Governance

The R-ARCSS was designed as an all-encompassing package of measures that would help end the civil war in South Sudan. Yet, in reality it does not efficiently address some of the root causes of the conflict. More than addressing those in a manner that connects both bottom-up and top-down drivers of tension, it focuses on elements of a power-sharing agreement and paves the way for resource sharing arrangements.

This brief examines how and why grievances emerge and how these can be instrumentalized by national and local-level actors to secure access to territory and resources, with significant effect on the political stability and security at the local level. It takes the debate around the number of states as an example of how administrative decisions on sub-state boundaries and the administrative power that derive from those decisions can re-enforced competition over governance and territory. This is best illustrated by increased politization of disputes between the Padang Dink and the Shilluk living on the east bank of the White Nile. The brief ends with a number of takeaways for international actors working to support the peace process in South Sudan.

This paper examines key policy and programmatic considerations for international health and employment
interventions responding to COVID-19 in conflict-affected countries. It outlines a range of important
peacebuilding considerations and highlights significant contributions the World Health Organization (WHO)
and the International Labour Organization (ILO) are making to mitigate the impacts of the pandemic.
By doing so, this paper aims to shed light on the risks and resilience factors that are particularly relevant in
countries recently or currently affected by armed conflict, or where the risk of an outbreak, escalation of, or
relapse into violence is high (for the sake of readability, these situations are hereafter referred to as “conflictaffected”). It suggests how these considerations can best be incorporated into COVID-19 policy responses
and programming, and provides general and practical guidance for how programmes and interventions may
need to be adapted to become optimally effective, do no harm and strengthen prospects for peace. Thus, one
of the main added values of this paper is the link of peace to health.
The paper stems from a partnership among WHO, ILO, Interpeace and the UN Peacebuilding Support
Office (PBSO) of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs.1
This publication targets national
governments/donors, international agencies and civil society engaged in the COVID-19 response specifically
in the areas of health, decent work and employment, and peacebuilding in conflict-affected settings.

On August 25, Transitional Justice Working Group of South Sudan, Human Rights Watch, and Institute for Security Studies held a webinar for the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) members and other officials to discuss the urgency for the establishment of the AU Hybrid Court for South Sudan, as a key factor to ensuring long term stability and accountability for serious crimes in South Sudan.

The initiative came on the heels of a joint letter, signed by 24 South Sudanese, regional and international civil society organizations calling upon the AU PSC to take concrete action to enable the immediate creation of the Hybrid Court on South Sudan (HCSS). In preparation for the webinar, Human Rights Watch published a question and answer document on the three accountability mechanisms provided for in South Sudan’s 2015 and 2018 peace agreements and the rationale for the AU’s unilateral establishment of the hybrid court, available here. On the day of the webinar, the panelists – who represented perspectives from AU officials as well as South Sudanese and international lawyers and activists –presented on accountability mechanisms agreed to by the parties to the conflict and opportunities and challenges to achieving accountability to break the cycles of violence and impunity in South Sudan.

In October 2015, the president of the Republic of South Sudan, Salva Kiir Mayardit, decreed a change in the country’s administrative structure and increased the number of states from 10 to 28.

The entire process had been accompanied by much political speculation and confrontation. What were the reasons for this decision? Was it a good decision for South Sudan? What interests did it serve? Why did it happen at this time? Was dividing South Sudan into 28 states legal and constitutional? What would the consequences be? How would the subdivision into 28 states relate to what had been agreed in the Agreement for the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS) that was signed in August 2015?

The creation of 28 states and the aftermath are only the latest events in a long history of debate and practice on how to divide South Sudan administratively. Recent steps have further invigorated a discussion that has been at times acrimonious, at others exploratory. It is intensely political, as the latest events have shown.

The purpose of this report is not to comment extensively on the latest events, or to recommend what might be the best structure for South Sudan. Rather, its starting point is the persistence of the debate in South Sudanese history. It acknowledges that, regardless of the next developments, there is a need for a structured and informed review of the myriad challenges and opportunities that arise from different administrative structures.

Despite moderate levels of external debt, the combined impact of a civil conflict, a large fall in oil prices, and high levels of fiscal spending has left South Sudan in debt distress. This crisis has caused payment delays on international obligations, on civil servant salaries, and other government obligations. Moreover, international lines of credit have been restructured on longer maturities, international reserves have declined to near exhaustion, and the country is currently constrained from accessing long term external financing. However, assuming implementation of the recently adopted economic adjustment policies and a successful peace process, the debt outlook would improve considerably which could allow for a gradual resumption of external financing. However, vulnerabilities remain high and a
prolonged period of lower oil prices or failure to address the country’s economic and security problems could cause continued debt sustainability problem.

