Year of Publication
2010
Institution/organisation
International Crisis Group
NGO associated?
✖
Summary
South Sudan is just eight months away from a self- determination referendum that will likely result in its secession from the North. Much remains to be done to implement the outstanding elements of Sudan’s Compre- hensive Peace Agreement (CPA), and time is running out. The agreement’s underlying aim of “making unity attrac- tive” has failed, and most Southerners thus appear deter- mined to choose independence. Neighbouring states are increasingly focused on the fragile circumstances in Sudan and the likelihood of a newly independent state in the region. Support from Sudan’s neighbours for the referen- dum process and respect for its result will be crucial to ensuring peace and stability in the country and the region.
Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Egypt are among the im- mediate regional states that matter most, as well as Eritrea and Libya. If a credible referendum is held in accordance with the CPA and the Interim National Constitution, and Khartoum endorses the process, recognition of a new Southern state should prove relatively uncomplicated for the region and CPA signatories more broadly. If, how- ever, the process does not go according to plan – particu- larly if Khartoum attempts to manipulate, deny or delay the exercise or its result – regional states and institutions will need to consider how best to respond to ensure re- spect for the CPA and the right of self-determination and to avoid a new conflict. Not enough planning is being done in this regard.
Each border state has interests at stake and will be directly affected by either peaceful separation or a return to con- flict. Despite differing views on unity, all are likely to accept the referendum on self-determination and honour its outcome, provided it goes ahead as planned. While the decision of the South Sudanese is paramount, strategic considerations will undoubtedly play a role in how each state responds if the process is disrupted. Responses will depend largely on circumstances and events, but an as- sessment of historical relationships, recent engagement and strategic interests sheds light on the positions of the key regional actors.
Having hosted and led the regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) peace process that yielded the CPA, Kenya has a particularly strong interest in seeing it implemented successfully. As the economic powerhouse in the region, it stands to benefit from the development of a considerable market and major infra- structure in the South, including as a conduit for oil. Kenya long managed to be pro-South without being anti- North, but diplomatic relations with Khartoum have shown signs of strain as its Southern leanings have become in- creasingly clear.
Uganda, the most unambiguous supporter of independ- ence, seeks a stable buffer on its northern border, not least to ensure that the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) insur- gency does not return to its doorstep. Trade has tripled in recent years with the South, which is now the largest im- porter of Ugandan goods. While the official policy is respect for the CPA and the will of the Southern people, some officials in Kampala are privately encouraging independence.
Egypt prefers unity and has arguably done more than Khartoum to make it attractive. It opposed including self- determination in the CPA talks, preferring instead to pro- mote its own initiative premised on unity. It has recently redoubled diplomatic efforts to prevent partition, in part because it fears a new state – and an unstable one at that – could pose a threat both to regional stability and its pre- cious supply of Nile water.
Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Egypt are among the im- mediate regional states that matter most, as well as Eritrea and Libya. If a credible referendum is held in accordance with the CPA and the Interim National Constitution, and Khartoum endorses the process, recognition of a new Southern state should prove relatively uncomplicated for the region and CPA signatories more broadly. If, how- ever, the process does not go according to plan – particu- larly if Khartoum attempts to manipulate, deny or delay the exercise or its result – regional states and institutions will need to consider how best to respond to ensure re- spect for the CPA and the right of self-determination and to avoid a new conflict. Not enough planning is being done in this regard.
Each border state has interests at stake and will be directly affected by either peaceful separation or a return to con- flict. Despite differing views on unity, all are likely to accept the referendum on self-determination and honour its outcome, provided it goes ahead as planned. While the decision of the South Sudanese is paramount, strategic considerations will undoubtedly play a role in how each state responds if the process is disrupted. Responses will depend largely on circumstances and events, but an as- sessment of historical relationships, recent engagement and strategic interests sheds light on the positions of the key regional actors.
Having hosted and led the regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) peace process that yielded the CPA, Kenya has a particularly strong interest in seeing it implemented successfully. As the economic powerhouse in the region, it stands to benefit from the development of a considerable market and major infra- structure in the South, including as a conduit for oil. Kenya long managed to be pro-South without being anti- North, but diplomatic relations with Khartoum have shown signs of strain as its Southern leanings have become in- creasingly clear.
Uganda, the most unambiguous supporter of independ- ence, seeks a stable buffer on its northern border, not least to ensure that the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) insur- gency does not return to its doorstep. Trade has tripled in recent years with the South, which is now the largest im- porter of Ugandan goods. While the official policy is respect for the CPA and the will of the Southern people, some officials in Kampala are privately encouraging independence.
Egypt prefers unity and has arguably done more than Khartoum to make it attractive. It opposed including self- determination in the CPA talks, preferring instead to pro- mote its own initiative premised on unity. It has recently redoubled diplomatic efforts to prevent partition, in part because it fears a new state – and an unstable one at that – could pose a threat both to regional stability and its pre- cious supply of Nile water.