Governance

The implementation of the R-ARCSS is stalled, as the parties have had difficulty gathering sufficient momentum to push the Agreement forward.
The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic has had serious negative impacts on the ability of the parties to implement the Agreement.
The crush of oil prices in the global market, South Sudan’s lack of credit worthiness internationally, US Treasury’s warnings, corruption, and South Sudan’s weak fiscal and monetary policies, all make it difficult for the country to access external resources to cushion budget shortfalls.
While the economic downturn as a result of the pandemic has dried up the public coffers, a combination of distrust among the parties and lack of political will is the most important factor hampering the implementation of the R-ARCSS.
To turn things around, leadership of the parties to the Agreement must renew their commitment to the Agreement and show by actions their willingness to move the country forward, possibly attracting external budgetary supports.
The international community needs to push the parties to live by their commitments and also contribute necessary financial and material resources to enable the parties to overcome the economic consequences of COVID-19. Significant donor reengagement will require evidence of significantly higher political will for peace in South Sudan.
The formation of state government is extremely critical to combating the pandemic and to restoring peace at the grassroots, which will help protect people from the virus and reduce cattle raiding and communal violence. Recent developments toward this issue are commendable.
Provisions aimed at returning to democracy and good governance such as election and constitutional making processes should be expedited and started early so as to build confidence in this transition. The parties to the Agreement blame current deficits in democracy and governance on COVID-19.
Should the parties fail to implement governance protocols fully, the potential for national elections to be conducted will have been thwarted, risking a return to an all-out war.

Focusing on South Sudan’s borderland with Sudan, in Northern Bahr el-Ghazal, it is clear that the national response to the virus, particularly the border shutdown, has rapidly become a new factor in Sudan and South Sudan’s cross-border political economy. The direct impact of COVID-19—like the consequences of Khartoum’s political transition and the establishment of the Transitional Government of National Unity in Juba—are yet to fully materialize in this borderland. This update summarizes the current political holding pattern around both COVID-19 and the political transitions in Khartoum and Juba, and how these interact with established long-distance trade and migrant work systems that drive the borderland economy.

This briefing is a product of the X-Border Local Research Network, a component of DFID’s Cross- Border Conflict—Evidence, Policy and Trends (XCEPT) programme, funded by UKaid from the UK government. The programme carries out research work to better understand the causes and impacts of conflict in border areas and their international dimensions. It supports more effective policymaking and development programming and builds the skills of local partners.

This article draws on empirical data collected in Yei River County, South Sudan, to contribute to debates on hybrid governance in Africa. Current literature offers a limited understanding of the practical workings of hybridity, and particularly of whether and under what circumstances hybridity may meet the interests and solve the problems of citizens. This article discusses how subsequent historical attempts at state-building have left a complex and layered governance system and analyses how this system functions on the ground in Yei River County, focusing on the land and justice sectors. The empirical analysis reveals institutional development to be ongoing and to be shaped through continuous negotiations among local stakeholders. Whilst in the land sector, this process produced power imbalances and violence, in the justice sector, unexpected institutional cooperation improved access to justice for local citizens. Important factors in determining these institutional outcomes have been what we have termed the two P’s: pragmatism and power.

Prophets—those recognised as having been ‘seized’ by a divinity—have played an important role in the history of South Sudan, particularly that of the Nuer people. They were seen as being powerful political actors and, alongside chiefs, important intermediaries for the colonial authorities. However, the influence of the Nuer prophets goes much further than mobilizing or de-mobilizing the Nuer population to or from violence. In the UN Protection of Civilians Site (POCS) in Bentiu, where over one hundred thousand war-displaced now live, the histories of the prophets have become a means through which POCS residents explain both the spiritual causes of war and their current predicament.
Speaking Truth to Power focuses on the life of Kolang Ket—a major prophet in the early twentieth century. His story, as recounted in the Bentiu POCS, includes his seizure by the deity known as MAANI, how he has wielded political authority and his legacy, which extends to the present day. Acknowledging the influence of the prophets is important to those trying to understand the contemporary political reality of South Sudan. This, by extension, can help external actors to assist the South Sudanese population in shaping a more sustainable, locally relevant peace, which goes beyond the fragile elite deals normally agreed by the country’s politicians.

Improved security and access to justice are urgent priorities for the people of South Sudan, who have been targeted by government and opposition forces since the beginning of the civil war in December 2013, and affected by violence between and within communities.

A variety of groups and institutions aim, or claim, to provide people with security and justice, from the police, military and courts, to customary leaders and the armed opposition. As most people cannot rely on the government for protection, they often have taken security into their own hands by forming armed community defence groups.

This report explores how the various providers of security and justice have responded to violence associated with the civil war, intercommunal conflict, and gender-based violence in Torit and Kapoeta, south-east South Sudan. It asks to what extent the security and justice providers are effective, inclusive, and whether people see them as legitimate. The report aims to inform efforts to enhance people’s security and access to justice.

The report emphasises the role of community defence groups who, in many parts of South Sudan, have been drawn into the civil war and become involved in large-scale violence, as is documented in Saferworld’s 2017 ‘Informal armies’ report. However, this subsequent report shows that elsewhere in the country, such groups have resisted involvement in the war, and have facilitated dialogue and cooperation between the government and armed opposition, and provided security for communities.

