

However, the following dialogue illustrates some perceptions regarding the real potential for women to play a leadership role as understood from the perspective of a group of male cattle-keepers in Terekeka.

BOX 12: GENDERED DIMENSIONS – PERCEPTIONS OF LEADERSHIP

Gendered Dimensions – Perceptions of Leadership

CH: Can women be leaders?

Male Respondent (MR) from within the cattle camp: they are not there.

Female Respondent (FR) from within the cattle camp: Here in the coral; women are there, they have something to say (ie: the potential is there); but they are suppressed by the men; the men say ‘you are just a woman; you have nothing to say’.

CH: What are the responsibilities of women?

MR: the woman doesn’t have any responsibilities; she is just to be married; she is to give birth.

CH: What happens if she wants to take responsibilities?

MR: How can she do this (ie: how could it be possible?) No woman is supposed to be given responsibility because she has been bought; a man pays 50-100 heads of cattle; the authority lies with me the man.

CH: do women agree?

Youth FM: that is the way of life here; we have just to accept it

Adult FR: it depends on the how strong the woman is; it depends on the context; urban men accept; women leaders are there in the town; I have seen them; but in the rural areas if you keep pushing they will beat you; they can even kill you. I myself am a leader but what can I do if the men don’t allow me.

Alternatively, a mixed group Taposa respondents reported that 'women leaders are there; they can be chiefs; NGOs come and select them as leaders; they are there' (8F&4M, orient TaposaVillage, Kapoeta). The men in this group readily agreed that 'women are good leaders; they have that soft kind of voice; when they are sent to the Governor to do something for the community, they will defend to community and talk until something good comes out' (8F&4M, orient TaposaVillage, Kapoeta). Taking this further, when a small group of educated urban youth in Terekeka were asked if women can lead, they readily said 'we have many male Ministers who are doing nothing; why don't we let the women have a chance in these ministries to see if they can do something' (2M, educated Youth, Terekeka). In Lorema a group of male respondents agreed that women 'can take decisions as long as it is a good one' (22M, youth, Lorema)

Indeed, some men agreed that it is possible for women to be leaders, pointing out that 'female Chiefs are there in the rural area; they are given these roles based on their actions that others have observed; based on their behaviour in their households; they must have good communication skills; they have a fair heart' (1M, Vet, Bor town). This respondent went on the claim that women leadership is unique 'because they have that kind heart; this is also according to the bible; they have the heart of forgiveness; they don't keep conflict (eg: revenge); they can discuss and then forget the problem' (1M, Vet, Bor town).

On this basis, although they largely agree that 'the potential for women leadership is there', women themselves remain dubious about their prospects for undertaking leadership roles. For example, when asked if women can be leaders the young English speaking woman in Pariak stated 'yes' as though this is very obvious, nevertheless adding 'maybe not here in Pariak because here the rights of women are not really existing; women are not given their rights by the men; they can't get the opportunity to lead' (1F, speaking English, Pariak).

Other women emphasized that 'men do not necessarily listen to women leaders because they have different responsibilities; women leaders deal with their own affairs; they are responsible for settling disputes among women (esp: at the water hole); if this doesn't succeed then men intervene and try to stop it from becoming a bigger problem' (5F, at kiosk, Pariak).⁴²

In this sense, in Lawala, the Chief said that 'women are not there in his counsel, but they lead on their own issues; women talk to women, especially those who are stubborn, the woman leader will talk to them' (1M, Chief, Lawala). He agreed that, in theory women can play a much larger role, but that 'society deters them', explaining that 'women are kept away from these processes so they fear to participate; as such they turn down the offer', although he equally added that 'their husbands usually prevent them' (1M, Chief, Lawala). The same Chief nevertheless claimed that 'women's contributions are bigger than people realise' (1M, Chief, Lawala).