This paper takes a localized conflict over a non-demarcated stretch of the Uganda–South Sudan boundary in 2014 as a starting point for examining the history of territorial state formation on either side of this border since its colonial creation in 1914. It argues that the conflict was an outcome of the long-term constitution of local government territories as patches of the state, making the international border simultaneously a boundary of the local state. Some scholars have seen the limited control of central governments over their borderlands and the intensification of local territorialities as signs of African state fragmentation and failure. But the article argues that this local territoriality should instead be seen as an outcome of ongoing state-formation processes in which state territory has been co-produced through local engagement and appropriation. The paper is thus of wider relevance beyond African or postcolonial history, firstly in contributing a spatial approach to studies of state formation which have sought to replace centre–periphery models with an emphasis on the centrality of the local state. Secondly it advances the broader field of borderlands studies by arguing that international boundaries have been shaped by processes of internal territorialisation as well as by the specific dynamics of cross-border relations and governance. Thirdly it advocates a historical and processual approach to understanding territory, arguing that the patchwork of these states has been fabricated and reworked over the past century, entangling multiple, changing forms and scales of territory in the ongoing constitution of state boundaries.

There are numerous issues that continue to undermine the full realisation of HLP rights for the people of South Sudan and HLP is recognized as a growing key protection concern across the country. The HLP Technical Working Group (HLP TWG) strives to ensure the integration of HLP rights and concerns in humanitarian responses, and to ensure that key affected populations are supported. This note summarizes the key HLP challenges in South Sudan and provides recommendations for various stakeholders to better inform advocacy and programming.

The relationship between what would become South Sudan and China started with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 between the old Sudan and Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). Oil, a major trigger of the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005), continued to fuel the violent conflict, which led to the partition of the largest country on the African continent. Driven by the opening-up policy as an important vehicle of the Chinese reform trajectory, China found itself drawn into the Sudanese conflict. Underpinned by its scramble to invest in the oil industry overseas and to acquire energy to fuel its booming economy, China took part in the conflict by supporting the government of Sudan militarily, economically and politically against the SPLM/A. As soon as the CPA was signed, China started to court the SPLM and newly formed Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) led by the SPLM in Juba. Surprisingly, the leadership of the SPLM overlooked the belligerent past and opted for cooperation with China. Why?

This paper will discuss a handful of issue: the pragmatic approach to cooperation in the light of the opening-up policy of China and its role in the war of liberation of South Sudan; how the realities of The Comprehensive Peace Agreement drove China’s quest to court the SPLM and GoSS during the interim period; how oil became a double-edged sword in the context of African agency; and role of China in the partition of old Sudan and the challenge to the doctrine of non-interference. This paper has mainly utilized data collected during fieldwork research in the form of interviews with so-called elites and the review of official documents.

The implementation of the R-ARCSS is stalled, as the parties have had difficulty gathering sufficient momentum to push the Agreement forward.
The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic has had serious negative impacts on the ability of the parties to implement the Agreement.
The crush of oil prices in the global market, South Sudan’s lack of credit worthiness internationally, US Treasury’s warnings, corruption, and South Sudan’s weak fiscal and monetary policies, all make it difficult for the country to access external resources to cushion budget shortfalls.
While the economic downturn as a result of the pandemic has dried up the public coffers, a combination of distrust among the parties and lack of political will is the most important factor hampering the implementation of the R-ARCSS.
To turn things around, leadership of the parties to the Agreement must renew their commitment to the Agreement and show by actions their willingness to move the country forward, possibly attracting external budgetary supports.
The international community needs to push the parties to live by their commitments and also contribute necessary financial and material resources to enable the parties to overcome the economic consequences of COVID-19. Significant donor reengagement will require evidence of significantly higher political will for peace in South Sudan.
The formation of state government is extremely critical to combating the pandemic and to restoring peace at the grassroots, which will help protect people from the virus and reduce cattle raiding and communal violence. Recent developments toward this issue are commendable.
Provisions aimed at returning to democracy and good governance such as election and constitutional making processes should be expedited and started early so as to build confidence in this transition. The parties to the Agreement blame current deficits in democracy and governance on COVID-19.
Should the parties fail to implement governance protocols fully, the potential for national elections to be conducted will have been thwarted, risking a return to an all-out war.

Focusing on South Sudan’s borderland with Sudan, in Northern Bahr el-Ghazal, it is clear that the national response to the virus, particularly the border shutdown, has rapidly become a new factor in Sudan and South Sudan’s cross-border political economy. The direct impact of COVID-19—like the consequences of Khartoum’s political transition and the establishment of the Transitional Government of National Unity in Juba—are yet to fully materialize in this borderland. This update summarizes the current political holding pattern around both COVID-19 and the political transitions in Khartoum and Juba, and how these interact with established long-distance trade and migrant work systems that drive the borderland economy.

This briefing is a product of the X-Border Local Research Network, a component of DFID’s Cross- Border Conflict—Evidence, Policy and Trends (XCEPT) programme, funded by UKaid from the UK government. The programme carries out research work to better understand the causes and impacts of conflict in border areas and their international dimensions. It supports more effective policymaking and development programming and builds the skills of local partners.