The January 2011 referendum on self-determination could result in Sudan’s partition, and the country’s North-South border may ultimately become the world’s newest international boundary. The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended two decades of civil war called for the border between the North and the semi-autonomous South to be demarcated within six months. Five years later, the task remains incomplete. The sooner the parties break the border deadlock the better, though the process need not necessarily be completed prior to the referendum as Khartoum has argued previously. Furthermore, a solution to the border is about not only drawing a line, but also defining the nature and management of that border and the future relations of communities on both sides. A “soft” boundary is ideal, one backed by a framework for cross-border arrangements and, if necessary, safeguarded by a joint monitoring mechanism. Progress toward both demarcating and defining the border will prevent it from becoming a source of renewed conflict in the post-CPA era.

In this review, we analyze the recent decision by President Salva Kiir Mayardit to reinstitute the ten states system of governance in South Sudan. We focus our attention on reactions from the stakeholders of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS), the public, the region, and international community, surveying the moods of those involved. We also examine the repercussions of, and implications associated with the decision. The main question we examine is whether the decision could potentially restore peace or latently produce additional troubles than is intended, extending instability. The president’s subsequent speech lends hopes for peace, suggesting that the decision could restore peace in the country, depending on how the underlying grievances are handled during the tenure of the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGONU). That is, the value of this decision is predicated upon the extent to which the RTGONU handles the fundamental matters of security, governance, service delivery, and justice, an achievement of which could not be attained absent of measured reforms

Availability of accurate and up to date data and information on land and different land uses, such as agriculture, forestry, mining, wildlife, water, housing and infrastructure, is critical to effective land governance and crucial for planning and managing the use of land and land-based resources. Public institutions and the government need land data and information for appropriate and timely decision-making; while land users, the general public and other stakeholders need it to effectively monitor and influence those decisions. Land data and information is also critical for effective tracking of land policy implementation processes to inform lesson learning and generate good practices, as well as to ensure sustainable and equitable land investments.
It is an often-repeated rhetoric that there is a lack of land data; either there is no data or the data that exists is unreliable or out of date. Collecting new data is a time-consuming and costly process. Data is collected and captured on a massive scale already, but research shows that of all existing data worldwide, less than 1% is actually analyzed and digested. With increasing digitization of information, increased use of internet in all parts of the world, and continuously growing demand for more data, the risk is that existing data is either purposely cast aside (as the source may be from outside our trusted networks) or simply overlooked. The current reality of land data is that in many par ts of the world, data remains inaccessible, fragmented, poorly managed or simply unusable.

With this State of Land Information Report, the authors seek to provide an overview of publicly available data and information on key land issues, from not only government, but also other sources. The aim of the research is to uncover the many different sources of land data and information at the country-level and help to identify actual data and information gaps, with a view to establishing a baseline for targeted ‘information-based’ interventions to improve the information ecosystem. What sets this research apart from other monitoring initiatives, is that the focus is on the database or dataset and its sources; the value or content of the information is not our main focus. The authors’ belief is that data quality, accuracy and reliability lies in the judgement of the user. For the very first time, the authors look at the entire landscape of a country to see trends and gaps when it comes to land data collection, as well as how accessible it is on the world wide web. The State of Land Information report concludes with -where necessary- concrete recommendations to data and information providers to improve their data sharing practices, to help establish a functioning, inclusive and democratized ecosystem of data.

Addressing the legacies of mass human rights violations is a daunting task for any society emerging from conflict. The challenges are all the more complex in South Sudan, where people have struggled with civil wars, state repression, and developmental neglect for generations. With the current conflict, transitional justice – or the range of judicial and nonjudicial measures that countries emerging from a period of conflict or authoritarian rule use to address past human right violations – has come onto the agenda for the first time. However, the foundational elements that are required for transitional justice interventions to succeed are lacking. Political leaders are largely uninformed about the role that transitional justice can play in restoring peace, and some are deeply uncomfortable with the notion of scrutinizing and holding people accountable for wartime abuses. Survivors are conspicuously absent from discussions about how best to address the legacies of the conflict, and human rights advocates are confronted with an ever-shrinking civic space. Moreover, there are real fears that the tense peace that currently exists among most armed groups could collapse at any moment and the country could return to full-scale civil war.

The uncertainties of the current situation make it all the more important for South Sudanese to develop a carefully considered plan for transitional justice that identifies priorities and sequences activities in a manner that sustains and builds momentum over time. Most importantly, transitional justice interventions must be tailored to the context and designed and implemented in a manner that is meaningful to South Sudanese. Transitional justice in South Sudan will be a generational undertaking. While the current generation may not realize the full rewards of their efforts, it is nonetheless incumbent upon us to begin the process and establish a strong foundation that subsequent generations might build upon.

Conflict and humanitarian crises increase the risk of both intimate partner violence and non-partner sexual violence against women and girls. The authors measured the prevalence and risk factors of different forms of violence against women and girls in South Sudan, which has suffered decades of conflict, most recently in 2013.