On the Question of constitutional requirements that women represent 25% of the government roles country-wide, the Terekeka Chiefs explained that this was not there in Terekeka because 'the place here in Terekeka is hot & violent; we cannot have women involved because the youth will intimidate them; they will beat them; we need to be big men so that we can dominate these youth' (5M, Chiefs, Terekeka). This leads us to the question of what constitutes leadership.

⁴² This group of women claim to have never seen such an escalation.

Indeed, a group of women in Terekeka also lamented that ‘women can have nothing to do with leadership; she can only do her own things like working in the market; and how she works in the household’. Others added that ‘to nominate a woman to be a responsible is not possible; men cannot accept this; it cannot be allowed’ adding that ‘even if we participate with men; men keep all the decision-making’. Other women in Terekeka equally complained that ‘we women are just here; we are oppressed; the men want themselves to be the ones speaking; they want to remain the ones deciding’.

In this line, in Lobonok, male respondents tentatively agreed that ‘*some* women are intelligent; these ones have the potential to be leaders’. A group of youth added that ‘what women think is sometimes equal to that of men’ (12M, youth, Lawala). However, when asked if women get nominated for leadership positions, these men made the excuse that ‘life here is not like that in urban areas; the problem is that women prefer their families; they cannot dedicate enough time to community matters so men do not nominate them’ (4M, elders, Lawala). Others further explained that they are not elected because ‘for time immemorial, it has been happening like it is today; we are just following precedents that exist; these ones have been set long ago’ (12M, youth, Lawala).

More generally, women point out that ‘we cannot get a job with other men; the husband always suspects that the wife will be engaging in sexual relations with these men’ (5F, at kiosk, Pariak). In this, women understand very clearly that the issue at hand is not this, but rather the underlying power dynamics. They explain this on the basis that ‘men are jealous; they want to pin the women down so that we will miss such opportunities’ (5F, at kiosk, Pariak). While explaining that ‘the culture will continue to prevent us from rising to the office of the men’, others stressed that ‘women must accept this; they must fear their husbands; it is the husbands who decide if the woman can have a role outside the house because he is the ‘supreme leader of the household; the husband must always be consulted’ (5F, Restaurant, BorTown).

Lamenting the fact that ‘women have no freedom’, another group of women in Terekeka complained that ‘men select who the women leaders are’ arguing that ‘it needs external people to come and choose the women leaders’ (12F, @milk market, Terekeka). When asked why they can’t do this themselves, she explained that ‘if it is done internally, men will fight you; they will sing against you;⁴³ they will say you are trying to ruin the women and our cultural ways; they can accept that the women should be there; if it is from the outside, men will fear it; they will only accept the outside decision’ (12F, @milk market, Terekeka).

Indeed, noting that ‘traditionally, women are not seen as important; they are just supposed to bring cows into the household’ a senior observer explained that ‘when people hear a woman speaking clearly and sensibly and with authority, they are confused by this (ie: this is such an anomaly); they are so surprised, they can just listen to her’ (1M, Pres, Terekeka). This creates a largely untapped potential in peacebuilding in the operational area.

8.4.1 Women’s Role in Peacemaking

Women are obviously very aware of the fact that their sons are at risk in conflict dynamics, with one group saying that ‘they are there fighting now; now we are just hoping that our sons are still alive; we are worried that our children will be killed’ (8F&4M, orient Taposavillage, Kapoeta). However, women are systematically very clear that they have no voice in the decision to fight or make peace. As one group stated, ‘no one is talking to women about making such decisions; no one includes the women; so no one is advising the youth to stop fighting’. When asked what they could add if they were included such decisions, they were very apprehensive.

⁴³ This refers to the chants that men develop. Women have been named in such songs and thus shamed. The songs often spread widely, thus she is widely shamed.


One group of Taposa women explained that ‘we do not have an opinion on the option to fight; that is a decision of the men; women don’t think about the Buya or the Dadinga in this way; this is for the men to think about; women only think about feeding the children’ (4F,AgTaposa@house). Another group suggested that ‘we cannot decide alone because we are just women; if someone can allow us we can talk; we can advise; but now we cannot talk, they cannot allow us to do this’ (13F; 11elders&2yough, Napetait).

Nevertheless, from a slightly more critical perspective another group of women said ‘we wonder what is wrong with these children; why do they want to always be fighting; in the villages they think they **must** be grabbing cattle; in the city they are always trying to grab money & power’ (6F,2elders& 4 youth, Kapoeta).

8.4.2 Participation

This is so in relation to dialogue processes as well, with a group of Taposa village women in Kapoeta explaining that ‘we have attended dialogues, but we have not participated; women have no voice in this; only men and the government are responsible’ (6F,2elders& 4 youth, Kapoeta). Another group of Taposa women explained that they have also attended such, but explained that ‘you stay far away; you can only go to listen to what the men are saying; women have no role in this’ (4F,AgTaposa@house). Another group from Napetait agreed that ‘it is only men discussing; women can say nothing; men cannot allow the women to speak’ adding that ‘women also worry that they might spoil the decision that the men are making’ (5F Elders Napetait, Kapoeta). It is interesting to consider this in relation to Arnstein’s ladder of participation.⁴⁴ In this case, the level of women’s participation remains at level 2-3, which equates largely with ‘non-participation’.

One group of women gave the impression that they did actually participate and were actually able to advise they sons to stop the fighting and revenge, however, they added that both men and the youth disagreed with them (13F; 11elders&2yough, Napetait). Indeed, the fear on the part of men is that women will denounce their violent habits in general. In this line, a staff member cited the situation of a woman from Kapoeta North who is regularly called upon to represent women because she is a clear and convincing speaker. However, in one case she reportedly spoke against cattle-raiding in general and after the fact, her husband berated her badly. She is now reportedly afraid to continue in her leadership role due to fears of beatings by the husband.



Nevertheless, observers agree that women have a particular role to play in these efforts, suggesting that ‘the youth can listen to women; they cannot listen to men because they become reactive; but they cannot do something against the women; as such it is time to let the women lead these efforts; the men & the government have failed to find solution; now it is time to give the women a chance’ (1M,staff,Kapoeta).

Many people agreed that such processes do not last. As a Taposa Priest explained that ‘when it becomes too much, they seek peace; they come to the government to reconcile them; but one month passes and gain you see them fighting; the spoilers of peace have again started the problems’ (1M,Priest,Kapoeta). Others agreed that ‘this does not last; people always resort back to fighting; we are always left wondering why people are killing each other’ (5F Elders Napetait, Kapoeta).

⁴⁴ Please see: Arnstein, S. (1969). A Ladder of Citizen Participation. JAIP, Vol. 35, No. 4, pp. 216-224.

Most pointed to the failure to implement decisions agreed upon. A group of Taposa men added that ‘there is no help from the government to enforce the decisions taken; police should manage the grazing places; there should be police posts there; the government should open markets’ (8M, Taposa village @school). This is especially so in the current context with one group of men stating that ‘the government keeps crying about peace; but now with the government fighting inside itself; it is now too weak; it can’t follow these battles; it cannot help us here’ (8M, Taposa village @school). In fact, in some cases people suggested that ‘it is only the government who wants such a process’ (8M, Taposa village @school). From another perspective, many pointed to politicians themselves being the spoilers. A group of women associated with the SPLA said that ‘dialogue processes do not work because important politicians always try to manipulate them; they incite people; they try to destroy the peace’ (3F, SPLA Captain, Kapoeta). Others added that ‘when we decide on peace, it is ruined by the politicians who incite people calling for revenge’. From another perspective, another group added that ‘if you decide to stop fighting, the enemy will come and steal all your cows’ (9M Napetai Village, Kapoeta). However, violence does not only manifest on this inter-trial level. Extreme violence also unfolds within the household.



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